

MY YEARS WITH NEHRU

Kashmir

B. N. MULLIK



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Preface

The encouragement for writing the story of *My Years With Nehru* came from Sri Y.B. Chavan. When I started writing that story it soon became apparent that the matter would be so voluminous as to make its inclusion in one single volume an impossible task. So, I decided to divide the writing subjectwise so as to make each volume comprehensive and yet handy. I also felt that in this form each volume would be more useful to the reader.

This particular volume *Kashmir* was completed by me in 1969. I have written this book almost entirely from my memory. The only documents that I have used are public documents relating to trial and other legal proceedings and publications in other books, newspapers and periodicals. Where I have used material from other books, I have acknowledged them at the proper places.

I held this book up for sometime as I was afraid that I might not have been able to marshal all the material correctly and chronologically and that my memory might have played a trick in dealing with such a long and momentous period when events followed closely on one another's heels. I was, however, fortunate that a former colleague of mine, Sardar Balbir Singh, who had dealt with Kashmir affairs, readily agreed to go through my draft and suggest changes wherever necessary. I was also fortunate that Sri M.L. Nanda, who had handled the Kashmir Conspiracy Case, also agreed to scrutinise the draft and make necessary corrections. I am grateful to them for the trouble they have taken to ensure the accuracy of the details narrated here. I am also grateful to Sri A.K. Sen, MP (former Union Law Minister), for having read the draft and making several important suggestions. Hence, I feel assured that this book will give a correct perspective of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir from 1948 onwards.

vi P R E F A C E

I have naturally interpreted the events as seen, experienced and comprehended by me. This may give an impression that I have given too much importance to myself or to the IB. But this was not the intention. Whatever we did in Kashmir we did as the agents of Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and every step that we took was done on his initiative and advice and with his full approval. If we succeeded in any mission it was only because we had his trust and support. Without that we could not have moved a finger in the difficult and often baffling Kashmir situation.

In this book wherever I have expressed an opinion it is mine and should not in any way be considered as representing the opinion of either Pandit Nehru or any member of his Cabinet or of the present Government. For these opinions the responsibility is entirely mine.

B.N. MULLIK

New Delhi
April 4, 1971

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I First Impressions

MUCH HAD ALREADY happened in Kashmir before September, 1948, when I joined the IB (Intelligence Bureau) as the Deputy Director in charge of Internal Affairs, which included Kashmir. Till then my knowledge of what was going on in those momentous days of 1947-48 in Jammu and Kashmir had been based on open material published in the newspapers. I was aware of the Kashmir Maharaja's initial hesitancy in acceding either to India or to Pakistan, the subsequent invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani raiders, the signing of the instrument of accession in favour of India, the arrival of Indian troops in the valley to avert an imminent disaster and the partial clearance of the raiders from the valley. I was aware of the fact that India had taken the case to the Security Council for securing withdrawal of the raiders and Pakistani nationals from the soil of Jammu and Kashmir. I had read about the visit of the UNCIP team to the sub-continent and Pakistan's admission of having inducted regular troops in the fight and of the abortive talks between Mountbatten and Jinnah and Nehru and Liaquat Ali. But all these events were taking place rather far from Bihar, where I was then a Deputy Inspector-General of Police, handling problems of quite a different type. Hence, I did not have any inside knowledge of what was going on behind the scenes. I had never visited Kashmir and so my ideas about this State derived from books were also vague. I did not know till late August, 1948, that I was soon to be pitch-forked into this medley of fast-moving events and that for the next sixteen years I would be very intimately connected with them. Had I known this, I would probably have come better prepared for the job that was awaiting me; or perhaps it was just as well that I came with a completely fresh mind.

Naturally, the Intelligence Bureau was deeply concerned with all that had happened and was happening in Kashmir and the

work had been ably managed by M.K. Sinha, my predecessor in this office. He had established personal relations with Sheikh Abdullah and other Kashmiri leaders and had done a lot to ensure proper liaison with the interim Government of the State. Unfortunately, Sinha had to leave in a hurry immediately after I arrived and so I did not have the benefit of interspersing my reading of the large mass of documents with personal discussions with him. Realising the importance of Kashmir from the Intelligence point of view, I plunged myself seriously into this mass of notes and records left by my predecessor in order to get a proper understanding of all aspects of the problem facing us. It was necessary for me to read into the minds of Sheikh Abdullah and other prominent National Conference leaders like Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, Mirza Afzal Beg, Ghulam Mohd Sadiq and Maulana Masoodi to follow the political trends closely. But so conflicting were the reports about these main actors in the drama that it was difficult to come to any objective conclusion about where they really stood *vis-a-vis* India. The only thing that seemed to be certain at that time was that the National Conference was working as a team with Sheikh Abdullah, the undisputed leader, towering above the rest, and Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra trailing as the No. 2, holding views at some variance with those of the Sheikh. It was also clear that at least in the valley the National Conference had the support of the vast majority of the Muslim population.

Soon after I joined, the UNCIP's proposals came to be known and these included: firstly, the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Pakistan-occupied territory; secondly, the reduction of the quantum of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir; and thirdly, after stages one and two had been completed, the holding of a plebiscite under an independent administrator to ascertain the wishes of the people on the question of accession to India or Pakistan. India accepted the proposal of the plebiscite provided (1) Pakistan first carried out stage one of the withdrawal; (2) the plebiscite administrator took his office under the Jammu and Kashmir Government; and (3) the Pakistanis were not given the chance to consolidate their hold on the areas which they had illegally occupied.

There has been much criticism in India of the Government of India's decision to take the case to the Security Council and its acceptance of the principle of plebiscite, as these created many difficulties for India during subsequent years. People questioned the necessity of taking the matter to the Security Council when Indian troops were capable of driving the Pakistanis out of Jammu and Kashmir. They also criticised India's acquiescence to a plebiscite when the Maharaja had legally acceded to India. Political and administrative decisions taken at a particular time have to be viewed in the context of those very times and not in the light of the hind-sight gained by subsequent developments; and the decisions taken in 1947-48 cannot be judged afterwards purely in the context of the events as they developed ten or fifteen years later, without going into the background. Hence, it is necessary to recapitulate the events that led to these decisions before passing judgment on them.

The Pakistanis had invaded Jammu and Kashmir territory in the month of October, 1947. Indian troops were landed in Srinagar immediately after the instrument of accession had been signed and they succeeded in driving away the raiders up to Uri in the Kashmir valley. In Jammu sector, they had pushed the raiders back up to Poonch but had not succeeded in making a link between Poonch and Uri, a route which was strongly held by the Pakistanis. But, after the re-capture of Poonch by Indian troops, the Pakistanis had re-occupied the surrounding territories even up to Rajouri and Mendhar and so Poonch remained a small island held by Indian troops surrounded on all sides by hostile Pakistani tribals to a depth of nearly 70 or 80 miles. The Pakistanis had also occupied large areas round about Tithwal and were infiltrating their nationals in the northern areas and had even the Zojila Pass in their control. They were in occupation of the Kargil area but Leh had been saved in the nick of time and was held by a small garrison which had no road-link with the valley. The winter had also set in. It was going to be extremely hard for the then ill-equipped Indian troops, organisationally considerably weakened due to the ravages of the partition, to fight in the wintry conditions of Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, there was the danger

of Pakistan bringing in fresh raiders, more accustomed than the Indians to the terrain and to the weather. There was every prospect of this fighting becoming a long-drawn-out affair and as India was then facing the gigantic problem of rehabilitating several hundred thousand refugees from West and East Pakistan, it was difficult for her to have a war on her hands at the same time. In any case, the operations had to be suspended till next summer. Normally, the Security Council's decision could have been expected within a short period and so India's action in taking the case to the Security Council to get the Pakistani aggression vacated seemed to have been quite unexceptionable. The manner in which the case got bogged down in the Security Council due to the manipulations of the British and the Americans has been ably described by B.L. Sharma in his book *The Kashmir Story* and does not need recounting.

As regards the proposed plebiscite, some held the view that, after the departure of the British, the Maharaja had the right to decide whether his State should accede to India or to Pakistan and as his act of accession to India was quite legal, the question of any further plebiscite to ascertain the people's wishes did not arise. Theoretically, such an argument taken in isolation may appear quite sound. It, however, overlooks the fact that the British view that paramountcy in a State would revert to the ruler had never been accepted by the Congress Party, which had always claimed such paramountcy for the people. If India had accepted the British view then the entire history of India after Independence might have been different, with each ruler exercising his individual judgment as to whether he should accede to India or to Pakistan or even remain independent. But taking the initiative out of the hands of the rulers meant that so far as the Indian portion of the sub-continent was concerned, all the States except Kashmir, which had a majority Muslim population, would automatically accede to India, and this is what actually happened, save in the cases of Junagadh, where the Nawab acceded to Pakistan, and Hyderabad, where the Nizam declared independence. On the other hand, the Muslim League supported the British view and favoured the ruler's prerogative in the matter and could, therefore, contend that

Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was complete as also Hyderabad's declaration of independence. All these three issues, i.e. Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad, had to be considered together and not in isolation. If India could claim Kashmir purely by virtue of the Maharaja signing the instrument of accession, then she would have to concede Pakistan's claim over Junagadh for the same reason and also tolerate Hyderabad as an independent State in its very heartland. Both Junagadh and Hyderabad were more vital from India's security and prosperity than Kashmir and it was obvious that the rulers of these two territories were acting contrary to the wishes of the people, the overwhelming majority of whom were Hindus. The sovereignty of the people was an article of faith with the Congress and it could not deviate from it. But even purely from the tactical point of view, it was only by upholding the sovereignty of the people that India could justify her action of sending troops to these territories in support of the people. The Junagadh and Hyderabad issues had both been taken to the Security Council, which, however, did not take up the complaints seriously as the outcome of the decision of the vast majority of the people of these two territories was never in doubt. The case of Jammu and Kashmir was just the reverse. It had a Hindu ruler and a majority of the Muslim population whose desire to accede to India could not be taken for granted. Even the Maharaja had vacillated for a fairly long time and had signed the instrument of accession only after the Pakistani invasion. Therefore, having taken the stand all through that people's sovereignty was paramount, India could not make an exception in case of Jammu and Kashmir and base her claim on the strength of the accession by the ruler. If at that time India did not agree to the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, the Junagadh case could be re-opened and India's position in Hyderabad also could be questioned. Hence, both from the moral as well as from the tactical point of view, India's decision to accept the plebiscite formula was correct. In any case, a promise had been made by the Government of India in those difficult days of October, 1947 that, after the Pakistani raiders had been driven out and peace restored in the State, steps would be taken to determine the wishes of

the people. There could be no going back on that promise.

Those who criticise India's agreement to the plebiscite do so without realising what the actual position was in the year 1947-48. Nonetheless, as B.L. Sharma's book *The Kashmir Story* would show, whilst accepting the principle of plebiscite, India had made three conditions which, in her view, could create conditions favourable to winning the plebiscite. In this State, the people's movement was more pro-Indian than pro-Pakistani and the leaders of that movement acknowledged their allegiance to Gandhi and Nehru. The Pakistanis were aware of this fact and also knew that they did not have many admirers in the valley after the despicable behaviour of the raiders. So, they purposely defaulted in carrying out their part of the agreement which was a precondition to the holding of the plebiscite.

Shortly after I joined the IB, India's second offensive in Jammu and Kashmir got going, in the course of which Indian troops, though unable to make any headway beyond Uri on the main Srinagar-Muzaffarabad Road, were able to clear the Pakistanis from Tithwal and the area east of Kishan Ganga, to open the route through Zojila right up to Kargil to connect with Ladakh and to clear the vast territory between Nowshera and Poonch of Pakistani raiders and make a final link-up with Poonch. Then there was a pause in the advance as the Indian troops were by then overstretched. Again, winter had set in and it would have been impossible to make any further progress for the next several months. It was in this context that the cease-fire was agreed to from January 1, 1949. This is another action which subsequently came in for much criticism on the ground that India should have cleared the entire territory of Pakistani raiders and troops and not have agreed to a cease-fire. Both regular Pakistani troops and tribals, and not the latter alone, had been engaged in this fight and there was every possibility of the fighting becoming prolonged, a prospect which was not in the interests of either India or Pakistan. Having accepted the three parts of the UNCIP's resolution, it was logical that, rather than continue the futile fighting and consequent loss of life, there should be a cease-fire and the matter should be settled peacefully through the Security Council. It is difficult to say now whether,

if the cease-fire had not been declared and Indian troops had been allowed to resume their offensive in the following summer, they would have been able to go much beyond the points which they had reached in October/November, 1948. Even the Military Commanders in the field, whom the Government had consulted, had agreed that the cease-fire was the best solution at that stage. In fact, there was no criticism of this decision at that time; all the criticisms came up subsequently when the Security Council failed to force Pakistan to withdraw from the occupied territory due to imperialist intrigues.

If a plebiscite had been held in Jammu and Kashmir some time in 1949, there was a good chance that the majority of the people would have voted for India, because the wounds inflicted by the Pakistani raiders on the peaceful people of Kashmir were still fresh in their minds and India was held in much respect as their saviour. The National Conference was also a united body and had complete control in the valley. Pandit Nehru's prestige amongst the Kashmiris was very high. They remembered that he was the one leader who had gone to Kashmir in support of the people's liberation struggle and had courted arrest by the Maharaja. Even the assessment of the British at that time was that there was an even chance for India to pull off the plebiscite.* However, the strongest opposition to the plebiscite came from Sheikh Abdullah himself.

*A special convention of the National Conference, meeting in October, 1948, had unanimously passed a resolution affirming the State's accession to India. The resolution said, "In these circumstances, the convention, therefore, confirms the provisional accession of the State with India. It further pledges its fullest support to a final accession to India on the basis of New Kashmir, the realisation and implementation of which will be our first and foremost task. The convention strongly hopes that the Indian Government and the people of India will lend the people of Kashmir all material, moral and political support in completing this task and achieving our goal of economic and political freedom."

On this occasion, Sheikh Abdullah, while moving the resolution, said, "So far as I am concerned, I feel certain that the political, economic, social and cultural interests of Kashmir demand an immediate and final accession to India, and India alone."

Hence, there was every reason at this time to hold that the plebiscite if freely held, would be overwhelmingly in India's favour.

His contention was that he alone represented Kashmir and whatever he decided was good enough for the Kashmiris and it was not necessary to have a plebiscite to find out what the people wanted. As he had opted for India, that was enough for his people. It hurt his vanity that an outsider should come as the Plebiscite Administrator to the State to find out their views. So the Indian Government was on the horns of a dilemma. It had accepted the UNCIP's resolution about a plebiscite and could not go back on it. On the other hand, its greatest supporter in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, resolutely set his face against a plebiscite.

As I have said earlier it was very difficult to judge from the reports received what was going on in the minds of the Kashmiri leaders. Even the reports from people visiting Kashmir were conflicting and were generally biased either in favour of or against Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference and were therefore misleading. The enmity of Sheikh Abdullah towards the Maharaja of Kashmir was well known and this permeated all his thoughts, utterances and actions. His antipathy to the Maharaja made him allergic to the Dogras as a community and the latter on their part were generally deeply suspicious of him. He always harped on the fact that there had been some massacre of Muslims in Jammu and, as a result, large number of Muslims had fled from Jammu into Pakistan. But he hardly ever mentioned the atrocities that had been committed on the non-Muslims in the areas overrun by the Pakistanis, and did not consider himself in any way responsible for the non-Muslim refugees, who had to flee from their homes and were living in utter distress in the Jammu area. It was this persistent and vehement accusation by the Sheikh against the Dogras, including the Maharaja, which caused deep-seated suspicion about his basic communalism in the minds of many people in India who further suspected that his professed friendship for the Prime Minister and India was only a poser for strengthening his own position in Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmiri Pandits, who had wielded much influence during the Maharaja's time, quite disproportionate to their numbers, were also apprehensive that in a rule by the majority their position would be weakened. Thus reports coming from Jammu and Kashmir were coloured, and it was difficult to

get an impartial view. There were stories of differences even between Sardar Patel and Pandit Nehru over their estimation of Sheikh Abdullah as a man and of his motives, but I was then in no position to know their respective views on this matter.

Gopalaswami Iyengar was at this time the Minister in charge of State Affairs, including Kashmir. His knowledge of Kashmir was vast and he had represented India's case in the Security Council. It was a pleasure to discuss with him various issues which cropped up from time to time. In January, 1949, we received a disquieting report from our contacts in Srinagar about an interview which the Sheikh had given to two foreign correspondents, Davidson and Ward Price, in which he had visualised the possibility of an independent Kashmir. Later, Karanjia of the *Blitz* also gave some indication of the Sheikh's thinking on these lines. This Srinagar report was passed on by us to the Government. The Prime Minister or Gopalaswami Iyengar might have enquired from the Sheikh about the actual facts of the interview and we subsequently learnt that the Sheikh had come to know about our report. He promptly demanded the withdrawal of our officer from Kashmir and threatened that, if this was not done, he would be put under detention. When we were asked to withdraw this officer, we protested and I met Gopalaswami Iyengar in that connection. Our argument was that an officer should be judged on the basis of his reports and in this particular case the officer had reported correctly. He was there for this very purpose and if he failed to report about the Sheikh's activities, which might go against India's interests, then there was no purpose in posting him there; and if the various States demanded the recall of the IB officers who did not cater intelligence suited to the State Governments, then it would be impossible for the IB to function at all and the Centre would not get any independent intelligence about what was going on in the various parts of the country. Gopalaswami Iyengar agreed in principle with my arguments, but said that Kashmir was a delicate case and we should realise that without Sheikh Abdullah's support it would be difficult for us to stay and work in Kashmir. So, the Government of India, he felt, had to give in on small matters so long as the Sheikh stood by accession

to India. He suggested that this particular officer, to whom the Sheikh had apparently taken a dislike, should be withdrawn and we should send in his place a more senior officer who would be able not only to meet the Sheikh and other Kashmiri leaders officially but also socially. We should also take this opportunity to strengthen our organisation in Kashmir. It was unlikely that the Sheikh, having once gained his point by getting a central officer withdrawn, would raise such a demand again, and it was also likely that the new officer, instead of being handicapped in his work by the Sheikh's hostility, might find himself in a much stronger position. If any fresh demand for a change came, it could then be dealt with on its merits. We did not agree with these arguments but there was no other alternative for us and so this officer had to be withdrawn and a more senior and competent officer was sent there as the Assistant Director (AD).

When the new officer had been at Jammu for a few days, the Sheikh objected to his posting without his prior clearance. Gopaldaswami Iyengar asked us to withdraw this officer immediately. Thereafter, he met him and sent him back to Kashmir after a month. By this move Gopaldaswami indicated to the Sheikh that, as he himself had approved of this appointment, there was no reason for the latter to feel aggrieved. There the matter ended for the time being. Gopaldaswami Iyengar's expectations, however, came true and the new AD succeeded in establishing himself firmly in Jammu and Kashmir and proved to be a most useful and efficient Intelligence Officer maintaining good relations with all concerned and yet reporting correctly and fearlessly. He stayed in the post for full ten years overcoming many difficulties which came in his way.

The Sheikh went on pressing his demand that the Maharaja must either abdicate or face an enquiry on the charge of conniving at the massacre of Muslims in Jammu and other places. This charge was false and it was clear that the Sheikh was only trying to pursue his old grudge against the Maharaja. It was a difficult choice for the Government of India. To ask for the abdication of the Maharaja through whose instrument of accession India had a place in Kashmir seemed ironical and might even weaken India's

case in the Security Council. But, not to do so would be to antagonise Sheikh Abdullah who was certainly the acknowledged leader of the Kashmiri people and who had the entire National Conference behind him at that time. So, a compromise was arrived at, again through the genius of Gopaldaswami Iyengar, and instead of abdicating, the Maharaja left Kashmir in the month of May, 1949, for good and his son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, took over the formal functions of the ruler as an agent of the Maharaja.

A month later we were informed that G.M. Ashai, who was the Registrar of the Kashmir University, had, after a tour of India, reported to the Sheikh in June, 1949, that the Muslims in India were being treated as second-class citizens and that they had no future in this country. This was a false and mischievous report, but unfortunately the Sheikh lent full credence to it, and thereafter this suspicion prejudiced all his thinking. He often referred to the alleged suppression of the Muslims in India to support his argument that the Kashmiri Muslims would also not get proper treatment in this country unless special safeguards were provided for them.

I have mentioned earlier that the UNCIP had recommended, and the Government of India had accepted, that a plebiscite should be held in Kashmir to determine the people's wishes. Admiral Nimitz had been nominated as the Plebiscite Administrator by the Security Council; but Nimitz never arrived, because Sheikh Abdullah violently opposed any plebiscite on the ground that he was the representative spokesman for Kashmir and no poll was necessary. To counter the proposal for a plebiscite, Sheikh Abdullah, on the advice of Gopaldaswami Iyengar, planned to call a Constituent Assembly which would give the Kashmiris a chance to express their opinion. India, of course, was quite right in not allowing the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted, because Pakistan had not implemented the first condition that had to be fulfilled, e.g. withdrawal of her troops from the occupied territory. So, legally India had a strong case in not proceeding with the plebiscite.

Reports continually kept on coming to Delhi, some to the IB, others direct to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, about hostile utterances by Sheikh Abdullah in private talks and the situation continued to be extremely confusing. Several persons

were sent by the Prime Minister and the Home Minister separately to get an independent assessment of the situation in Kashmir, but their reports were generally subjective. Those sent by the Prime Minister generally reported in favour of the Sheikh and those sent by the Home Minister reported adversely. In addition to these, large numbers of Kashmiri Pandits and Jammu Dogras, who had access both to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, gave their own views, which were generally hostile to Sheikh Abdullah. There were well-founded complaints from the Hindu and Sikh refugees that they were being ill-treated, and, though two years had passed, no arrangement had been made for their rehabilitation and they were leading a miserable existence. Both the Home Minister and the Prime Minister were anxious that an independent assessment of the actual position in Kashmir should be made. I was asked to make this study and submit a report.

I went to Kashmir towards the end of August, 1949, and stayed there for nearly ten days. This was my first visit to the valley. I met Sheikh Abdullah on three or four occasions and also some of the other leaders like Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, G.M. Sadiq, Shamlal Saraf and D.P. Dhar. I met a large number of other Hindus and Muslims, both officials and non-officials. I met Maj.-Gen. Thimayya and visited several military posts in the Uri sector. I visited a number of places all over the valley. Our AD's assessment and advice were also available to me. On two occasions Sheikh Abdullah invited me and my wife to meals at his place where I met the Begum and her daughters and also many other invitees. We talked extensively on each occasion we met and I must admit that Sheikh Abdullah created a very favourable impression on my mind during this visit.

I felt that Sheikh Abdullah's agreement to the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was not made in a huff and was not forced by events; there was a much deeper ideological unity with India and the Indian leaders than most people realized. His regard for Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was deep and genuine. This ideological unity was based on the fact that both Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had always supported the States people's struggle against the Indian princes

as also Sheikh Abdullah's struggle against the Maharaja of Kashmir. The Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru had always stood for the oppressed people of the States against their rulers in the same way as Sheikh Abdullah had championed the cause of the people of the Kashmir valley against the Dogra ruler. The Indian leaders considered the rulers to be a creation of the British and propped up by them to serve their own imperialistic ends, and this was exactly the view which Sheikh Abdullah held of the Kashmir ruler. Incensed by the oppressions of the ruler, Pandit Nehru had rushed to the valley in support of the people and had courted imprisonment by the Maharaja. Thus, strong bonds of unity had been forged between the Kashmiri people and the Indian people, who were both fighting for their liberation. On the other hand, Jinnah wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan simply because the valley had a majority of Muslims. Unlike the Congress leaders, he had not suffered either for India's emancipation or for the achievement of Pakistan, and his gain was a by-product of the Indian struggle for independence. Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, had genuine feelings of friendship for Pandit Nehru and identity of views with him; whereas towards M.A. Jinnah he entertained only feelings of fear, distrust and repugnance. Hence, the accession to India was not a fortuitous decision brought about by the fear caused by the unprovoked invasion of the territory by Pakistani raiders, but was based on ideological grounds; and so when India was partitioned and Kashmir had to choose between India and Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah, would have chosen India, while insisting on a special status for the valley.*

*Speaking at an Id gathering in Srinagar after the Convention of the National Conference, referred to earlier, Sheikh Abdullah had said: "The decision taken (i.e. confirming the accession to India) was the logical outcome of a year of hardships and sufferings perpetuated on an innocent and peaceful people by Pakistani troops. The pledge, I gave to Pandit Nehru last year, that Kashmir will be a part of India has now become an eternal bond ... It was after fully knowing India's attitude that the decision for permanent accession was taken—a decision which would affect the destiny of the entire population of the State for generations to come. Our decision to accede to India is based on the fact that our programme and policy are akin to those followed by India."

I talked about Kashmir-India relations with other leaders, particularly with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. and D.P. Dhar. They had at that time no suspicion that the Sheikh's feelings for India were not genuine and their own views in favour of India were equally strong though not based on such strong ideological grounds; they were more pragmatic and realised that Kashmir's welfare depended on its unity with India and apprehended that Kashmir would be swamped by the tribals and would lose its identity if it acceded to Pakistan. The Yuvraj, with whom I held extensive talks, had then no suspicions against Sheikh Abdullah, even though he was unhappy over the treatment that had been meted out to his father. This was the general view which was held by practically all sections of the people whom I met, official and non-official, leaders and common people, Hindus and Muslims. The number of people at that time who were not reconciled to the accession of Kashmir to India was small. During my visits to Baramullah and Uri, which had suffered badly during the Pakistani invasion, I found that local feelings at these places were even stronger against Pakistan than in Srinagar.

On my return to Delhi, I prepared my report on the above lines and sent it to the Director, who passed it on to the Home Secretary, H.V.R. Iengar. As both the Prime Minister and the Home Minister had desired an impartial assessment to be made of the political situation as existed in Kashmir at that time, and as Kashmir was being dealt with by Pandit Nehru himself, the Home Secretary passed on copies of the report to both of them. I was not aware of this nor of the fact that the Prime Minister had considered the report to be an impartial assessment of the situation in Kashmir, and had forwarded copies thereof to all the Indian embassies abroad and also to the Indian Representative at the UN to give them a proper perspective about Kashmir.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was unhappy. This report of mine apparently went against the views which he had held about Kashmir in general and Sheikh Abdullah in particular. He suspected that the Sheikh was not genuine and was misleading Pandit Nehru and was not happy that the report should have been given such wide circulation. A few days after I had sent the report, the Home

Secretary informed me that the Sardar did not agree with my assessment and had taken exception to the fact that I had submitted this report without first consulting him. He also told me that the Prime Minister had sent copies of this report to all our embassies abroad endorsing the views expressed therein. I was naturally upset over this development and feared that it might not be possible for me to stay in the IB much longer in the face of the Sardar's anger. However, I was convinced in my own mind that I had made an honest attempt to arrive at a correct assessment.

I got a summons to see the Sardar the next day. He was not well and was seated on his bed. He looked at me quietly for some time. Then he asked me whether I had written the report, a copy of which was in his hands. I replied in the affirmative. He asked me why I had sent a copy of this to Jawaharlal without consulting him. I replied that I had submitted the report to the Director. Sardar Patel then enquired whether I knew that Jawaharlal had sent copies of this report to all our embassies abroad and what was my reaction to this. I said that I had heard about the circulation only the previous day from the Home Secretary and I was naturally happy to hear that the Prime Minister thought so well of my report that he had thought fit to circulate it to our Ambassadors abroad. The Sardar then said that he did not agree with my assessment of the situation in Kashmir in general and of Sheikh Abdullah in particular. I said that I had acquired a fair background of the situation in Kashmir from the records which I had studied and the large number of people, Kashmiris and others, I had met during the year I had been in the IB. With this background, I had gone to the Kashmir valley with a fairly open mind. I had visited many places, met large number of people, including most of the leaders, and the views that I had ultimately put down in my report were those which I had formed after mature thought. I was not aware that he the (Sardar) held different views. But, even if I had been, I would have felt that it was my duty to place before him my own independent assessment and not tailor the intelligence to please him, nor would I have done so to please the Prime Minister either. I mentioned to him several instances when the Prime Minister had taken

exception to some of our reports, because they were contrary to his views; but this had not deterred us from reporting the facts as we saw them. I felt I would be failing in my duty if I had acted otherwise.

The Sardar then gave me his own views about Sheikh Abdullah. He apprehended that Sheikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India and Jawaharlal Nehru and would come out in his real colours; his antipathy to the Maharaja was not really an antipathy to a ruler as such, but to the Dogras in general and with the Dogras he identified the rest of the majority community in India. In his slow voice, he firmly told me that my assessment of Sheikh Abdullah was wrong, though my assessment of public opinion in Kashmir valley about accession was probably correct. After having pointed out what he considered to be my error in judgment, he was, however, good enough to say that he agreed with my views that I should submit only independent assessments to the Government and not tailor them to suit the known or anticipated views of particular leaders. He said that I would soon discover my error but, at the same time, he complimented me on the way the report had been written and the pains I had taken over it. This was the greatness of the Sardar. Whilst disagreeing with my views, he recognised my right to express them. There our interview ended. I was not relieved of my job and continued in the IB and was soon afterwards promoted as the Director by the Sardar over the heads of nearly thirty of my seniors in the cadre.

That day I came back to my office wondering whether I had really made a mistake in my assessment of Kashmir and whether what the Sardar had said was not right after all. Events, as they turned out subsequently, proved that the Sardar was right and I was not. Within three years we found ourselves fighting against Sheikh Abdullah. Sardar Patel was dead by then. Yet, I feel that possibly events might have turned out differently and the subsequent pain, turmoil, and embarrassments could have been avoided if the special difficulties of Kashmir had been understood by all concerned and they had guided their talks and modified their actions on the basis of this understanding. Probably, things would not have come to this pass at all if the Sardar

was still living, because Sheikh Abdullah had a very wholesome respect and fear for him. And, if Sri Rajagopalachari had continued as the Home Minister, his genius would have found a solution which, whilst satisfying the Sheikh, would yet have kept Kashmir firmly within India. However, events rolled on inexorably, and the future, as it unfolded itself, belied many of our cherished hopes and ideas and brought us face to face with stark realities and forced us to take many unpleasant steps

2 Disillusionment

KASHMIR REMAINED a matter of close study by the IB and with the help of the contacts that I had established during my visit there in 1949 and with the improved intelligence coverage organised by the Assistant Director, we were kept well informed of all developments concerning the politics and the security of this State. When I became the Director in July, 1950, the Prime Minister instructed me to pay personal attention to Kashmir. So, "Kashmir Affairs" was taken up as the DIB's (Director, Intelligence Bureau) personal charge. I went to Kashmir valley every year and in some years more than once and also visited Jammu and Ladakh and, after every visit, personally reported to the Prime Minister my appreciation of the developments that were taking place. He would send for me frequently and pass on for verification or cross-check any information which he had received from other sources. He had many important sources of information and generally was better informed than we about the main political trends. Two of his main sources of information were the Yuvraj as he was then (he became the Sadar-e-Riyasat later) and D. P. Dhar. He used to get information also from Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. My personal relations with the Kashmir leaders, though good, were still formal and I had yet to gain their full confidence.

By the middle of 1949 the first breach in the Kashmir National Conference had taken place. Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra was an efficient organiser and had been the underground Dictator of the Quit Kashmir Movement against the Maharaja before Independence. He was the only person in the National Conference who could measure up to Sheikh Abdullah, and so was *persona non grata* with the latter who was both jealous and apprehensive of Karra's influence lest his own position be subverted. So, Karra was not given a place in the first Cabinet which the Sheikh

formed under the Maharaja. In anger Karra left the National Conference, and a few years later, at the instigation of Pakistan, formed the Kashmir Political Conference, which stood for outright accession to Pakistan. At this time it was not possible for Pakistan to commit any further acts of aggression as the Indian Army was in a position of some strength in the State and the UN observers were maintaining an effective watch on the frontiers. So, Pakistan switched on to internal subversion and sabotage and developed contacts with various anti-Indian groups and individuals and financed several mushroom subversive organisations, Karra's Political Conference being one of them. Another important person with whom the Pakistanis developed contacts was Pir Maqbool Gilani, who was to figure prominently later in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case. However, we managed to penetrate several of their communication channels and secured control over some of their contacts and so we were often forewarned about covert developments which enabled us to take the necessary counter-measures. We discovered the arrival of the first consignment of arms and explosives from Pakistan for distribution amongst the pro-Pakistani elements and captured it before any mischief could be done. The slow infiltration back of Kashmiri and Jammu Muslims, who had fled to Pakistan at the time of the partition, had also started and our information was that many of them were being deliberately sent back after being trained in subversion and propaganda. At that time the Kashmir Government showed no anxiety about this process of infiltration and did not take any steps to stop it on the plausible ground that all refugees from the State had the right to come back and should be allowed to do so. Pandit Nehru, when he heard about the various attempts at subversion by Pakistan, urged us to improve our coverage further and this made us open more frontier intelligence posts not only to counter Pakistani schemes of infiltration and subversion but also to collect intelligence from across the cease-fire line. We had to do this very cautiously because the Government of Sheikh Abdullah, while tolerating us, was still very suspicious of our activities and put obstructions in our work in many ways. So, we worked under the cover

of the Army and only thus could we operate in the frontiers.

Early in 1950 the Kashmir Government introduced land reforms, under which land was distributed to the tiller restricting the maximum holding to about 180 kanals and the land holders (mostly Hindus) were deprived of their titles. But, no permanent provision was made for the settlement of the Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan-occupied territory, though they were living in utter misery. They were given only temporary leases of evacuee property, and so their future remained uncertain in contrast to what was being done in India to permanently rehabilitate the refugees from Punjab and N.W.F. Province. This discrimination against the refugees from Occupied Kashmir was sought to be justified on the plea that the land which had belonged to the evacuee Muslims could not be treated as evacuee property, because, according to the terms of the UN resolution, these persons were entitled to come back and get resettled in their former possessions. A few refugees from Poonch and Rauri had actually come back from Pakistan and they had been immediately given back the land dispossessing the refugees who had in the meantime cultivated it. But, there was no prospect of the return of the refugees *en masse* as many of the male adult evacuees had enrolled themselves in the regular Pakistan Army and in the Azad Kashmir forces and had also found other employment. But this provision, while creating serious uncertainty amongst the Sikh and Hindu refugees in Jammu, was a standing invitation to persons who had gone away to Pakistan to come back at their sweet will and claim their land. And Pakistan took advantage of this to send back trained saboteurs and propagandists, whose numbers went on swelling as the years passed. The Land Reforms Act was the first important piece of legislation which was enacted by the Kashmir Government without any prior reference to the Government of India and was a source of much concern and embarrassment to the latter. Of course, on grounds of principle, one could not take exception to this legislation, because in India also land reforms, which gave the tiller the title depriving the zamindar of his rights, were under way. But the sting was in the fact that this

legislation was hurried through without consulting the Centre.

The next step was to call the Constituent Assembly. It would have been beneath Sheikh Abdullah's dignity to accept any plebiscite administrator from outside for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of his people, and yet there was the undertaking given to the people of Kashmir by the Government of India at the time of the accession that, after peace had been restored, steps would be taken to ascertain their wishes. The idea of calling a Constituent Assembly was originally Gopalaswami Iyengar's; but the Sheikh turned it to his advantage and pursued it relentlessly. This was a logical step because the Security Council had failed to secure the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Occupied Kashmir and create conditions favourable for a plebiscite.

In justifying the calling of the Constituent Assembly, the National Conference (NC) was of the view that the conditions of drift and uncertainty should end and desired that a democratic forum should be established which would ascertain the wishes of the people on issues relating to their future. The NC held that accession to India was perfectly valid—legally, morally and politically—and the people of the State could no longer be denied the opportunity of social progress that was afforded to them by virtue of their being a part and parcel of the Indian Union. Accordingly, the General Council of the NC, meeting in October, 1950, under the presidentship of Sheikh Abdullah, issued a mandate to the party for the convening of the Constituent Assembly which would take decisions on all vital issues concerning the future of the State and its affiliations.*

*The resolution stated: "The indecision and unrealistic procedure adopted so far (by the Security Council) has condemned the people of the State to a life of agonising uncertainty. The All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference is gravely concerned and cannot any longer afford to ignore the perpetuation of these conditions of doubt and frustration. In the opinion of the General Council, therefore, time has come when the initiative must be regained by the people to put an end to this indeterminate state of drift and indecision... The General Council recommends to the Supreme Executive of the people to take immediate steps for convening a Constituent Assembly based upon adult suffrage and embracing all sections of the people and all the constituent units of the State for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir..."

On April 4, 1951, the Yuvraj issued a Proclamation directing that a Constituent Assembly shall be constituted forthwith for the purpose of framing a constitution for the State. There was a flutter in the Security Council which suspected that this was an attempt to by-pass it and so the Government of India had to give an assurance that this would not in any way interfere with the commitments made by it and the Constituent Assembly would settle only internal matters leaving international issues unaffected. Sheikh Abdullah, however, had other ideas and intended to use the Constituent Assembly to settle all issues, internal or international, according to his own line of thinking. So, when an Anglo-us draft resolution meant for the Security Council appeared in the press disapproving of the calling of the Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah reacted strongly and issued a long statement asserting the right of the people to decide their future through such an Assembly.*

Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in September, 1951, and seventy-five members were returned. The election manifesto issued by the National Conference, which secured an overwhelming majority in the elections, was drawn on the mandate that the Constituent Assembly would ratify the State's accession to India. Nomination papers of most of those who could form an opposition were rejected—a pattern which was followed in several subsequent elections. So, practically all the constituencies returned candidates uncontested. Even otherwise the results would not have been different so far as the valley was concerned, because the National Conference was very strong

*Sheikh Abdullah said: "The attitude which the draft resolution reveals towards the Constituent Assembly comes as a painful reminder of all the dilatory means which have so far delayed the subjecting of Pakistan to the penalties of an aggressor, who had invaded our country. On the other hand, the attitude of the promoters of this resolution towards the Constituent Assembly appears as an attempt to stay the democratic development of a people who wish to build the framework of their government in a democratic way. Our development as a democratic people demands the convening of the Constituent Assembly. It is the highest organ reflecting the peoples' will. We cannot wait indefinitely and hold up our march forward..."

and the Sheikh's prestige stood very high. But, some more opposition members might have got in from the Hindu-majority areas of Jammu who would be strongly pro-India. The result of this election satisfied the Sheikh's vanity, as he used to declare openly that *he* was Kashmir and anybody who was opposed to his views did not have any place in the valley. So, to him the existence of an opposition party in the Constituent Assembly was unthinkable.

In the Constituent Assembly, on the crucial issue, i.e. the State's accession to India, Sheikh Abdullah, after discussing the various alternatives, rejected the possibility of the State's accession to Pakistan or its independent status and strongly advocated that Kashmir's interest lay in its unity with India. He said that the Indian Constitution had set before the country the goal of secular democracy based on justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction, ideals for which the Kashmiri people had been struggling so long and so the Kashmiri Muslims' interests would be safe in India. Almost the very first step the Assembly took was to abolish the rule of the Maharaja and replace him with a Sadar-e-Riyasat to be elected by the Kashmir Legislative Assembly. Yuvraj Karan Singh was elected the first Sadar-e-Riyasat (Governor) and took office on November 17, 1952. The Assembly also approved of a separate flag for the State to be flown on all normal occasions and restricted the use of the Indian National Flag to formal functions. The Constituent Assembly then appointed a Basic Principles Committee with Afzal Beg as the Chairman, and Mir Qasim, Dogra, Dhar and Harbans Singh Azad as its members. This Committee carried on prolonged discussions, and in March, 1953, produced the final draft which caused a serious rift in the leadership of the National Conference. Moreover, with the disappearance from the party of Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra, the recognised number two in the organisation, a good deal of in-fighting had started amongst the claimants for that position. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd was the chief contender, but for a time Sadiq, Afzal Beg and Dogra joined hands and he was isolated. However, he made up with Sheikh Abdullah later and ultimately gained the second position.

Discussions in the Constituent Assembly showed some ominous trends. Whereas Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, Sadiq, D. P. Dhar, Dogra, etc. tried their best to bring about a fair amount of integration with India, the group headed by Sheikh Abdullah, whilst accepting the State's accession to India as valid, wanted to keep Kashmir as autonomous as possible with only a tenuous bond through accession on defence, communications and foreign affairs.

After the UNCIP's departure in 1948, the Australian Judge, Sir Owen Dixon, came on the scene as the UN Representative. His final recommendation was that an overall plebiscite for the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, including the parts occupied by Pakistan, was no longer possible. According to him, Jammu and the contiguous Hindu-majority areas could merge into India and the Pak-occupied Kashmir along with the contiguous Muslim-majority areas like Poonch, Rajauri, Mendhar, etc. could merge into Pakistan. A plebiscite could be held in the Kashmir valley alone under the auspices of the UN to determine its future. We had reported at that time that Sir Owen Dixon was greatly influenced by another Australian, Dr. Edmunds, the Principal of the C.M.S. Mission School and a close confidant of Sheikh Abdullah and it was suspected that these proposals had the latter's tacit approval.*

It was therefore more than a coincidence that throughout 1951 and 1952 certain ominous developments started taking shape, with the Sheikh turning increasingly autocratic in his ways and intolerant of any advice from the Government of India. Of course, his personal relations with Pandit Nehru remained as cordial as before, but his utterances against India displayed a more critical tone. In April, 1952, Gopalaswami Iyengar wanted to bring about a measure of integration between Kashmir and India on financial matters by extending the jurisdiction of the Comptroller and Auditor General to the State. The Sheikh strongly resented this move and accused the Government of

*This finds support in the fact that even as late as 1968 Sheikh Abdullah approvingly referred to these proposals though they were dead and buried long ago.

India of wanting him to sign a promissory note in their favour. Piqued by this attempt by the Government of India at financial integration, Sheikh Abdullah made a highly provocative speech* at Ranbirsinghpura the same month, which was duly reported by us to the Prime Minister, who mildly rebuked him for this. Sheikh Abdullah, of course, promptly denied the more objectionable portions, but there is no doubt that he was trying to assert his independence.

As the Constituent Assembly had to fix certain basic principles, it was necessary that there should be an agreement about them with India at least so far as they related to this country. A draft Delhi Agreement was prepared the same year to bring about certain constitutional ties with India. Though Bakshi and Sadiq fully agreed to this, the Sheikh had mental reservations and at first refused to come to Delhi to sign the Agreement. However, he could not carry the majority of the Constituent Assembly with him on this issue and was ultimately persuaded to agree to the draft. Bakshi, Beg, Dogra and Dhar accompanied the Sheikh to Delhi on the occasion of the signing of the Agreement.**

We kept the Prime Minister regularly informed of all the developments, both favourable and adverse, that were taking place in Kashmir and also of the detailed proceedings of the Constituent Assembly as well as the discussions which were going

*Sheikh Abdullah said: "Kashmir's accession to India will have to be of a restricted nature" and described arguments in favour of the full application of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir as "unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy". In another speech, two weeks later, he said: "It would be better to die than submit to the taunt that India was our bread-giver. Kashmir is not eager for India's aid".

**Sheikh Abdullah commended this Agreement to the Constituent Assembly in the following terms: "A satisfactory position has emerged and we are now able to assess the basic issues of our constitutional relationship with India in clearer terms. There has been a good deal of accommodation of our respective points of view. Both have been impelled by the desire to strengthen further the existing relationship and to remove all obscurity and vagueness. We are convinced, as ever before, that we have the full support of the Government and the people of India in the fulfilment of our democratic ideals and the realisation of our objectives".

on in the Basic Principles Committee. The Prime Minister never doubted the authenticity of our reports because we always tried to present an impartial picture. In his mild and friendly way he pointed out to the Sheikh either directly or through Bakshi and others whenever any particular trend was likely to go against the interests of India or Jammu and Kashmir itself. There was an attempt at this time also to ignore the Ladakhi people and deny Kushak Bakula his rightful place in the political set-up. The Sadar-e-Riyasat, who had visited Leh in 1952, had reported to the Prime Minister the deep-seated disappointment which existed in the minds of the Ladakhi people, because they were being totally ignored by the Kashmir Government.

Sheikh Abdullah, of course, suspected that all these reports were going to the Prime Minister from the IB, and this time, instead of asking for the withdrawal of the Assistant Director, which demand, he rightly apprehended, might be resisted, he asked for the transfer of two of his immediate subordinates, hoping that thereby he would be able to restrain their boss sufficiently. This demand was actually made through Bakshi who had even threatened that unless these officers were removed they would find themselves in fetters. I had a long discussion with the Prime Minister about this and he agreed that our officers were not at fault and that the Sheikh was behaving in an unreasonable way. But, his point was that we were in Kashmir because of the Sheikh, and if the latter resiled, India's position would be difficult. The situation being so delicate, it might be necessary to yield on small matters so as not to affect the bigger issues. So he advised me to go to Srinagar, talk to the Kashmiri leaders and settle the issue across the table. He hoped that I would be able to win my point, but told me that I should be prepared to withdraw the two officers, in case the Sheikh was adamant. Accordingly, in October, 1952, I arrived at Srinagar and, after ascertaining the full facts from our officers, met the Sheikh, Bakshi and D. P. Dhar, the three persons who were mostly concerned in this matter. I impressed upon Bakshi and Dhar, who came to see me in the Nedou's Hotel, that the charges made against the two officers were quite unjustified and based on a misunderstanding of their

functions. My point was that as Kashmir was friendly to India, nothing that Kashmir was doing could be unfriendly to India's interests. Whatever was happening internally in Kashmir was happening with the consent of the Government of India. Hence, the occasion for any adverse report against the Kashmir Government did not arise. I mentioned the numerous occasions when we had contradicted adverse reports sent by interested parties to the Prime Minister. On the other hand, these officers were engaged in work of vital importance to Kashmir's security against subversion by foreign agents and had succeeded in unravelling several attempts at conspiracy initiated by Pakistan; hence, they deserved not condemnation but congratulations from the Kashmir Government. I also stressed that the Government of India had once withdrawn an officer on demand by Sheikh Abdullah, but this process could not be repeated every time a demand was made. We would look into any specific charge, but it would be unfortunate if officers, who were doing a life-and-death job in the frontier areas, where no Kashmir Government officers dared operate, were to be insulted and humiliated by hurling at them unfounded allegations. Bakshi and Dhar were apparently convinced by my arguments. Later that night, Dhar came and saw me again to assure me that the Kashmir Government would not press for the withdrawal of these officers and they could continue in their posts. He also gave me an objective review of the political situation. Dhar helped to clear the misunderstanding as he did on numerous occasions later. The next day at a defence meeting, which I attended, Bakshi said that there had been certain misunderstandings and he had no complaint against the IB officers. We learnt that the previous night he had met the Sheikh and had convinced the latter of the untenability of the charges against these central officers. When I returned to Delhi I reported this to the Prime Minister. He was happy that I had been able to avert another rift between the Governments of India and Kashmir.

During this trip to Kashmir, I also went to Ladakh and my enquiries there confirmed what the Sadar-e-Riyasat had already stated about the deep-seated resentment prevailing amongst the

Buddhist population in Ladakh against the shabby treatment which they were receiving at the hands of the Government. The Sadar-e-Riyasat's report on Ladakh, probably reinforced by mine, led the Government of India to take more active and direct interest in the economic development of Ladakh and several central officers were posted for better administration and speedier development. This visit to Ladakh was also utilised by me for strengthening our intelligence work not only in Leh but extending it up to the frontiers of Tibet and also for organising patrol parties right up to our frontiers with Tibet and Sinkiang through those uninhabited parts in North and North-East Ladakh which had till then not received any attention from the Kashmir Government.

While the Prime Minister remained alert all the time about various developments in Kashmir, his personal relationship with the Sheikh and his family remained very cordial. He continued to entertain the hope that the Sheikh would not only remain with India but would take an active part in the political, economic and social development of this country. In fact, in many circles it was even believed that the Sheikh was the right person to succeed Pandit Nehru or become his deputy in his lifetime. At this time I received some information which tended to show that the British had connived at and assisted the so-called "liberation movement" in Kashmir in the early thirties which Sheikh Abdullah had spearheaded against the Maharaja because of their extreme dislike of the latter as he refused to be subservient to them. This link was both direct and through some leaders of the Ahmediya community of Punjab with whom the Sheikh used to be in close contact. The British had also tried to use this channel to bring about a cleavage between the Hindus and the Muslims of Kashmir. As is well known, the Sheikh had started his political life as a Muslim Conference worker and it was only at a subsequent stage, probably due to the influence exercised on him by Gopalswamy Iyengar, the then Prime Minister of the State, and also persons like Bakshi and Sadiq, that he converted his organisation into the National Conference in 1938. His own proclivities, however, remained communal. I mentioned this to Pandit Nehru

and he was surprised. It seemed to explain many things which he had so far found inexplicable in the Sheikh.

If anything accelerated the final break between Sheikh Abdullah and India, it was the Praja Parishad agitation in the winter of 1952-53 in Jammu province over the demand for the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India on the basis of one constitution, one flag and one president. The Jammu people were genuinely alarmed at the Sheikh's opposition to the complete integration of the State with India. The abolition of the Maharaja had also hurt them. And land reforms had affected them more than the people of the valley. The unsettled condition of the Hindu and Sikh refugees from Occupied Kashmir also served as an irritant to them. This agitation was countered very strongly by the State Government, sometimes even brutally, but it went on growing in strength and this in turn invited more reprisals. A similar agitation was being carried on in Delhi city also by the Jana Sangh, a party newly formed by Shyama Prasad Mookherji, on the issue of Kashmir's complete integration with India. The agitation in Delhi was also countered strongly by the Delhi Administration and day after day the processions used to be dispersed by *lathi*-charge. The Sheikh became extremely bitter and categorised this as Hindu revivalism which was trying to swamp the Muslims of Kashmir and the Muslim-majority areas of Jammu. (Before this as an administrative measure the Muslim-majority areas of Doda and Kishtwar had been formed into a separate district detaching them from Udhampur which had an overall Hindu majority.) The Sheikh took this opportunity to give vent to his hostile feelings against the Dogra community of Jammu, which he naturally linked with the Hindu community of Punjab and the rest of North India. He treated the Jana Sangh agitation as symptomatic of the general Hindu mentality and this he expressed in bitter language which added further grist to the mill of Jana Sangh propaganda.

The Prime Minister was greatly distressed by these harmful developments. He talked to me on the disastrous effects which the Jana Sangh-Praja Parishad agitation was likely to produce on the Muslim mind in Kashmir. He said that the Government of

India agreed with the Jana Sangh's views that Jammu and Kashmir should be fully integrated with India and was taking steps in that direction. But, there were other forces like Pakistan and the Security Council which could not be ignored and it was not in India's power to do whatever she liked in respect of this State. Referring to the Jana Sangh's demand that at least Jammu should be integrated, the Prime Minister said that this would amount to subscribing to the two-nation theory and would destroy the *raison-d'être* of India's existence in the valley. He said that if such an agitation based purely on emotionalism and not reason was allowed to grow, no democracy could function. He said that the Jana Sangh agitation had given him a shock and for the first time in five years he had started feeling doubtful about the future of Kashmir.

The Prime Minister asked me to go to Jammu on a dual mission. The first was that I should go round all the main centres of the agitation and try to persuade the Praja Parishad to call off the agitation by explaining that Kashmir was already an integral part of India and no further integration was necessary—the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was also going to recognise this position. However, as the matter was still under the consideration of the Security Council, a separate status for Kashmir had to be maintained for some more years. These special privileges would gradually disappear and Kashmir would be like any other state of India. It would be wise on the part of the Hindus of Jammu to hold their patience a little longer and assist in this natural process of integration. My second mission was to talk to Sheikh Abdullah and request him to desist from making communal and anti-Hindu speeches. Pandit Nehru said that Sheikh Abdullah, sometimes on provocation and sometimes even without any, was in the habit of referring to the alleged atrocities by the Hindus on the Muslims in Jammu during the communal disturbances of 1947 but never made any reference to similar atrocities which had been committed on the Hindus in Occupied Kashmir. The atrocities committed by the Hindus in Jammu were inexcusable, but such trouble had occurred in many other parts of India and these were often the repercussions of what had

happened in Pakistan those days. It was the duty of every leader to forget the past and see that the country settled down to normalcy. But the Sheikh's utterances unnecessarily raked up these old issues and kept them fresh in people's minds. Such statements were creating a hostile atmosphere against him in India. So, my job was to explain to him the inadvisability of making such statements in public, whatever views he might hold in private.

I arrived at Jammu in an atmosphere of great suspicion from the Kashmir Government. The guest house where I was accommodated was under strong watch. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, who was then the Home Minister, and D. P. Dhar, the Deputy Home Minister, came to see me immediately after my arrival. They wanted to know why I had come. I frankly explained my mission to them. They were extremely sceptical about my being able to persuade the Praja Parishad to call off its agitation. They were alarmed and expressed their unhappiness when I told them of my intention to visit the places where the agitation was at its highest tempo. To disarm their suspicion I suggested that the Superintendent of Police, CID, of Kashmir should come with me. They were not at all keen about the proposal, because they suspected that I had come to report against the measures which they had adopted to suppress the movement. Moreover, according to them, the visit by a senior central officer might be construed as a censure against the steps taken and might further encourage the agitators. However, in the end, they agreed to my proposal when they heard that the Prime Minister himself desired it and had deputed me for this purpose. D. P. Dhar stayed on after Bakshi had left and put me in the picture about the separatist agitation and its repercussions and also told me the nature of suspicion which existed against my visit. He advised me to be very careful in my talks and utterances and warned me that I would find the going very tough.

During the next five days, along with our Assistant Director and a Superintendent of the Kashmir Special Branch, I visited at least ten places in Jammu province where the agitation was strong or where the police had gone into action. I met hundreds of

people including some underground leaders, and at each meeting I talked to them on the lines of my briefing by Pandit Nehru. I made some additional points also that, so long as the Indian Army remained in Kashmir, the argument that Kashmir was not integrated with India was only academic and it was unnecessary to raise an agitation which would only result in making the Muslim mind hostile to India and strengthening Pakistan's case in the United Nations. It was a great test for me to put across my views (which were really Pandit Nehru's views) to the people who had many real causes of grievance against the State Government and who were extremely suspicious of Sheikh Abdullah and also simultaneously to remove the suspicion which till then was clouding the minds of the Kashmir Government leaders that the IB was acting in a manner prejudicial to their interest. As Dhar had warned me, it was a difficult and delicate task to get people to listen to me, infuriated as they had been with the very rough handling which they had received. But, I succeeded in gaining their confidence because I had the authority of Pandit Nehru behind me. People listened to me patiently when I told them that this agitation was doing the greatest harm to the cause they were attempting to serve. Ultimately, they agreed with me. The result of this visit was that the intensity of the agitation dropped immediately and, after a shortwhile, it petered out.

I earned the praise of both Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and D.P. Dhar. The latter, to quote his words, said: "Mr. Mullik came to solve an extremely knotty problem and has succeeded. He has done a real good turn to the State and its people". I am proud that till the end both of them continued to hold this view about me. From this time onwards at every crisis in Kashmir's history, I used to be personally present in Kashmir and work shoulder to shoulder with the Kashmir leaders to surmount their difficulties. They were good enough to communicate these views to the Prime Minister who thereafter sent me on such missions to Jammu and Kashmir whenever the occasion arose. On all subsequent occasions thereafter, on whatever mission I went, my burden was lightened, because there was no longer the atmosphere of suspicion against me or the Central Intelligence.

However, I met with little response from Sheikh Abdullah whom I saw after completing my first mission. He had already heard from Bakshi Ghulam Mohd the result of my effort to restrain and contain the agitation started by the Praja Parishad and so he had no reason to suspect that my visit was in any way directed against his interests. However, I was surprised to find him a completely changed man from the time I had first met him in September, 1949. He received me coldly and then he gave me a long lecture. He made violent accusations against the Dogras of Jammu in general and the ex-ruler and the Praja Parishad in particular and spoke contemptuously of the RSS and the Jana Sangh of India. He repeated for my benefit the lurid details of the alleged atrocities that had occurred in Jammu province and compared the Dogras with wild animals bereft of any human feelings. I then politely tried to talk him round by explaining to him, on the lines of the briefing given to me by Pandit Nehru, that it was no use repeating endlessly what had happened in 1947. It was necessary for all concerned to forget the past and unite the people in common partnership. In reply he tauntingly remarked that naturally my outlook in the matter would be different, more or less insinuating that, because I was a Hindu, I would overlook the cruelties of the Hindus on the Muslims. I told him that perhaps he was not aware of my work and strenuous efforts in the past for communal harmony, and if Pandit Nehru had not been sure of my bona fides, he would not have reposed confidence in me and sent me on this difficult mission. Sheikh Abdullah softened a little and refrained from making any remark against me personally; but I could not persuade him to desist from indulging in his theme of hatred against the Dogras and giving expression to his great contempt for them. He himself would have probably liked the entire Dogra community to migrate to India and make over their lands to persons of his choice. I was disappointed, because whereas I had succeeded in one part of my mission, I had completely failed in the other.

In the evening, before I was to depart from Jammu, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and D. P. Dhar again met me and I narrated to them the result of my talks with the Sheikh. They were not surprised

and requested that I should convey to Pandit Nehru my impressions of the Sheikh who, according to them, was using this agitation as an excuse to get out of his previous commitments to India. They thanked me for all that I had done in Jammu to check the intensity of the Praja Parishad agitation against the Government. They further requested me that I should ensure that the Punjab Police took necessary steps to seal all the entry routes from Gurdaspur District into Jammu, as they alleged that Jana Sangh volunteers, having found the main Madhopur route blocked by the Kashmir Police, were using these minor routes to cross the Ravi for coming over to Jammu to intensify the agitation. I left Jammu by car along with Mehra, our Deputy Director at Amritsar, and, after seeing the possible infiltration routes, met the Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur, and arranged for the posting of police pickets at all these points to prevent any entry into Jammu without a proper permit. (At that time a permit was necessary for entry into Jammu and Kashmir.) The Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, promptly endorsed these arrangements.

On my return to Delhi I reported in detail to the Prime Minister what had happened in Jammu, my success with the Praja Parishad agitators, my talks with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and D.P. Dhar, and finally my failure to bring about any change in the Sheikh's attitude. I also told him the measures which had been initiated by me on the Gurdaspur-Jammu border to seal all the entry routes into Jammu from India. The Prime Minister appreciated the steps that had been taken to stop this infiltration and said that the Sheikh had made it an issue that Jana Sanghis from India were going into Jammu and inciting the people and had imputed collusion by the Punjab authorities. He was happy to hear that I had been able to persuade the Praja Parishad to see sense and consider calling off the agitation. He was, however, distressed that the Sheikh still continued his hostility to the Hindus of Jammu and gave vent to these feelings publicly. The Prime Minister commented that all this was due to the Sheikh's communal background and, though politically he had tried to turn a new leaf, in his heart he had never been able to get over his earlier predilections.

3 Fall from the Pedestal

THE PRAJA PARISHAD agitation in Jammu and the Jana Sangh agitation at Delhi for the complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India and the support which this agitation received from certain other quarters in India gave Sheikh Abdullah the much-needed excuse to openly challenge India's professed secularism and he used this as an argument to prove that the integration of Jammu and Kashmir, and particularly of the Kashmir valley and certain adjoining parts, which had Muslim majority, with Hindu India would not be in the interest of the Muslims in Kashmir; and from then onwards he started openly propagating for a special status for Kashmir. Some talks which two prominent foreign visitors had with him at this time might probably have created an impression in his mind, probably misconceived, that if Kashmir became independent its security could be guaranteed by the big powers. The State then could develop like Switzerland, drawing all the world's tourists and fattening on their money, with himself the biggest beneficiary as the undisputed leader of the land. Hereafter, all his references to India were in hostile terms and contained strong criticism of any action of the Central or any State Government or any event anywhere in India which he could malign as communal in nature and he used all these instances to prove that India's profession of secularism was only on paper. He made several speeches with direct or indirect allegations on these lines and took advantage of the Friday gatherings at the Hazratbal Mosque to spread this poisonous propaganda. This new trend alarmed the Hindus of Kashmir, and confirmed the suspicions of the people of Jammu against him, including many who had supported him so far. We kept the Prime Minister fully in the picture about these new and unhealthy developments. He also got confirmation of our reports from

D. P. Dhar and the Sadar-e-Riyasat, Karan Singh. Pandit Nehru was greatly distressed by this *volte-face* of Sheikh Abdullah. In the meantime, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookherji was arrested at the Madhopur Bridge on May 8, 1953, for defying the ban on his entry into Jammu and Kashmir and was taken to Srinagar where he was placed under house arrest. Criticism in India against the Sheikh mounted as a result and this, in turn, made him still more defiant of India. It must, however, be said to the credit of other Muslim leaders like Bakshi, Sadiq, Mir Qasim, and even Masoodi, that in spite of the humiliations to which they were subjected by the Sheikh, they resisted all pressures, direct and indirect, and all intrigues by him to force them to toe his anti-Indian line. Several hints sent to Sheikh Abdullah by Pandit Nehru to come to Delhi and talk matters over to clear the misunderstanding were spurned by him. Even an open invitation by the Prime Minister went unheeded.

If Mohammad would not come to the mountain, the mountain had to go to Mohammad! And so the Prime Minister went to Srinagar in May, 1953. The visit coincided with the session of the National Conference from May 16 to 21 to discuss the Basic Principles. Throughout this meeting the Sheikh maintained his hostile attitude towards India, though he outwardly showed respect and cordiality to the Prime Minister. In spite of the latter's attempt to induce him to take a reasonable attitude, the Sheikh remained recalcitrant. At the conclusion of the National Conference meeting, Pandit Nehru invited all the assembled leaders and Sheikh Abdullah to his residence and talked to them for a long time about the internal and international situation, India's past history, his own conception of India's future and the position of Kashmir in India in order to bring the Sheikh round to a reasonable frame of mind by indirectly explaining that Kashmir's security and prosperity could lie only in its association with India and, bereft of this, Kashmir would head towards its destruction culturally, economically and politically, though some transitory gain might be secured initially. Yet the Sheikh would not relent, and Pandit Nehru returned to Delhi in a very dejected mood. G.K. Handoo had gone with the Prime Minister on this occasion as

the Security Officer, and till late hours of that last night in Srinagar, Pandit Nehru talked to him (he was really thinking aloud) about the Sheikh's folly and his betrayal of India in spite of all that the latter had done for Kashmir in the fateful days of 1947 and thereafter. Handoo on his return reported to us all these talks and the virtual failure of the Prime Minister's mission. To us in the IB this was no news and the development was not unexpected. I had myself had a glimpse of the Sheikh's mind when I had met him in Jammu in connection with the Praja Parishad agitation in January that year and thereafter we had closely followed each of his public pronouncements and many of his private talks and the way he was trying to crush all opposition to himself in Jammu and Kashmir.

Pandit Nehru then sent Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to Srinagar to make one more attempt to bring round the Sheikh. The Maulana Sahib was not in the best of health at this time, yet he went. He too utterly failed to convince the Sheikh about the folly of his ways. In fact, he could not engage the Sheikh in any useful talks. On the other hand, the Sheikh totally ignored him and even went to the length of insulting this highly respected leader at the Id meeting. The Maulana Sahib's advice to the Prime Minister on his return was to dismiss Sheikh Abdullah before he committed any more mischief.

I had to go to London for some important work in June and I was expected to be absent from Delhi for over a month. The Prime Minister also had to go there in connection with the coronation of Queen Elizabeth and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. He desired that a special watch should be kept on Kashmir during this period. So, I sent Handoo to the valley to keep a close but unobtrusive watch on the developments. He was to work independently of our AD but would use the latter's line of communication with us. At London, I used to meet the Prime Minister often as he was interested in the progress of my work. One day, when both of us were free, he called me into his room and enquired whether I had kept myself in touch with what was going on in Kashmir. He had received some depressing reports from Rafi Ahmed Kidwai who had been

asked to look after Kashmir in Pandit Nehru's absence. Naturally I was well informed as I was getting the reports on Kashmir by diplomatic bag and I told him all that had occurred since he had left India. The Prime Minister then asked me if I knew what had happened during his visit and subsequently during the Maulana's visit to Srinagar. I told him what I knew and he said that my understanding was correct. Though he still hoped that a change for the better would come over the Sheikh, he was very upset at the shape events were taking there and he considered that the time might soon come when certain drastic steps might have to be taken. He added that on his return he would like to send Kidwai to Kashmir for a final attempt at reconciliation. He enquired from me when I would return to India and on hearing the date he said that he himself would be returning about that time and he advised that we should keep our Intelligence in full gear and, if necessary, strengthen it. He again stressed that this was only a precaution and he was hoping that the Sheikh would yet change as he had done on several past occasions.

The news of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookherji's death on June 23, 1953, at the place of his detention in Srinagar reached us in London. Pandit Nehru was seriously concerned about the possible repercussions in India and the consequent further hardening of the Sheikh's attitude. Indeed, there was criticism all over India about the way this respected leader had been treated in Kashmir and the weakness which the Government of India had shown in this matter. A very strongly worded telegram came from Dr. B. C. Roy, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, demanding to know from the Sheikh why he had not been informed about Dr. Mookherji's illness when he had been the latter's family physician for years and how the Kashmir Government had allowed this to happen. During Pandit Nehru's absence, Maulana Azad was consulted about delivering the telegram to the Sheikh as it was apprehended that the latter's reaction would be violent; but the Maulana Sahib opined that a communication from Dr. B. C. Roy could on no account be withheld. So, the telegram was delivered. The Sheikh did not have the courtesy to send a reply or even express regret. His attitude was that as Dr.

Mookherji was the founder-leader of the Jana Sangh, which was helping his mortal enemy in Jammu, i. e. the Praja Parishad, and as Dr. Mookherji had broken the law in furtherance of the agitation for the complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India to which the Sheikh was opposed, he did not deserve any special consideration and had to meet the consequences of his action. In any case, the Kashmir Government had not thrown him into jail but had kept him under house arrest and had arranged for proper medical attendance. Criticism of the Kashmir Government's action in detaining Dr. Mookherji, leading to his death, continued all over India and was particularly vehement in West Bengal for quite some time and Sheikh Abdullah found in this ample support for his own allegation that India was secular only in name but was basically communal and so Kashmir could have no honourable place in that country.

It would be wrong to conclude that Sheikh Abdullah was as yet planning to take Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan. He was evidently angling for a special status—just short of independence. He knew he would have no position in Pakistan; but a semi-independent status for the valley would give him all that he desired—security from foreign invaders, economic prosperity due to the influx of tourists and munificence of India and yet no subservience to the Central Government which according to him was Hindu dominated. That explains why he put Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra in prison in June, 1953, when Karra openly came out in favour of Pakistan and held a public meeting at Srinagar announcing the establishment of the Kashmir Political Conference when some shouts of *Pakistan Zindabad* were raised.

The Basic Principles Committee's Report had, in the meantime, been referred for consideration and finalisation to a Council of the Inner Eight composed of the Sheikh, Bakshi, Beg, Sadiq, Masoodi, Dogra, Saraf and Budh Singh. From June 4 to 10, the Council discussed the question of Kashmir's relations with India. Finding the Sheikh to be adamant in his determination to strike an independent path, Bakshi got the final decision postponed so as to gain time till Pandit Nehru returned from London.

I returned to India in July. The Prime Minister also returned

soon afterwards. I found on return that things had moved rapidly and the Sheikh had intensified his criticism of India and was moving headlong into a crisis. I paid a quick and unobtrusive visit to Srinagar to gauge the situation myself and did not meet any of the Kashmir leaders on this occasion. This was more to appraise our own Intelligence needs than to make an assessment of the situation, of which we were getting a clear picture from our AD's reports. The situation at this time was that only Afzal Beg, Mohd Shafi and a few others were with the Sheikh, and all the other important leaders, i.e. Bakshi, Sadiq, Masoodi, Mir Qasim and the Hindu leaders like Saraf, Dogra and Dhar were ranged against him. In the Constituent Assembly, the Bakshi and Sadiq group commanded a substantial majority. In order to dislodge Bakshi, whom the Sheikh identified as the strongest ally of India, the latter forced an election to the National Conference from Srinagar which was Bakshi's stronghold hoping that he could uproot Bakshi that way. But Bakshi turned the tables on him and his group came out with a thumping majority. In India many people had expressed doubts about Pandit Nehru's hold on the people of Kashmir, but this internal tussle, during which the Sheikh was doing his best to undermine Pandit Nehru's influence, showed how strong the latter's hold was. Even in the Constituent Assembly, whose membership had been handpicked by the Sheikh, who had not allowed any opposition to grow, he could not carry the majority with him when he took an out-and-out anti-Indian stand. I found that the more the Sheikh was getting isolated, the more desperate he was becoming and there was every apprehension that he would assume the role of a dictator or do some other desperate act.

On my return, I reported all these developments to the Prime Minister. At this time D.P. Dhar also arrived in Delhi and acquainted Rafi Ahmed Kidwai of the serious situation in Kashmir and how the Sheikh was out to destroy all opposition to him and that such of the National Conference leaders like Bakshi, Sadiq, etc., who did not toe his line, were in imminent danger of being thrown out of the Cabinet and the National Conference and the Sheikh set on assuming dictatorial powers. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai had earlier written a letter to the Sheikh offering to go to Srinagar to effect

a reconciliation, to which the Sheikh had sent a curt reply saying that such a visit would bear no fruit. Kidwai then telephoned to the Sheikh, but met with the same rebuff. When Kidwai and Dhar met the Prime Minister and acquainted him with the grave situation in Kashmir and advocated strong measures, Pandit Nehru informed them that not only had the Sheikh declined even his invitation to come to Delhi for talks but had, in reply, indulged in making false charges against India and had finally said that, in spite of his personal friendship and regard for Pandit Nehru, the time had come when these personal interests had to be sacrificed in the interest of the country. When Pandit Nehru enquired what should be done in the circumstances, Kidwai pointed out that the Sheikh had himself indicated the course of action and there should now be no hesitation in throwing him out.

Pandit Nehru then sent for me and, after acquainting me with these developments, asked me how strong was our organisation in Kashmir. I mentioned that we were in fair strength in the valley though not so in Jammu and that it was difficult to induct more staff as this would attract the Sheikh's attention and he might demand the expulsion of the entire staff just as he had successfully done in 1949. The Prime Minister said that we should take the risk and strengthen the organisation immediately. Whilst appreciating our AD's work, he wanted that a more senior officer with greater authority should be sent temporarily and he asked for my nomination. I named Handoo, both because he was a very competent and senior Intelligence Officer and because he had many connections with Kashmir and possessed good knowledge of the valley. Besides that, he was in Kashmir during my absence from India and was fully acquainted with the latest trends. The Prime Minister, whilst agreeing with me about Handoo's suitability as an Intelligence Officer, however, asked me to name another person, as, according to him, the need was not for intelligence any longer but for action. He also said that Handoo's connections would be very useful for intelligence work but might prove to be a handicap when serious action was contemplated. I then named D.W. Mehra, our Deputy Director at Amritsar. He was senior to Handoo, was already in charge of Kashmir and so had all the

background knowledge of the developments that were taking place there. He had also visited Kashmir on many occasions and, therefore, was fully in the picture not only about the valley but also about Jammu. Moreover, he was a man of action and had gained considerable experience of dealing with the tribals during his service in the N.W. Frontier Province before the partition. The Prime Minister approved of Mehra's selection and asked me to send for him so that he could himself talk to him. On this occasion I found Pandit Nehru in an extremely agitated and distressed mood. I had never seen him like this before. From the trend of his talk it was easy to conclude that he was on the brink of taking a momentous and also unpalatable decision, which was being forced on him, and which went against his very nature and line of thinking. Yet, it was a decision which he had to take in the interest of the country as a whole.

On July 31, Mehra and I met the Prime Minister in his house and he talked to us for nearly two hours, giving us the entire background picture of Kashmir from the earliest times to-date and finally he came to the point that there was no other alternative but to remove Sheikh Abdullah and install Bakshi Ghulam Mohd in his place. He hoped that the change would be effected peacefully, but he warned that we must be prepared for the worst, because the Sheikh undoubtedly had a large following in the valley and over this matter the pro-Sheikh group would be supported by the pro-Pakistani elements also. Mehra should be prepared to assume control of the Jammu and Kashmir Police Force and was to take over as the Chief Executive under the Sadar-e-Riyasat, if that became necessary. At this point Pandit Nehru was nearly overwhelmed by emotion. Both of us, who had known him for some years, had never seen him in such disturbed mood before. We realised that he was on the point of uprooting a plant which he had nursed with great care. At the end, he wished Mehra good luck and wanted to be kept informed regularly. For this purpose, we could call him up even in the night.

Our Assistant Director had earlier reported to us that the Army in the valley was not on the alert and would not be ready for immediate action in case there was a sudden deterioration of the

law and order situation. I had mentioned this to the Prime Minister and advised him that the Army should be put on the alert quietly; there was the probability that if secrecy was not well-maintained, the Sheikh might anticipate events and try to create more difficulties. As the State Government would have to rely on the Police and the Militia for any action, it would be necessary for the Army authorities to sort out the unreliable elements of the Militia and keep them under strict control and make only the reliable elements available to the State Government. So, the same day Pandit Nehru called up Brig. B.M.Kaul and entrusted him with the task of passing on the word to Lt.-Gen. Atal, the Corps Commander at Udhampur and the Divisional Commander in Srinagar about the impending action. One reason which must have weighed with the Prime Minister in selecting Kaul was that the latter had previously commanded the Kashmir Militia and so would be able to sort out the unreliable elements. The Prime Minister also trusted him as an able and reliable officer specially suitable for facing emergencies. Kaul later met me and travelled with Mehra to Jammu. At this time, the Prime Minister, at the suggestion of Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, also sent A. P. Jain to Srinagar as his personal representative to hold a watching brief and ensure that the administrative action was not hasty but was tailored to the political needs. At Delhi it was Rafi Ahmed Kidwai who remained in charge of Kashmir affairs and A.P. Jain represented him at Srinagar.

Events thereafter moved fast. The fateful day was approaching, but the actual course of action determined not by Kidwai but by Sheikh Abdullah himself. On August 6, the Sheikh peremptorily ordered Sham Lal Saraf to resign from the ministry. Saraf was a very old National Conference worker, senior even to Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, and probably second only to the Sheikh. He met the Sadar-e-Riyasat and later refused to resign. The Sheikh then had no other alternative but to dismiss him, but for this he had to go to the Sadar-e-Riyasat which he was unwilling to do. Other members of the Cabinet like Bakshi, Sadiq, Dogra and D.P. Dhar supported Saraf and they constituted the majority. Even Masoodi, the General Secretary of the National Conference, opposed the

Sheikh's anti-Indian attitude, and in the National Conference Working Committee also the Sheikh's anti-Indian group was in a minority. So, he had lost his majority in all the three bodies that counted, i.e. the National Conference, the Constituent Assembly and the Cabinet. Constitutionally it was no longer possible for him to carry on the government and the only alternative before him was to depose the Sadar-e-Riyasat and assume dictatorial powers. He could not do this with his own strength which was dwindling. Moreover, he could not ignore the presence of the Indian Army. So, he had to get support from outside to carry out his intentions. We got information that Pir Maqbool Gilani had established contacts with Pakistan and that an emissary was on his way to Tanmarg (near Gulmarg) to meet the Sheikh. Suspicions deepened when the Sheikh suddenly left for Tanmarg on the morning of July 8. So, the D-day was automatically determined by the Sheikh's own action, as any further delay might be attended with unforeseen results. The Sadar-e-Riyasat remained steady and did not allow himself to be hustled into action.

On this day I was to keep an hourly communication with Mehra and A.P. Jain was to communicate whenever necessary either with Pandit Nehru or Rafi Ahmed Kidwai. I kept the Prime Minister informed about Pir Maqbool Gilani's contacts with the Pakistanis and the possibility of an emissary coming and later the Sheikh's sudden departure for the rendezvous. I also informed the Prime Minister that the situation was tense and people expected important developments. In the evening, the Sadar-e-Riyasat issued orders dismissing Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister and invited Bakshi to form a Ministry. At 11 o'clock that night when Pandit Nehru and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai were attending a party at the Hyderabad House, I got a call from A.P. Jain asking me to get the Prime Minister back to his house immediately as he had some very important communication for him. He confirmed that the Sheikh had left for Tanmarg that morning probably to hatch his plans for a coup and so action for a change-over had been decided for that night but, on account of Bakshi's hesitation, the change-over had not till then taken place. I went to the Hyderabad House immediately and met Pandit Nehru and passed on the information

to him. He sent Rafi Ahmed Kidwai along with me, saying that he would follow a little later as his sudden departure along with Kidwai might give rise to unnecessary speculation. Kidwai asked me to get in touch with Mehra at once and Mehra said that Bakshi was jittery and was hesitating to take over till he had the confirmed news of the Sheikh's arrest. Pandit Nehru arrived soon afterwards. He and Kidwai sat upstairs and I sat with O.M. Mathai downstairs awaiting events. A two-way communication was going on between me and Mehra on one side and Kidwai and Jain on the other. Jain was told by Kidwai to keep in touch with Bakshi. I communicated the same order to Mehra. At midnight the Sadar-e-Riyasat issued orders for the Sheikh's arrest as his meeting the Pakistani emissary would constitute a grave danger to the State. Both Pandit Nehru and Kidwai were rather upset that orders for the Sheikh's dismissal had been issued and yet no Ministry had been formed leaving the Sadar-e-Riyasat in charge. This would give rise to serious allegations that India had ultimately contrived to restore Hindu Dogra rule in Kashmir. They wanted that there should be no delay in announcing Bakshi as the new Prime Minister. I communicated this to Mehra and he remained with Bakshi the whole of that night discussing the situation and ultimately at 4 o'clock in the morning of August 9, when Bakshi heard that a party had left for Tanmarg for arresting the Sheikh, he went to the Raj Bhavan where he was sworn in as the Prime Minister (as the office was then called). Mehra reported this at about 4-30 in the morning and also mentioned that L.D. Thakur, DIG of Police, with a force of police and militia had been sent to Tanmarg to take the Sheikh into custody, as there was every danger that he would go in hiding and try to create serious disturbances in the Kashmir valley with the help of Pakistanis.

The Sheikh was duly arrested and later taken to Udhampur by the police party without any incident on the way. Others arrested on that day were Afzal Beg, Ch. Mohd Akbar and a few others, including a couple of Hindus. Fairly widespread disturbances broke out in Srinagar valley and some of these were of serious nature. The Prime Minister asked me to visit Srinagar while these disturbances were going on. During this trouble I came in very close

touch with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and D.P. Dhar and saw their sterling qualities at the time of a crisis. Bakshi, though nervous at the beginning because he was being directly accused of betrayal of the Sheikh, was all confidence by the time I arrived and said that the disturbances were being caused by a handful of persons and they would be crushed in no time, as the majority of the people were on his side. He himself was a man of the people and perhaps knew them better than the Sheikh did; the latter in his haughtiness would hardly deign to talk to the common man. In fact, according to Bakshi, except for his politics, as a person the Sheikh was not much liked in the valley. But the man who shone during this crisis was D.P. Dhar. He was there at the centre of the disturbances, managing the small militia and police force most adroitly and competently and had all the information at his finger tips. Mehra was a source of great strength to him and, with his long experience in the frontier and later during the communal disturbances in Delhi, he proved to be a pillar of strength. He was absolutely undaunted and was not afraid of going even into the most congested areas with little or no armed escort. Our AD also played his part extremely well and kept D.P. Dhar and Mehra informed of all the plans of the hostile groups. The disturbances lasted for nearly three weeks. A total of nearly sixty people were killed in the firing by the police and militia mostly in Srinagar city. Even when the violent disturbances subsided, the agitation for the Sheikh's release continued in the valley in one form or other for a long time. Kashmir ultimately got reconciled to the Sheikh's absence and there followed a decade of comparative peace during which the State made a good deal of progress in every field.

The Prime Minister was, however, never fully reconciled to the Sheikh's detention and from time to time raised the question of his release. This was not because the Prime Minister felt that any change had come over the Sheikh—actually no such change was at all discernible and the Sheikh's activities in the jail became even more inimical towards India—but because he was inherently opposed to any detention without trial. Having himself suffered long years of imprisonment under the British, he was ideologically opposed to detentions for political reasons. However, the Sheikh

could not be released and events in Kashmir moved forward; and, as I have mentioned above, a period of peace and prosperity followed. Bakshi proved to be a good leader and was ably assisted by his Cabinet consisting of Sadiq, Saraf, D.P. Dhar, Dogra, etc.

When some months later, I met Sri Rajagopalachari at Madras (he was then the Chief Minister), he asked me why it had become necessary to arrest Sheikh Abdullah. I narrated to him all the circumstances which had led to his arrest. Rajaji said that the Sheikh should have been given a third alternative of autonomy or even semi-independence and the door should not have been shut against him. He apprehended that continued uncertainty and unrest would prevail in the valley. It is difficult to say, even with hind-sight, if any other course of action could have been taken at this time. Jammu and Kashmir already enjoyed a special status under the Indian Constitution. Anything more in the nature of complete autonomy could be justified only on the ground that one region of the State had a Muslim majority. This could not be done in secular India. Moreover, in that case the demand for separation of Jammu and Ladakh from Kashmir and their integration with India would have become irresistible. If Jammu and Ladakh were separated on communal grounds, Kashmir might also go to Pakistan. So, there was no easy solution to the problem.

4 Preventing Subversion

MAULVI MASOODI was the General Secretary of the National Conference at the time of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest. He was an astute politician and a good organiser. He favoured internal autonomy in Kashmir but had opposed the Sheikh in his extreme anti-Indian stand. The Gujjar community to which he belonged had little identity with the Kashmiri Muslim and, in the interest of his minority community, he tried to keep in with both sides. He had worked hard in conjunction with others to prevent the Sheikh from getting an upper hand in the organisation and had hoped all the time that he would, with the help of others, be able to persuade the Sheikh to take a more reasonable attitude. Hence, he did not agree to the ouster of the Sheikh and much less to his arrest. After the change-over in Kashmir, Masoodi came away to Delhi and, along with Mridula Sarabhai, tried to develop an anti-Bakshi lobby in India. When Bakshi reorganised the National Conference some months later, he dropped Masoodi from the post of General Secretary and appointed Bakshi Abdul Rashid in his place. So, out of the eight original stalwarts of the National Conference (Sheikh, Karra, Beg, Masoodi, Bakshi, Sadiq, Saraf and Dogra), the first four had dropped out or fallen by the way and only four were left with D.P. Dhar, Mir Qasim, etc. forming a strong group of second line leadership. So long as this leadership kept together, Kashmir enjoyed peace and stability and during the next four years Kashmir made phenomenal progress in all spheres of her economy and education. The flourishing tourist trade also contributed to Kashmir's economic prosperity. The road-link with India was improved, a tunnel was cut through Banihal and, though this road was occasionally blocked during the winter, one could easily do the journey from Jammu to Kashmir in one day. The trade with India also grew. The Bakshi Government also took steps to

integrate the higher administrative and police services with the all-India services. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction was extended to Jammu and Kashmir and in many other fields integration with India progressed. After independence, the years 1953-57 stand out as the best period in Kashmir.

Frank Graham succeeded Dixon as the UN representative. Graham covered much the same ground as Dixon, but he came to the conclusion that it would be unrealistic to ask for the withdrawal of the forces from the areas held by India and Pakistan. Keeping in view the main resolution of the Security Council that the dispute should be settled by a plebiscite, he proposed that the parties should come together and devise means by which this could be done. But the Security Council, instead of accepting Graham's report, tried to introduce several irrelevant issues putting the responsibility for the failure more on India, conveniently overlooking the fact that the main responsibility for the impasse lay with Pakistan which had to make the first move by withdrawing her troops from Occupied Kashmir but which, on one excuse or the other, she had failed to do so far. Naturally, India raised strong objection to this manoeuvring and so the only portion of the resolution which got through was the suggestion that the two countries should establish direct contact to settle the issue.

Thereafter, there were several meetings between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan and an understanding was arrived at in London when both the Prime Ministers had met there at the time of the Queen's coronation in June, 1953. About a month after Sheikh Abdullah's deposition and arrest, Mohd Ali Bogra, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, came to Delhi and the two Prime Ministers decided that the best way to ascertain the people's wishes would be to hold an impartial and regional plebiscite, and that the Plebiscite Administrator should come from a small country and not from a big country like the USA or the UK which had political interests in this region. Unfortunately, Mohd Ali Bogra, on return to Pakistan, could not get this proposal accepted by his Cabinet and the USA also put pressure on him to retain Admiral Nimitz as the Plebiscite Administrator; hence he backed out of the agreement. This was an unfortunate development since the agree-

ment had brought India and Pakistan very close to each other in settling this outstanding dispute. It is surprising that this initiative by the Prime Minister of India to settle the Kashmir dispute by the method suggested by the Security Council was overlooked in the subsequent deliberations of that Council.

The Pakistan-United States Aid Pact of 1954 changed the situation completely. Pakistan also joined the Middle East Pact sponsored by Great Britain and the USA. Though this pact was ostensibly aimed against encroachments by Soviet Russia, just as the subsequent South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was directed against Communist China, Pakistan did not conceal her own motives and openly declared that this would strengthen her hands against India in Kashmir, and even help in solving the Kashmir problem. Pandit Nehru reacted to this sharply and held that this very statement indicated that Pakistan wanted to settle the issue by force of arms. He also declared in the Lok Sabha that though President Eisenhower had assured India that the United States would exercise effective curbs on Pakistan from using American arms aggressively against India, it would be difficult in the event of hostilities to decide who was the aggressor and Pakistan would be free to make the first hostile move and then put the blame on India and employ American arms against her.* Indeed, the US-Pak Aid Pact as well as Pakistan's entry into CENTO and SEATO so changed the situation that it was impossible to create a suitable atmosphere any longer for successful talks on this disputed issue. The US-Pak Aid Pact also automatically brought the USA on the side of Pakistan and the Middle East and SEATO Pacts brought other powers also on Pakistan's side and introduced the cold war in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

After the failure of the Graham Mission, another UN representative, Jarring was sent to India. Jarring came to India in March, 1957, visited both sides of the cease-fire line and held long talks with Indian and Pakistani leaders. He was the first UN representative who realised that to talk in 1956-57 of the plebiscite mooted in 1948 was unrealistic and no longer feasible. He found that the position of the two countries in the areas of Jammu and Kashmir

*This actually happened in 1965.

under their respective controls had stabilised so much that it would be dangerous to upset the *status quo*.

In 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India and made an extensive tour of the country. This visit made a deep impression in the minds of these two Soviet leaders about the functioning of democracy in India, the liberty which the people enjoyed in expressing their views freely and the progress India was making through democratic methods in all fields of industry, agriculture, education, etc. Khrushchev also visited Srinagar and there declared that Soviet Russia considered that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had made their final choice and that Kashmir was a part of India. This brought great comfort to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and to the millions of people of India who read that statement. Henceforward, Russia's attitude in the Security Council also changed and the Soviet representative vetoed every resolution which that Council tried to push through with the weight of the Anglo-American bloc and which was adverse to India's interest and was not acceptable to that country. In fact, speaking on one such resolution the Soviet representative declared that his country could not vote for any resolution which India found herself unable to accept.

In the meantime, political manoeuvring in Kashmir continued and Bakshi released Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra in December, 1954, and for a time tried to win him over; but Karra, who had even questioned the Sheikh's leadership, would not accept Bakshi as the new leader, as he considered himself to be more important than the latter. He was, in any case, by then too deeply involved with Pakistan to accept Kashmir's identity as part of India, which he would have had to do had he joined forces with Bakshi. Immediately after his release, he resumed his contacts with Pakistani agents and Pakistan tried for nearly two years to build up his group, but, finding that Karra was no longer a winning horse, ultimately gave up hopes of utilising him as the spearhead of opposition against India, while still maintaining contact with him and assisting him financially.

Karra's eclipse was also partly due to the earlier release in November, 1954, of Mirza Afzal Beg. This astute politician, who

had influenced the Sheikh to take a progressively strong anti-Indian attitude, had been suspected of holding strong pro-Pakistani leanings. A few months after his release he set up the Plebiscite Front whose aim was to secure the holding of a plebiscite for ascertaining the wishes of the people. The people's wishes had already been determined at the time of the accession. The Convention of the National Conference had unanimously endorsed the decision. The Constituent Assembly, even during Sheikh Abdullah's premiership, had endorsed the Delhi Agreement on the basis of Kashmir's permanent accession to India. The Assembly, whose membership Sheikh Abdullah had hand-picked with the assistance of Beg and others, had, in the meantime, gone ahead with the framing of the constitution of Kashmir as a part of India, though with special safeguards in many respects. In fact, Clause 1 of Part I (form of State) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir State said: "The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall ever be an integral part of the Union of India". At this stage to ask for a plebiscite was nothing short of asking the people to vote against India. The Sheikh himself, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was not in favour of acceding to Pakistan, even though he had become hostile to India, because in Pakistan he saw no future for himself and, therefore, preferred a semi-independent status. But, Beg's aim was suspected to be ultimate accession to Pakistan through the intermediate stage of a semi-independent status. Due to his subversive activities, Beg was re-arrested in 1955, and at the time of his arrest some incriminating letters* were found in his possession disclosing his cognizance of and part in a conspiracy to bring about a state of armed revolution in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of Pakistan for overthrowing the Government.

Before the General Election, which took place in March, 1957, a split had taken place in the Kashmir National Conference between the two top leaders—Bakshi and Sadiq—with their respective supporters ranged on each side. The dispute was over the allotment of seats for the forthcoming elections to the supporters of each group. The two sides failed to reach an agreement. Though the elections were fought and won with an overwhelming majority on

*Exhibits No. P-33 and P-34 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

the National Conference ticket, shortly after the elections, the Sadiq group left the Government and the National Conference, and formed the Democratic National Conference. With Sadiq, also went Dogra, D.P. Dhar, Mir Qasim and a few others. Of the original leaders of the Kashmir National Conference, only Sham Lal Saraf remained with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. The Democratic National Conference was soon joined by the Kashmir Communist Party and it is this alliance which gave the microscopic Communist Party of Kashmir a new life and strength and a firm footing in Jammu province. Deterioration in Kashmir's general administration started from this time. The Democratic National Conference continuously sniped at the Kashmir Government and was tackled vigorously by Bakshi's Peace Brigade and this caused much bitterness between the two groups and led to much mudslinging. Bakshi also was forced to become more and more autocratic. Taking advantage of the situation, some of his proteges and some members of his family indulged in some shady deals which started affecting Bakshi's personal reputation.

It must, however, be mentioned here that Bakshi himself was a liberal-minded and large-hearted person with his feet planted strongly amongst the masses. He tried to do much for improving the material conditions of the people of Kashmir and achieved a great deal. He was not communal and was trusted and respected equally by both Hindus and Muslims. Though a man of not much formal education, he had tried to educate himself and fully understood all the intricacies of Government business and the rules of the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies, and it was amazing how he mastered even the most intricate details of budget and of development plans. He was completely loyal to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and considered himself an Indian out and out. In his own mind there was no question of Kashmir's existence outside India. He was the staunchest opponent of Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir and was a fearless leader. There is no doubt that he kept the Pakistanis at bay almost single-handed for eleven long years. It is a great pity that all these services to Kashmir and India were so quickly forgotten after his resignation in 1963 on the basis of the Kamaraj Plan and the subsequent treatment that he received at

the hands of the Government was deplorable, to say the least.

When I had first gone to Srinagar in August and September, 1949, I had made an extensive tour of the valley and had visited some of the forward-most posts of the Army in the Uri sector to acquaint myself with the problems of intelligence and security which they were facing. Major-General Thimayya was then the GOC of the 19 Division in charge of the valley and the northern areas, and I had a long meeting with him. He was very concerned at the fact that the Army did not know anything about what was happening even five miles beyond the frontier which it was holding. Under the terms of the cease-fire, Army units were prevented from patrolling within five hundred yards of the cease-fire line, and the area being full of jungles, even what happened within that five hundred yards strip often escaped the Army's notice. He said that he had tried to set up an intelligence net of his own, but had failed because he found that service officers were not quite suitable for this type of work. He, therefore, urged that the IB should take up this work so as to provide the Army with the much-needed intelligence of enemy positions. I recognised the need of this work but I had some hesitation in accepting the responsibility, because we had till then not worked in the field of military intelligence and I was not quite certain that we would be any more successful than the army units. However, Thimayya was insistent that only the IB could do this work. I consulted him about the places where the location of intelligence units would be helpful. I also enquired, whether in view of the very exposed nature of the forward areas, where these intelligence units would be located, he would be willing to give the Army's protection for their physical security, and he readily agreed. I visualised some objection from the Kashmir Government and so Thimayya agreed to place them under the Army's cover, and as defence was in the hands of the Government of India, the Kashmir Government could not then raise any objection.

Later, in consultation with our AD, I decided that intelligence posts would be required all the way from Kargil in the north to Ranbirsinghpura in the south. The Chief of General Staff, whom I met on return to Delhi, accepted the scheme for the Jammu

area also. I then discussed it with Sanjivi, the Director, and the proposal was put up to the Home Ministry and was immediately sanctioned. Sanjivi left me in charge of this work and I selected officers from Punjab, particularly with a military background, of which there was no dearth in that State and, after a course of thorough training, deputed them to Jammu and Kashmir. Both Maj.-Gen. Thimayya in the valley and Maj.-Gen. Tara Singh Bal in Jammu were very helpful in inducting our staff, giving them safe abodes away from the Army centres and looking after their personal safety and taking personal interest in their work. These officers required all this assistance and cooperation because they were the pioneers in the IB in the field of frontier intelligence. The results achieved almost immediately were acclaimed by the Military Commanders in Jammu and Kashmir and showed the proper way of going about this work, that is, properly locating well-trained and knowledgeable civil officers, working with the full cooperation and protection of the Army, without the latter in any way interfering with their lines of communication, contacts and modes of work.

It was the success in this venture which emboldened us subsequently to assign the responsibility for intelligence from Pakistan to the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB) at Amritsar and Shillong and, following the system adopted in Jammu and Kashmir, posts were opened near the frontiers both in Punjab and in Assam. The set-up in Punjab became almost immediately productive. It is through this network that we first received information in 1951 that Pakistan was preparing for attacks on Jammu and Kashmir in order to buttress her claim that these areas were seething with discontent and were up in rebellion against the oppressions of the Government of India. This plan was foiled by India immediately moving troops to Punjab thereby warning Pakistan that an attack on Jammu and Kashmir would be met by an attack on Pakistan proper.

When the Himmatsinghji Committee on Border Defence made the study in 1951 of India's Intelligence needs, it assessed the work of the IB in Jammu and Kashmir area and found that this had been very productive and that it had been fairly productive in the Punjab

sector also. The Army was also working in this field till then and though it sometimes came in our way, we did not object because, being new to the job, we were still in the stage of gathering experience and so welcomed other organisations also to supplement our effort. The Himmatsinghji Committee, after making a comparison between the output of the work of the posts set up by the Intelligence Bureau and those worked by the army direct, came to the conclusion that nothing would be lost if the latter were abolished and the entire work handed over to the IB. When the Cabinet accepted this recommendation and entrusted the IB with this work, in spite of our objections, we had to go ahead and enlarge our network. We established another SIB in Calcutta to cover the West Bengal area and added posts on Rajasthan and Saurashtra frontiers and even in an area like Tripura. So, the number of frontier posts went on increasing, and so far as Pakistan was concerned, the position was that the IB was generally well-placed and could inform the Government beforehand about all developments in the military field, both deep inside Pakistan and on the frontiers.

When I was making a prolonged visit to Jammu in 1951, I was confronted with the problem of infiltration back of people who had fled from Jammu and Kashmir during 1947. In some cases this was due to nostalgia as their relatives were on this side, and some others came back because they could not settle down in Pakistan. There was a third category of people who were being trained and infiltrated back into the State by the Pakistani authorities for the purpose of organizing subversion and sabotage. It is this aspect of infiltration which we had to contend with, both in the Jammu area and in the valley. The military authorities complained that the infiltrators had fairly easy access into our territory because the Army posts in the frontier had large gaps between them and, besides that, the five hundred yard wide belt near the cease-fire line could not even be controlled. We also had noticed that contacts by such infiltrators had already started with the pro-Pakistani elements in Jammu and Kashmir and several instances of sabotage could be traced to such persons. At a meeting of the defence committee, which was attended by Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and D.P. Dhar in Srinagar, this question was raised by the Army

authorities and it was decided that frontier police posts should be established at points fixed by the Army ahead of the Army posts to prevent this infiltration. Naturally, these police posts had to be under the Kashmir Government, because it was apprehended at that time that induction of any police force from outside might contravene the cease-fire agreement. Moreover, the State Government was keen that this work should be kept in its hands. So, we decided at that meeting and subsequently in further meetings, in which Bakshi, D.P. Dhar and myself took part, that a force of five hundred Home Guards should be sanctioned, and after quick training, they should be deployed on the frontier. This was the beginning of the anti-infiltration work with which the IB was very largely concerned for the next fifteen years. The force was sanctioned by the Government of India promptly.

Unfortunately, the Home Guards, which the Kashmir Government raised, were of a very poor quality. They were ill-trained and badly officered, and their clothing and equipment left much to be desired and so their performance at the frontier did not come up to the requirements or expectations. It also soon became apparent that five hundred was too small a number for protecting the entire frontier from Ranbirsinghpura to Kargil against infiltration. On the other hand, even if the force was increased, we were doubtful about the capacity of the Kashmir Police to raise, train, equip and sustain these additional numbers of Home Guards. When Pandit Nehru visited the valley in August, 1952, our Assistant Director met him at Sonamarg and apprised him of the problem of infiltration and also mentioned some of the contacts which these infiltrators were making and the acts of sabotage that they had committed. Pandit Nehru was immediately seized of this danger and the next day on his return to Srinagar, he held a meeting with the Kashmir Home Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and military authorities and our officers at Srinagar. In this meeting, it was decided that the strength of the Home Guards should be doubled and additional posts should be established all along the frontier to prevent infiltration. The Prime Minister sent a telegram to Delhi immediately conveying the decisions taken at this meeting and ordering that sanction should be issued immediately.

We strongly supported the proposal to increase the force. But, the Home and the Defence Ministries were sceptical about the capacity of the Kashmir Government to handle a larger number of Home Guards, so poor had been the standard of the first group of five hundred which had been raised. So, it was tentatively decided that I should go to Srinagar and persuade the Kashmir Government to agree to the induction of one battalion of Indian Armed Police and utilise it for frontier protection duty so long as the Kashmir Government itself could not raise a new battalion of the Home Guards to replace the Indian battalion. The Government of India would pay for both the Indian Police battalion and the raising and training of the new battalion of Home Guards till it could replace the Indian Police battalion. The Government also agreed to raise the strength of the older unit of the Home Guards to that of a battalion. Anticipating that I might be able to get the concurrence of the Kashmir Government to this proposal, I arranged with the Inspector General of Police, Madhya Pradesh, to lend us one battalion of the Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Police for this purpose. So, I arrived in Srinagar two weeks after the Prime Minister's return, and in my meeting with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and D.P. Dhar, with the backing of the Army Commander, I made them agree to this arrangement. We lost no time and immediately inducted the first Indian Police battalion and placed it under the Inspector-General of Police, Kashmir and this was utilised in the Jammu sector. By the time the additional battalion of Home Guards was raised, the turmoil in Kashmir had already taken place after the Sheikh's arrest and these Home Guards were extensively utilised for maintaining internal order. Thereafter, the Kashmir Government was not willing to spare them for the frontier. When during subsequent meetings with the Army and the Kashmir Government it was found that the opening of still more posts had become necessary, we gradually inducted more Police battalions. Increases were effected practically every year and, working under the control of the Kashmir Government, these Police battalions were ranged all along the frontier allowing the Army posts to be withdrawn to the rear and providing them the much-needed time for rest and training. These police posts succeeded in checking

and preventing infiltrations on any large scale, and took the first shock in any surprise attack by the Pakistanis. However, in this terrain it was not possible to stop individual infiltrations especially when the infiltrators were welcomed by some among the local population who had returned earlier and had settled down. On their own, the local people hardly ever gave any information about them, partly due to sympathy and partly due to fear of reprisals.

With the Sheikh out of the way, it became easier for the Central Intelligence to work with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd as the Prime Minister and D.P. Dhar as the Home Minister. The old suspicions had disappeared and the Kashmir Government were by then convinced that the IB operated in the State very much for the benefit of the local Government and its main aim was to prevent subversion, terrorisation, sabotage and conspiracy by Pakistani agents and to collect intelligence of vital need for the security of the country. During an extensive visit to the Jammu area in 1955 along with the AD, we found that there were allegations of resettlement of infiltrators in the villages in the Jammu sector, and this resettlement was being assisted by some of the petty local officials and MLAs. It appeared to us that all the measures that we had adopted so far were on the frontier only; but if a person could once get across the frontier, his further movements remained quite unhindered; and the meagre Kashmir Police Force was unable or unwilling to stop the rehabilitation of these infiltrators. So, the need of having anti-infiltration or counter-intelligence posts deep inside the territory, particularly in the Jammu sector, dawned on us; and I was fortunate to get the agreement of the State Government to this proposal and we thereafter established such posts throughout the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. They were manned mostly by Kashmir Police officers. These posts succeeded in giving us names and information of hundreds of infiltrators, and many of them were pushed back. Of course, the difficulty of the Kashmir Government in uprooting infiltrators who had already settled down had to be understood. An infiltrator being shot dead on the frontier in the process of infiltration did not arouse anybody's emotion. But, once the infiltrators eluded the police and army

vigilance and succeeded in entering the territory, various sorts of political pulls started being exercised on the State Government and it then became difficult for the latter to take any drastic action against them. (It was the same type of problem which Assam faced and could tackle with much difficulty in subsequent years.)

I continued to make extensive tours throughout the State, and along with the Assistant Director, I visited every post on the frontier and inspected the work and gave directions for further improvements and fixed targets. We visited all the counter-intelligence posts when they were set up and they also required detailed supervision and direction as the work was of a new type. We visited many of the frontier checkposts to find out the difficulties they were encountering in patrol and watch duties and to look for the weak points which still existed in our frontier defence arrangements, so that these gaps could be suitably filled up. All through this period we had the fullest cooperation of the Army and they helped us in every way possible whenever we asked for it. They appreciated the value of the intelligence which was being produced by our posts. We got the fullest cooperation from the Kashmir Government and there was no longer any difficulty in inducting new personnel into that State. Mehra, who had been previously the Deputy Director of the SIS at Amritsar in charge of Kashmir affairs and who had taken part in assisting the State Government during the troublesome time of the Sheikh's deposition, was now the Inspector-General of Police. He knew all about the needs and difficulties of the IS and, therefore, went all out to help us. Bakshi himself often discussed the problems with Mehra, our AD, and myself and gave useful suggestions and he also helped us to find staff and accommodation and also suggested targets and contacts in areas where we did not have any. The Prime Minister maintained an unfailing interest in Kashmir affairs, always kept himself informed about the progress of our security work in Kashmir and took interest even in minute details. He was concerned about infiltrations that were still occurring and he took a very serious view of the sabotages and subversions that occurred in the State and constantly guided us. Another person who was of much help to us during this period was Vishnu Sahay, the Adviser on Kashmir

affairs (later he became Governor of Assam). His knowledge of Kashmir and its personalities was deep as he had been dealing with Kashmir affairs almost from the time of accession and whenever we were in difficulties we turned to him for help and he could be relied upon to resolve them.

So, our work in Jammu and Kashmir progressed in three directions simultaneously: (1) forward intelligence, (2) counter-intelligence; and (3) armed police checkposts. Slowly and steadily we built up a strong organisation able to tackle any large-scale attempt at infiltration, subversion, sabotage and political conspiracy. But, during the four years that Sheikh Abdullah had been in power, several thousands of people had been infiltrated by Pakistan and they had been resettled mostly in their original lands and some in other places also. Though our counter-intelligence staff listed many of them, only a percentage of them could be forced back because of the political pressures on the Government. They formed a useful base for Pakistan to exploit and as many of them had been sent back deliberately in earlier years for this very purpose, they lent themselves readily to subversion and sabotage and they formed the links between Pakistani Intelligence and the local population.

Ever since Beg had formed his Plebiscite Front, the Pakistanis started vigorous contacts with the leaders of the Plebiscite Front who were not behind bars. When the split took place between Bakshi and Sadiq, Pakistan saw in this an opportunity to commit further aggression against India by initiating large-scale sabotages and explosions. Many of these attempts were foiled due to advance intelligence received, but in some other cases, though intelligence was received, the infiltrators could not be traced in time with the result that the damage took place. This caused a lot of consternation in Jammu and Kashmir and created much criticism and bitterness in India. However, the cases were carefully worked out and in many of them arrest of the actual culprits was made and from their statements further information was obtained about Pakistan's massive effort at perpetrating a series of explosions and sabotages in Jammu and Kashmir to prove to the Security Council where discussions on Kashmir were to come up shortly, that a

rebellion was still brewing in that State because of India's refusal to hold the plebiscite. At one stage people became impatient and wanted to stage similar sabotages and explosions in the Pakistan-occupied territory, but we did not agree. Our reason was that the population on the other side might not come forward to shelter and assist such saboteurs and so even if people tried to send some, they could only operate in the fringes and could not penetrate deep into the territory. Moreover, the massive effort which Pakistan was making in this direction had produced little result and had only some nuisance value, and so all these efforts had in the main proved to be futile. If our people indulged in such tactics, we would gain nothing but, on the other hand, forfeit the advantage of the argument we could produce before the Security Council of Pakistan's continued violation of the cease-fire. The matter was at one time taken up with the Prime Minister who, after consulting me, disapproved of the suggestion.

When the Jarring Report came up for discussion in the Security Council, India was represented by Krishna Menon. We briefed him fully about the continuing acts of Pakistani sabotage and explosions since the cease-fire and the mounting scale in which this had been attempted in the year 1957. Krishna Menon from the beginning took an aggressive attitude in the Security Council, refused to accept any resolution to which India was not a party and very ably and strongly refuted all the allegations made by Pakistan and the arguments of the Anglo-American bloc of countries. He listed all acts of aggression which Pakistan had committed in violation of the cease-fire agreement and various assurances which the Pakistani representatives had given to the Security Council and narrated the acts of aggression which were currently going on in furtherance of the massive effort at subversion, and asked pointedly what the Security Council was doing to stop this continuing aggression and to prevent this continuous violation of the cease-fire agreement. The Security Council had no answer and, in fact, the Jarring Report had gone against the attitude which the Security Council had been holding till then, and, with Krishna Menon's vehement opposition, the Security Council found itself helpless; and finally the Soviet veto sealed the fate of the Security Council

resolution. From then onwards it became apparent that the Security Council would not be able to pass any resolution which India did not fully accept. This really was a triumph for India and for the first time the Indian representative came out victorious and the Pakistanis retired crestfallen. There then followed a period during which, except for maintaining its observers on the cease-fire line, the Security Council allowed the India-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir to go into cold storage.

5 Beginnings of a Conspiracy

AS MENTIONED IN the last chapter, in order to counter and contain Pakistani attempts at creating disorders in the State by means of infiltration, sabotage and subversion, we set up a large number of counter-intelligence posts and these together with the forward intelligence posts helped us gradually to get a fair insight into the working of several of Pakistan's channels of communication with people inside Jammu and Kashmir. With this knowledge we then succeeded in penetrating three important channels, one from Hillan in Occupied Kashmir via Nilkanth Gali into Srinagar, the second from Lipa via Tangdhar to Srinagar and the third through an officer in the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi. For obvious reasons, I cannot describe how this penetration was effected. It was an epic of intelligence effort on the part of our Jammu and Kashmir staff. Once having penetrated these three channels, we gained control over Pakistan's communication system through them and came to know of several other channels already in operation or in the process of being set up. We succeeded in neutralising some of them but there were some left in respect of which we had to be satisfied with the end product only. We also once managed to remove the records from one of Pakistan's Intelligence Posts in Occupied Kashmir and this gave us valuable information about Pakistani contacts in Jammu and Kashmir and their plans for infiltrating saboteurs for destroying important targets.*

Shortly after the Sheikh's arrest, it was found that contact had been established by his supporters with Pakistani agents operated by one Major Asghar Ali (it might be a pseudonym) and letters had passed between the two sides specifying the terms under which the Pakistanis would be willing to assist the former.** Alerted by

* Exhibit No. P-214 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

** Exhibits No. P-11, P-15 and P-16 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

and acting on the information given by us, the Kashmir Police made several arrests and recovered many documents which proved the conspiratorial activities of the underground War Council that had been formed shortly after the Sheikh's arrest and later of the Plebscite Front set up by Mirza Afzal Beg. In one instance a large part of the office records of the Plebiscite Front was seized when these records were being surreptitiously removed from one place of hiding to another. Several Pakistani couriers were also captured along with documents or incriminating materials. At the time these arrests were made, *ad hoc* prosecutions were instituted mostly under the Security or the Foreigners Act and convictions were secured; but it was not yet time for a detailed examination and scrutiny of the documents, which was done later.

The incriminating letters recovered from Afzal Beg during his second arrest in 1956 had disclosed that regular communication was being maintained between the War Council and the Plebiscite Front leaders with those in jail, including Sheikh Abdullah, by means of couriers. One of these letters showed that the Sheikh had sent instructions to equate Pakistan with India in future.* From another, it transpired that a record of G. M. Sadiq's talks with Sheikh Abdullah** as also a copy of the letter which the Sheikh had written to Sadiq had been sent to Pakistan by the Plebiscite Front suggesting their simultaneous publication in several languages. In this there was also a mention of the letter addressed to the Security Council demanding plebiscite which had been smuggled to Pakistan.† The photostat copy of this letter

* Exhibit No. P-36 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

** Before this G. M. Sadiq, who was then the Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly had met Sheikh Abdullah in jail to get the latter's views on certain questions pending in the Assembly.

† Exhibit No. P-33 said: "All the copies of the conversation, letters to Ahrar (G. M. Sadiq) and copies of the statement have already been sent to Hyder Khan (Pakistan) and it has been emphasised that the publication of these letters in different languages should be synchronised with their publication here (Kashmir). The letter addressed to the Security Council (by Sheikh Abdullah) has also been sent to them (Pakistan). Those people wanted its original and certified copy which have also been sent. But they have been told not to make use of the original."

appeared in Pakistani papers in January, 1957 simultaneously with its presentation in the Security Council. Another passage of the seized letter mentioned that whilst weapons had been received from Pakistan, it was necessary to import saboteurs also, as it was not possible to raise them locally. The insidious character of this letter will be apparent from the following extract from it (translated into English): "A reliable man of Hyder Khan (Pakistan) came here last week. Long discussions were held with him and our position was explained to him in detail. They are preparing to come forward openly. I pointed out to him the harm which was occurring due to the indefinite postponement of the matter and it is possible, if it is delayed any further, irreparable damage may be done. Secondly, I pointed to him the necessity of pruning branches in the garden. They had sent the scissors and other material but a gardener is not available. So, he was asked to send a good gardener from his village (Pakistan) itself. The rot that has set in can be remedied by immediate pruning of branches. He wanted to know your opinion as to their future programme. So, if you think proper send detailed instructions..." This letter was written by a very important person in the State. Its seizure put us wise about some of the very important contacts which Pakistan had succeeded in making and the high level of her subversion. Another equally important contact also came into the picture later. These letters clearly indicated that the Plebiscite Front was in close contact with Pakistan and was acting in the latter's interest.

When Beg was free, Sajawal Khan, Pakistani Intelligence Officer from Hillan, visited Srinagar in August, 1955 to work out a plan for channelling Pakistani assistance to the Plebiscite Front. Unfortunately, due to a little delay in receiving this information, we could not trap this officer; and scenting danger he escaped into Pakistan without making any more contacts. Of course, Pakistan did not put all her eggs in one basket and, whilst giving massive support to the Plebiscite Front, she kept up contacts with and extended financial assistance to other groups also including Karra's Kashmir Political Conference.

Letters and communications to the Sheikh's supporters started

coming regularly through the channels controlled by us and were allowed to be passed on. Communication between the leaders outside and those inside the jail clearly showed that these messages used to be passed on to Sheikh Abdullah, who was then in prison at Kud. Rules regarding visitors were not observed strictly in respect of Sheikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg, and it was possible for visitors to go and meet them without being subjected to a search and Begum Abdullah was even allowed to stay with her husband on more than one occasion. Letters from the jail used to be smuggled out by such visitors and delivered to the Plebiscite Front leaders in Srinagar and other places and these gave them detailed directions about how to proceed with their organisational and agitational work. There was no criticism in them against Pakistan though it was well-known that the people of Occupied Kashmir were living in pitiable conditions with little or no political freedom. In one letter (Ex. 83) said to have been dictated to Pir Abdul Ghani by Afzal Beg under the authority of Sheikh Abdullah, there was clear mention of correspondence between Asad Saheb (Sheikh Abdullah) and Niazi (Pak IB Officer at Rawalpindi). In this it was also stressed that it would be very useful if Pakistan could get Sheikh Abdullah summoned before the Security Council in a regular way. These letters also fell into our hands during the process of their transit. Other letters were recovered during house-searches on the information that such letters had been received.* The contents of these letters revealed the ramifications of a conspiracy in the offing. By 1956 large sums of money in Indian currency started coming from Pakistan to the Sheikh's supporters and also other hostile groups.**

I have mentioned earlier how Masoodi enlisted Mridula Sarabhai's assistance in creating a pro-Sheikh lobby in Delhi. It was a great pity that this noble lady, coming from one of the most illustrious and patriotic families of Gujarat, and who had

* Exhibits No. P-25, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 80, 83, 96, 178 and 185 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

** Exhibits No. P-197, 201, 202, 203, 206, 207, 208 and 210 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

distinguished herself by devoted service to the Congress and as Mahatma Gandhi's Secretary, and was held in esteem by Pandit Nehru and all Congress leaders, was so loyal to Sheikh Abdullah that she could not see anything wrong in the Sheikh's speeches and actions, even when they went directly against India's interests. When a furore was caused in January, 1957 due to the smuggling out to the Security Council of the anti-Indian letter in the Sheikh's name, she refused to believe that he could be responsible for it and blamed the Indian Intelligence for fabricating it. She wrote to the Sheikh in jail asking him to contradict it but the latter in return snubbed her and told her not to interfere in matters which did not concern her. Yet her faith in the Sheikh remained unshaken. And because of this the Plebiscite Front circles exploited her to the maximum limit. Indeed her house in Delhi became a haven for the activities of the Plebiscite Front leaders some of whom even made contacts with the Pakistan High Commission from this place. They took advantage of her munificence and made her part with a considerable amount of money in course of a couple of years in order to finance the activities of the Plebiscite Front. She tolerated all this exploitation apparently believing that Sheikh Abdullah was basically pro-India and, properly handled, would yet put his weight on India's side.

We kept the Prime Minister and the Home Minister (Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant) generally informed of these goings on between Pakistan and the Plebiscite Front leaders. When substantial sums of money started coming from Pakistan, Pandit Pant expressed concern at the fact that we were allowing the money to be passed on though it was being used for anti-Indian purposes. I explained that unless the Government were prepared to take legal action, it would be rather foolish on our part to allow a link, penetrated with so much difficulty after years of hard work, to be snapped by withholding the payment. Pandit Pant was not satisfied but did not interfere in using our own discretion. But realising that the matter would soon come to a head, from the month of May, 1957, we started a systematic study of all the material which had come into our hands in a piecemeal manner over the previous three and a half years. We posted another senior officer to Srinagar for

this work and this also necessitated my visit to Srinagar every month thereafter.

Our anticipation did not go wrong. In August/September, 1957, Pandit Pant had gone to Srinagar. I was also there on one of my normal tours of inspection. At this time, a courier arrived from Pakistan with Rupees fifty thousand in Indian currency for two important persons in Srinagar. I produced the currency in its gunny packing before Pandit Pant and wanted his decision whether we should allow the money to reach its destination adding that, left to myself, I would do so. Pandit Pant wanted time to give a decision but did not till the time he left Srinagar two days later. In the meantime, I had allowed the money to be passed on. Several days later, at Delhi, he enquired from me what had happened to this money and I informed him that it had been paid to the addressees. Though he supported my action on this occasion, he desired that we should not allow this any longer and instead investigate the possibility of launching a case of conspiracy against the Plebiscite Front leaders and others who might also be connected with it. I replied that we were working on these lines and had collected a good deal of material to warrant the institution of a criminal case. I however added that so far all this was being done as an intelligence operation, but once we instituted a case and put it in court and provided the evidence, some part of our secret working would be exposed and so there should be no withdrawal from the case afterwards. Pandit Pant agreed and asked me to communicate this to the Prime Minister, which I did. The Prime Minister also concurred, though he made no commitment that a prosecution would necessarily follow. He was, however, keen that the material collected should be assessed properly in order to decide how far these leaders had individually and collectively indulged in a conspiracy.

So, we redoubled our efforts to marshal the evidence. Arrests of some of the culprits, who had committed acts of sabotage during the year 1957, also yielded valuable material and several confessions had been made throwing more light on this sustained effort at bringing about an insurrection. A letter written from jail to Pakistan for more massive financial assistance also

fell into our hands when passing through our net.

A conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and executed in darkness. As usual, the conspirators in this case also had taken the utmost care to ensure that their communications would not be intercepted and, even if it happened, they could not be easily understood and would give an innocent appearance. Words and phrases of common parlance were used but their significance could be understood only by the confederates. Codes and phrases related to both persons and materials and a code list was found containing over one hundred names. Arrests and seizure of documents forced them to change the codes. Sometimes even the father's name was used to signify a person. Sheikh Abdullah was referred to as Asadullah, Ahmed Sahib, Qaid-i-Azam, Bhai Saheb, Aziz, etc. Afzal Beg had the names Israel, Abdul Aziz, Akadare Islam, Nizamuddin, Bara Bhai, Mumtaz, etc. Money was referred to as Books, Rasalajat, Akhbar, Penicillin, Medicines, Amanat, Mal, Ande (eggs) etc.* Intrinsic evidence from various documents confirmed that letters were being taken in and out of the jail by visitors. In a letter written to the prisoner in jail in July, 1956, a Plebiscite Front leader wrote: "I feel it a rare pleasure in despatching this communication through Mohtrima Begum Sahiba".

By October, 1957, we had pieced together sufficient evidence to draw up a First Information Report** on a charge of conspiracy against eleven leaders of the Plebiscite Front including Mirza Afzal Beg, Pir Maqbool Gilani, Begum Abdullah, etc. to bring about a violent revolution in Jammu and Kashmir in order to overthrow the Government. Sheikh Abdullah was not included in the FIR as the evidence against him till then was not strong as we had not been able to decode all the captured documents. Both the Prime Minister and the Home Minister approved of our action in drawing up the FIR and Bakshi Saheb was also in full agreement.

Thereafter, all through the winter of 1957-58, every month I used to visit Kashmir for ten to twelve days at a stretch to review

* Exhibit No. P-38 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

** F.I.R. No. 100 dated October 9, 1957 of Kothibagh Police Station.

the progress of the investigation. We used to sit for twelve to fourteen hours a day in the bitterly cold room of a house, which we turned into our office for this purpose, and myself with the Assistant Director, the investigating officer, and an Advocate named R. K. Kaul, who was appointed by Bakshi Saheb to assist us on law points, used to go through the documents that had been recovered at various stages of arrests, searches, raids, etc. These were mostly in Urdu and in codes, and various code or nick names for the persons concerned were used, which were not known excepting amongst the immediately concerned circles of the Plebiscite Front. The AD's intimate knowledge of all the events that had taken place in Kashmir since 1953 and the arrests and searches and the consequent recoveries that had been made helped us to fix the dates as well as extract the hidden meaning out of many of these letters. He also could interpret many of the letters with the help of the intelligence which he had received at that time. The investigating officer who was well versed in Urdu, and R. K. Kaul, who had deep knowledge of Urdu and Kashmiri, helped us to interpret these writings. Mehra was also often called in to help us with Pushto and Persian words which frequently occurred in these documents. By the month of January, 1958, the entire range of the conspiracy became apparent and we found that we had built up a formidable case against all the accused mentioned in the FIR and also against Sheikh Abdullah and several others whose names had not been included in it. Higher legal assistance was necessary and B. B. Lal, Public Prosecutor of Delhi, was appointed for this purpose. At this stage Balbir Singh, Joint Director, came to my rescue and took off a great deal of load from my shoulders. With the help of B. B. Lal and the team that was working, he completed the scrutiny of the evidence within two months and by March, 1958, we were ready to submit a charge-sheet.

The conspiracy that ultimately unfolded itself before us was described in detail later by the magistrate in his judgment committing the accused to the Court of Sessions. The following summary from that judgment will explain the magnitude of that conspiracy and its ramifications. The Magistrate found that soon

after the arrest of Sheikh Mohd Abdullah on August 9, 1953, his friends, sympathisers and relations outside the jail started an orgy of violence which took the State Government three to four weeks to control. When this attempt at overthrowing the Government by means of criminal force was suppressed, these leaders started a propaganda war to foster contempt of and hatred and disaffection against the State Government, incite communal feelings and disharmony in the State and ultimately to create disturbance of peace and tranquillity in order to bring about a state of public disorder. The propaganda was also aimed at fostering hostile feelings amongst the people against India. The principal characters, who engineered this campaign, included Begum Abdullah, Khawaja Ali Shah (whose brother was married to Sheikh Abdullah's daughter and who was a trusted man of the Sheikh), several other important National Conference workers including one who had resigned from service on the day of the Sheikh's arrest, and Khawaja Ali Shah's sister, Saeeda Begum, who used to work amongst the women along with Sheikh Abdullah's daughter, and Saeeda Begum's son Ghulam Hassan Kanth. They established what they called a War Council to carry on these activities. The War Council issued posters and pamphlets, slogans and wall writings in order to carry on this propaganda. The Council also observed the 9th of every month as the Abdullah Day by exploding crackers in different parts of the town. From its inception the War Council left no doubt that it would stop at nothing, not even murders, for the attainment of its objective. Posters were issued inciting the people to kill Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. For a time Begum Abdullah financed the propaganda and also supplied the cyclostyling machine for preparing the posters. She then started contacting Pakistan and sent a trusted emissary to Azad Kashmir in September, 1953 to ascertain how far Pakistan's expression of sympathy on the arrest and detention of Sheikh Abdullah was genuine. This emissary contacted Major Asghar Ali, who was then the head of the Pakistani Intelligence in Azad Kashmir area, and he in his turn contacted his superiors at Rawalpindi and then informed Begum Abdullah that a high level emissary should be sent.

Thereafter, there was exchange of more letters between Begum Abdullah and Asghar Ali till the emissary was captured. Whilst these negotiations were going on, the Begum visited her husband in Udhampur Jail in the month of October, 1953 and stayed with him for several days. It could be reasonably presumed that she must have apprised Sheikh Abdullah of the progress of these negotiations and had his support.

In the meantime, the War Council went on publishing inflammatory pamphlets, posters and news bulletins and several centres were set up in different parts of the town, i. e. in the houses of Khawaja Ali Shah, Ghulam Mohd Butt, Ghulam Hassan Kanth and the house of the Begs at Anantnag. This was for the purpose of dispersing the records so as to avoid their wholesale capture in a raid. There was a good deal of propaganda against India in these pamphlets. The texts of many of the pamphlets came from Pakistan and, after cyclostyling, they were distributed in the valley. At Pakistan's instance, the War Council accused India of desecrating various places of Muslim worship in India, of showing disrespect to the Quran and of trying to reduce the Muslim majority in the valley by importing non-Muslims from outside. Abuses were hurled at Nehru who was accused of practising fake secularism. During raids by the Kashmir Police and as a result of arrests and searches from time to time, a large number of original pamphlets and correspondence with Pakistan was recovered. Much of this correspondence was in cryptic language and code names were used when referring to the conspirators.

More contacts with Pakistan started and a hand was taken in this by Pir Maqbool Gilani, who had originally been arrested with Sheikh Abdullah but had later been released. He along with another important person established contacts with Sheikh Abdullah through an employee of Kud jail, to which the Sheikh had been transferred by then, and through his help letters used to pass to and from the Sheikh. Gilani used to convey the Sheikh's wishes and requirements to the Pakistanis and, after gathering the reply, communicate it to him in jail. By November, 1954, Beg was released on medical grounds. The Sheikh advised him to visit Delhi to make contacts with the outside world, which Afzal

Beg did. Beg cleverly changed the name of the War Council to Plebiscite Front; thus the Plebiscite Front was born on August 9, 1955. Its ostensible object was to secure for the people of Kashmir the right to an impartial plebiscite which had been promised to them by India and also the Security Council; but the Front was only a comouflage for the War Council, which remained unaffected; and henceforward the work was carried on both openly and underground in the name of the Plebiscite Front and the War Council respectively. Beg was contacted in his house by a Pak Intelligence Officer, Sajawal Khan, on a day when he was holding a meeting of important party members and certain plans were discussed.

Thereafter, Pakistan started sending financial aid to the Plebiscite Front, and it came to various personages but a larger part of the money came to Begum Abdullah, who passed on the funds to various members of the Front. Mirza Afzal Beg opened two or three other lines of contact with Pakistan. That the main inspiration for this conspiracy was coming from the Sheikh was quite apparent from the contents of many of the letters which were written by the conspirators and also the letters which were written from the jail at the dictation or under the direction of Sheikh Abdullah and these conclusively proved that all these actions were being taken with his approval. After Mirza Afzal Beg was re-arrested in September, 1956, contact with Pakistan continued through the Begum and others. Earlier a letter from the Sheikh, demanding plebiscite, had been smuggled out to the Security Council through Pakistan. The conspirators had already planned to import arms and explosives as well as Razakars from Pakistan, and this was apparent from the letter recovered from Afzal Beg at the time of his re-arrest. One of the conspirators went to Lahore on the pretext of seeing the Indo-Pakistan Test Cricket Match but in reality to contact Pakistani Intelligence Officers at first hand and he brought back a lakh of rupees. Soon afterwards two important conspirators received a consignment of arms at Yus Maidan from a Pakistani emissary. Money also started coming from the contact in Pakistan High Commission. The conspirators also started sending information regularly to

Pakistan, which was broadcast from the Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radios for the benefit of the world, particularly of the Muslim countries. These invariably contained false and tendentious propaganda accusing India of genocide and suppressing the Muslims of the Kashmir valley. When Sheikh Abdullah found that all this propaganda was not having the desired effect on the people, he started inciting them in the name of religion by sending letters to some of his friends, which looked innocuous on the surface but which contained exhortations from the life of Hazrat Mohammad giving instances of how in spite of great difficulties and obstacles in his way, Hazrat Mohammad conquered all his adversaries. Sheikh Abdullah mentioned several battles which Hazrat Mohammad had fought and won even with much inferior forces. There was a clear incitement to the people not to be cowed down before the might of the Government but to rise with faith in their hearts as the followers of the Prophet had done.

It was clear that the range of this conspiracy was wide. Sheikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg were the directing heads and Begum Abdullah formed one of the important links with Pakistan for receiving money and directions; there were others also in contact with Pakistan like Pir Maqbool Gilani, Khawaja Ali Shah and Ibrahim Jehangir. Their aim was to carry on an incessant propaganda against the Bakshi Government and the Government of India by means of posters, pamphlets, news sheets, wall writings and by the word of mouth to antagonise the Muslims of Kashmir valley against the Bakshi Government and against India. In this way an atmosphere was to be created in which it would be easy for Pakistani agents to operate and undertake explosions, sabotages and killings, because it was felt that the people of Kashmir themselves would not willingly come forward to commit these acts of violence however much they might sympathise with the cause. Pakistan went on financing the conspiracy by pumping in large sums of money and also sending large quantities of arms and ammunition. By 1957, on the basis of the information received from the conspirators, Pakistan considered that the ground was ready for a revolution and sent large groups of

infiltrators (code name *gardeners*) who carried out a series of explosions and sabotages, in which several lives were lost. Some of these attempts were foiled because of timely information received, but in other cases, the infiltrators got through and, before they could be trapped, the mischief had taken place. There was no doubt that these frustrated Kashmiri leaders, in conjunction with Pakistan, had conspired to bring about a state of utter anarchy and disorder in Jammu and Kashmir by propaganda and by large-scale acts of violence and killing with a view to overthrowing the lawfully constituted Government of Jammu and Kashmir. That they did not succeed was not due to any want of preparations on their part but because the Kashmiri people were unwilling to be hustled into any irrevocable course of action. Besides that, association with India had brought much material benefit to them and the Bakshi Government was popular and, by and large, had met the aspirations of the people. Police vigilance had also made it impossible for the conspirators to plan anything properly and much less to implement the plans.

6 Release and Re-arrest

THE PRIME MINISTER had never reconciled himself to Sheikh Abdullah's arrest and detention for a prolonged period without trial. The democrat that he was, he could not tolerate detention without trial even of his confirmed enemies. So, he used to press the Kashmir Government every six months or even oftener either to place the Sheikh on trial or to release him. Our investigation received a severe jolt when on January 8, 1958, Sheikh Abdullah was released. At that time we had pieced together a great deal of evidence against him and it was apparent that he was the main conspirator and if he was left out it would be difficult to proceed against other accused persons because they could always disavow the Sheikh. Moreover, the question would always arise in a subsequent trial as to why the Sheikh was released at a time when the Prosecution had collected sufficient incriminating material against him to warrant a charge sheet, and it could always be argued that even by that time the Prosecution did not have enough material against him and any evidence subsequently produced could be looked upon with suspicion. However, our only hope was that, intoxicated with his newly found liberty, which he must have ascribed to his strength in Kashmir valley and which ultimately the Government could not ignore, the Sheikh might stick his head out too much and in that process expose himself further, and bring to light more incriminating evidence against himself; and this is what happened.

Sheikh Abdullah spurned the offer of the State Government to airlift him to Srinagar and even the loan of a Government vehicle. He hired a car and made a most dramatic return to the valley through the Banihal Pass halting at places on the way where people flocked to see him from nearby villages. He behaved as if he was a king returning to his country after exile for

re-installation. He was met by large crowds all along the route and he was received and lionised by the masses at Srinagar.

Thereafter he started holding public meetings in different parts of the city every day. He delivered most intemperate speeches against the Bakshi Government and the Government of India. He called Bakshi a traitor and usurper and incited the people to throw him out and give him the treatment that all traitors deserved. He challenged the right of the Government of India to be the arbiters of Kashmir's fate and demanded that the people should be given the right to decide this for themselves. In this way, day after day, the Sheikh went on building up mass hysteria. It was apparent that the situation was heading for a crisis and within a few days, Sheikh Abdullah, by the very power of popular support, might be able to oust Bakshi and seize power in spite of the presence of the Indian Army in the valley. And to this end, he carefully marshalled his forces. He gave a call for a mammoth meeting on Friday, January 17 at Pathar Masjid, situated right in front of the Mujahid Manzil, the headquarters of the National Conference, in a supreme bid to capture it. This was an issue of great prestige, because in the valley the metaphor had taken deep root that 'he who controlled the Mujahid Manzil ruled the valley'. The seizure of this office would have been a signal for his supporters to rebel openly against the ruling party and seize the National Conference offices all over the valley. It would have been then a simple task for the Sheikh to lead huge mobs into the seats of administration and take them over and arrest Bakshi and his supporters or hand them over to the mobs. The whole city was tense—so was the whole valley; this was going to be the Sheikh's D-day. The day caused great anxiety to Pandits Nehru and Pant and from the morning both of them went on enquiring how things were developing. Mehra had arranged his men to guard the Mujahid Manzil and any attempt to seize it by force would have led to bloodshed. But how many people could the police shoot? It would have been impossible to stop the crowd collected at Pathar Masjid pouring into the Mujahid Manzil. The crowd at Pathar Masjid had begun collecting since the morning. The number went on increasing till by midday

well-nigh 20,000 people had collected. More were moving along the roads leading to this place—ready to enter the lists but not quite prepared to confront the armed police. There was great expectation, mingled with much anxiety, about the outcome of the battle that was to begin any moment. Every one was anxiously waiting for the Sheikh's arrival. But the hero did not appear. At the last moment his courage failed. He had never faced bullets and he was not going to do it now! What would happen to Kashmir if he died! So, whilst the crowd at Pathar Masjid went on waiting for him, he went to Hazratbal where he gave vent to his anger and frustration by delivering one of his bitterest speeches against Bakshi and against the Government of India. At Pathar Masjid, the crowd waited impatiently with their ardour diminishing every minute, and, as the winter night approached, they gradually faded away. This was an anti-climax and, by his last minute withdrawal, the "lion" had not only let down his admirers and caused the greatest disillusionment amongst his supporters, but had exposed his weak spots also. Was this the leader, who had worked up the feelings of the people during the previous seven days in the name of Hazrat Mohammad bidding them to rise, face bullets if necessary and drive away their oppressors? What had happened to him that he even failed to make an appearance when the crowd was poised, under his bidding, to seize the Mujahid Manzil? This was to be their supreme moment when they could seize power and yet they had been balked of their prize—not due to any action by the Government but because the lion had developed cold feet. The hero had come down greatly in the estimation of his people!

When we reported this to Pandits Nehru and Pant, it relieved them of much anxiety. It was a moment of political triumph for Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. His action in releasing Sheikh Abdullah was politically vindicated, if by nothing else, by this failure of the Sheikh to lead his people to victory. Thereafter, though the Sheikh's power of mischief still remained considerable and could not yet be ignored, his charm had been lost and he was no longer the idol who could move the people in any way he liked. They would weigh his words and judge the consequences before they would

move; they would not follow him blindly. Bakshi played this up extremely well and maintained his firm hold not only on the administration but also on the National Conference and came out almost as the Sheikh's equal in popular estimation. In spite of the fact that the Sadiq group had at that time left the National Conference and was non-cooperating with the Government, Bakshi showed tremendous powers of organization and leadership. But the fight was not yet over. A further test was soon to come giving a second opportunity to the Sheikh and Bakshi to measure their respective strengths against each other.

The test came on the Republic Day of 1958 (January 26), which Bakshi had planned to celebrate in a grand way as a counter-blast to the Sheikh's agitation in the valley. All through the years the Sheikh had been in detention, there had been much clandestine propaganda in the Kashmir valley, the refrain of which could be heard even in Delhi, that Bakshi could thrive only so long as Sheikh Abdullah was out of the way. Once the latter regained his freedom and came back to the valley, it was widely believed that Bakshi would have no leg to stand on. So Bakshi naturally wanted to demonstrate his own hold on the people of Kashmir in spite of the Sheikh's open and violent propaganda against him. Sheikh Abdullah could not tolerate that India's Independence Day would be celebrated in a big way in Kashmir when he was not in the Government, and from the sacred altar of Hazratbal he issued a "*firman*" for the complete boycott of this function by the people of Kashmir. So this was going to be a trial of strength between these two giants and it was apprehended that serious disturbances might break out on this day with Bakshi insisting on implementing the full plan of the Republic Day celebrations and the Sheikh persisting with his boycott call.

Pandit Nehru was a bit alarmed because this trial of strength might result in bloodshed if both the rivals persisted with their plans. So he asked me to go to Srinagar and ensure that no violence took place to mar the day. He suggested that, rather than suffering an orgy of violence, it would be better to forego those parts of the celebrations which might encounter opposition from the Sheikh's supporters. Any disturbance in the valley on this day

would receive very adverse press comments throughout the world. He was emphatic that there should be no bloodshed and, if this was likely, the Republic Day celebrations should be confined only to the hoisting of the flag and a march past by the troops and the police.

I arrived in Srinagar on January 24, 1958 and, after collecting full information from our officers, discussed the situation with Bakshi Saheb and Mehra, the Inspector General of Police. I found that the most important part of the programme was a huge procession of about 50,000 people, sponsored by the National Conference, to be taken over a route nearly five miles long through the most congested parts of Srinagar town. These roads were very narrow and tortuous and the population in this part of the town was supposed to be under the Sheikh's control. I enquired whether this part of the programme could not be omitted because it was obvious that disturbances might easily break out when the procession would be passing through this congested area. The provocation might come from the processionists or from the opponents but the result would be same. It would be extremely difficult to control rioting in this area and soon the whole town might be in conflagration. But Bakshi said that his National Conference people had the upper hand and they had clear instructions that they should be peaceful even if provoked with jeers, black-flags and stones and must not retaliate and thus give scope for disturbances to break out, as this was exactly what the Sheikh wished to happen. I expressed grave doubts about the feasibility of conducting a peaceful procession through this inflammable area and again pressed for the abandonment of this part of the day's programme. But Bakshi would not agree. It was a question of life and death with him and if he had to bow down to the Sheikh's threat of boycott of the Republic Day, then he would not be able to face the people any longer and would rather bow out of the Government. I then consulted Mehra. He also felt confident that he would be able to tackle the situation and there would not be any large scale disturbances calling for drastic use of force, though small scale disturbances might take place. In the evening, I telephoned to

the Prime Minister and gave him an account of my talks with Bakshi and what the latter had told me about his own views in the matter. Pandit Nehru said that he understood Bakshi's sentiments and hoped that his own premonitions would turn out to be baseless and in any case he wanted me and Mehra to take every possible precaution to prevent large scale disturbances.

It was bitterly cold and snowed and rained the whole day and night of January 25. Mehra and I went round the route along which the procession was due to pass and planned the necessary precautionary measures. The town was quite tense and people were generally apprehensive of serious disturbances breaking out if the Republic Day procession went through this part of the town. It was snowing and raining when the day broke on the 26th morning and the prospects of a large gathering at any of the functions looked dim. But surprisingly the parade in the morning, in spite of bad weather, was a great success and was conducted in a peaceful atmosphere with a large audience, which included not only the invitees but many ordinary people from the town as well. We kept our fingers crossed as the main trouble was expected in the afternoon at the time of the procession. We alerted the troops and had police reserves at several places *en-route*. Mehra and I went to the most congested part of the town, where trouble could be apprehended, and took up our positions at vantage points to watch the progress of the procession. It was mud, mud and mud everywhere. It was bitterly cold, the wind was piercing and it was raining incessantly. Surprisingly there was not a single black flag to be seen throughout the procession route. If black flags had been hoisted the previous night, they must have been pulled down by the National Conference workers early in the morning. The Abdullah supporters kept themselves indoors, both due to inclement weather and fear of trouble. Then the procession came. It wended its way through the narrow lanes and by-lanes, overroads which were a foot deep in mud and water. It was an unending sight; and it was most exhilarating. The procession went on and on and it must have been over two miles long and we stood there for over two hours waiting for the tail-end of the procession. Finally, the

procession emerged out of the old city area and converged in a huge meeting of about 40,000 people in the Civil Lines. There Bakshi Saheb addressed them on the sanctity of the day and complimented them on the fine spirit the people had shown in spite of the most adverse climatic conditions. The people's response, enthusiasm and discipline exhibited on this day, in spite of the adverse propaganda let loose by some self-styled leaders, affirmed their faith in their abiding unity with India, which no power on the earth could shake. It was clear that not only had the Sheikh's boycott call completely failed but that his supporters did not even dare stick their heads out and create any obstructions or difficulties in the observance of this day by the National Conference. It was also clear that the Sheikh could no longer move the people of Srinagar as he liked and that Bakshi could now face up to him. In the evening, after gathering reports about the peaceful celebration of the day all over the valley, I rang up the Prime Minister and later Pandit Pant to inform them of the day's proceedings, particularly of the success of the procession. They were both very happy and Pandit Nehru asked me to convey his congratulations to Bakshi Ghulam Mohd which I did. Naturally, Bakshi was very happy and highly elated and asked us to a dinner in his house that night to celebrate this occasion.

Though he suffered two serious political defeats, within three weeks of his release from jail, Sheikh Abdullah was not yet vanquished. He continued to hold propaganda meetings all over the valley in which he delivered inflammatory speeches inciting the people to shed their fears and rise against the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. He tried to excite their passions to a pitch when violence would automatically erupt, thereby creating insurrectionary conditions in the State. His usual technique was to recite from the holy Quran such passages as described the fight of Hazrat Mohammad and his supporters against their opponents and the infidels and in course of this the Sheikh would compare Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and his supporters with those infidels and other opponents of Hazrat Mohammad. Hazratbal Shrine became his favourite platform for delivering

political sermons and he misused the sanctity of the place by utilising the prayer gatherings on Fridays and other sacred days for his most pernicious propaganda against the State and the Central Government. One of his themes was to disabuse the Muslim mind of any sense of gratitude for the large economic aid which India was giving to Kashmir at some sacrifice to herself. Lest the Kashmiri people be swayed by this act of generosity, the Sheikh exhorted them to starve rather than get food from the infidels. He also sent out secret instructions to the rural areas for the recruitment of Razakars. We could not use shorthand stenographers to record these speeches as they would be beaten up by the Razakars. So, we adopted other methods to do the same and got accurate records of all these speeches, which were later used in the trial.

It was obvious that the Sheikh was trying to build up the tempo of the agitation to such heights again that people's anger would boil over and they would automatically rise; but finding that the phlegmatic and discerning people of Kashmir heard him and even joined him in shouting criticisms against India and the Kashmir Government but would not rise in revolt, on February 21, 1958 he made a more direct appeal for violence after quoting extensively from the Quran and citing the incidents where people had risen in rebellion against oppression. The Sheikh also told the volunteers and Razakars who had put on badges and had collected there, that just as they did not require any special exhortation to come and work in the meeting, similarly they should not require any special exhortation for doing other acts. The meaning was plain. The Sheikh was exhorting these people to go out of the shrine and take the law into their own hands and so it happened. Though the main assembly remained unmoved, some of the conspirators and the Razakars rushed out of the Hazratbal grounds and attacked the National Conference office at Raj Bagh, in which one National Conference worker was killed and about thirty others were injured. They also burnt a jeep belonging to the National Conference, damaged a police wireless vehicle and destroyed some shops. But when arrests were made, the courage of these fighters failed and they did not

make any more attacks on the installations of the Government or of the National Conference.*

Whilst this open exhortation at violence and disorder was going on, Sheikh Abdullah was also holding secret meetings in his house in which the question of demanding a plebiscite for merging the State with Pakistan, large-scale enlistment of Razakars, who could be imparted instructions in the handling of bombs and other arms, which were being received from Pakistan, and making contacts with Pakistan were planned. Large amounts of money also started coming both from the contact in the office of the Deputy High Commission of Pakistan at Chandigarh and from Pakistan direct. Some of this money was received by Begum Abdullah. How else could the propaganda and the Razakars be financed? There were no local funds from which these large expenses could be met. As things were coming to a climax and it was apparent that the Sheikh was doing everything possible to join hands with Pakistan and by creating disorders in the State to give an excuse to Pakistan to intervene directly, he was re-arrested on April 30, 1958. At the time of his arrest, a draft of the Plebiscite Front resolution, dated April 7, 1958, which gave a clear call for breaking the ties with India and more or less accepted accession to Pakistan as the aim of the Front, was recovered from his house. The draft had many corrections in Sheikh Abdullah's own hand, proving clearly that he had taken part in its preparation.**

*First Information Report No. 25 dated February 21, 1958 of Srinagar Sadar Police Station.

**Exhibit No. P-169 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

7 The Kashmir Conspiracy Case

IN THE MEANTIME upset by the Sheikh's hostile activities, Pandit Nehru made several enquiries to ascertain what progress had been made in the investigation of the conspiracy case and I assured him that it was making good progress. By the month of March, when the Sheikh's dangerous activities became only too apparent and it was clear that he was doing his best to bring about a state of anarchy in Kashmir and destroy its ties with India, Pandit Nehru became impatient with the delay in the investigation. He probably felt that we were dragging our feet as our previous claim of having discovered a big conspiracy could not be substantiated. The Home Minister, Pandit Pant, having more experience in such matters, knew that the investigation of a big conspiracy case like this would invariably take a long time. I have mentioned earlier that by the end of January, 1958 our investigation had been completed; but then B. B. Lal, Advocate, had to make his independent appraisal of the collected material from the legal point of view and give us his opinion whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant a trial in court and, if so, he had to prepare a brief, which we would have to produce before the Attorney-General for his opinion, as a case of conspiracy had to be sanctioned by the Government before a complaint could be filed. B. B. Lal considered that we had a very strong case against Sheikh Abdullah, Begum Abdullah, Afzal Beg and several others and his brief was ready for submission to the Government by the middle of March, 1958. But we were in no hurry to submit the charge-sheet. When the Sheikh was released, we were sure that he would indulge in such activities as would enable us to get further direct evidence against him, and so we preferred to wait for a while. His inflammatory speeches, his call to raise Razakars, the Hazratbal rioting and murder, the Plebiscite Front manifesto and the receipt of

large sums of money from Pakistan by the Begum during his presence in the house all went to further strengthen the case. Actually, he could be indicted even on the basis of his activities during the period of his freedom. When he was sent back to jail, we were quite satisfied that he had built up an unassailable case against himself.

So, when about the end of March, 1958, Pandit Nehru insisted that we must produce the brief within a week, we were in a position to do it the very next day. This consisted of sixteen hundred and odd pages of typed material in which the evidence had been carefully marshalled by B. B. Lal and Balbir Singh. Of course, Pandit Nehru could not scrutinise all this and he passed in on to Pandit Pant to take a decision. We gave a copy to the Attorney-General who wanted two weeks' time to study it. Another copy was also given to the Law Minister, A. K. Sen, on whom Pandit Pant used to depend a great deal. Pandit Nehru used to call a meeting at his house almost every evening with A. K. Sen, Sri Setalvad, the Attorney-General, Nair, the Kashmir Government Legal Remembrancer, Balbir Singh and myself. Sometimes the Prime Minister also joined and Bakshi Saheb was also summoned on two or three occasions. Jai Gopal Sethi was then being considered for appointment as the Chief Prosecution Counsel and he also joined these discussions. On Balbir Singh fell the most onerous task of going through the evidence in detail with the Law Minister, the Attorney-General, Jai Gopal Sethi and Sri G. S. Pathak who had also been summoned by Pandit Pant for consultation. He had to stay night after night with these eminent lawyers to make them understand the full background of this case. It was not a simple task to explain the various ramifications of such a big conspiracy, nor was it easy even for the most competent lawyer to grasp the details in a day or two by hearing the narrative. Unless one went through all the original documents—and there were hundreds of them in Urdu, written mostly in cryptic language using code names—and became properly acquainted with the political situation as it was then developing, it was impossible to understand their full significance. From the intelligence angle we had been working on this line since 1953 and it had grown on us, and from the

month of August, 1957, we were working in a concentrated way on this case as a team and so we could clearly see the development of the conspiracy month by month since August 1953 and its various interconnections. It was impossible to pass on all this knowledge by mere discussions. A counsel had to go deep into these documents and then get the meaning clarified and connect oblique and even vague references in a document with facts which occurred outside, statements which were made at different places, and even political statements which were made in India or Pakistan or the United Nations, and then only he could understand the case properly. B. B. Lal had also worked on it for three months and so by now he also had a good understanding. It was an uphill task for Balbir Singh all the way, but so accurately and perfectly did he do his job that, after a fortnight's discussion, Jai Gopal Sethi told Pandit Pant that he was perfectly satisfied with the evidence and was of the view that no court in British India could have acquitted this case and no court in Independent India would do it. He further said that he had handled many big conspiracy cases either as a Prosecution or as a Defence Counsel but he had never seen one in which the evidence was so perfect in all respects as this. A. K. Sen and G. S. Pathak, with whom also Balbir Singh had worked hard for many days, also came to the same opinion. Sri M. C. Setalvad had withdrawn from the case earlier for want of time.

This was a period of great strain for Balbir and myself. We attended Pandit Pant's meetings day after day and had to meet all criticisms and questions and remove all doubts of these legal luminaries point by point; but the most exacting of them all was Pandit Pant himself. Nothing escaped his notice and over a period of four to five weeks, in the presence of these lawyers and the Law Minister, he went over the entire range of the conspiracy point by point and at last gave his verdict that the case should be charge sheeted, and he communicated this view to the Prime Minister also. We were happy that ultimately all our labour had succeeded and these arch-enemies of India were going to face a trial. We had no doubt about the result.

But there were disappointments still on the way. Pandit Pant

called a final meeting to decide on the charge-sheet. Pandit, Nehru, Bakshi, A. K. Sen and myself were present. Bakshi at this stage declared that whatever might be the strength of the evidence against Begum Abdullah, he could not agree to her prosecution. Muslim opinion in Kashmir valley would not excuse him for dragging this lady, who was known as "Madr-e-Meharban", to the courts. I argued that without her in the trial we would miss one of the main connecting links with Pakistan and this would greatly weaken our case; but on this question Bakshi would not budge; and Pandit Nehru also agreed with him. We then had to make a re-appraisal of the evidence without the Begum as an accused and at the end we felt that the case could go on even without her. But a greater disappointment awaited us when a couple of days later Pandit Nehru decided that Sheikh Abdullah should not be prosecuted. We were in a quandary because for years we had been told that Sheikh Abdullah could not be indefinitely detained without trial and now that a proper charge-sheet had been prepared and legal opinion left no doubt about his directing hand in the conspiracy, we were being told that he could not be put on trial. Of course, the reasons for this decision were political. India had built up her moral case about Kashmir's accession around Sheikh Abdullah; but if now it was proved that the Sheikh was attempting to take the State to Pakistan, it might embarrass India a great deal. We became extremely doubtful about the ultimate success of the case without the two principal accused. All our arguments against this decision were of no avail and we had to bow our heads to it. We were not certain whether the case would be allowed even against the two Pirs—Pir Maqbool Gilani and Pir Maqbool Wilgami—who were also important conspirators. Bakshi had some mental reservations about them also because of their religious status but he did not insist on their being left out. Ultimately on May 21, 1958 a complaint was filed in the court of the Special Magistrate, Jammu, under section 121-A and 120-B of the Ranbir Penal Code and Section 32 of the Security Rules against 25 conspirators, including Mirza Afzal Beg, Pir Maqbool Gilani, Pir Maqbool Wilgami and others. In the charge-sheet there were

also names of five Pakistanis who had assisted in this conspiracy. There were nearly 40 other co-conspirators who were not included in the charge-sheet but were mentioned in the complaint.

Then the search for a Prosecution Counsel started. Jai Gopal Sethi commanded a large practice in Delhi. He had appeared either as Prosecution or Defence Counsel in many big conspiracy cases in undivided Punjab. He had taken part in the day to day discussions before Pandit Pant, and had fully grasped all the ramifications of this case. So he was naturally our first choice. But at this stage, in spite of our best persuasions, he expressed his inability to take on this big case, as it would necessitate his stay at Jammu for a continued period of three years or more which he estimated would be the minimum required for the trial, and such a long absence from Delhi would affect his future practice. We tried for lawyers from Bombay and Madras, but they also declined on similar grounds. Ultimately, J.P. Mitter, Barrister from Calcutta, was selected by the Law Minister, and he joined in the beginning of June. Again, Balbir Singh and B.B. Lal had to stay with him at Srinagar for over two weeks to give him proper briefing. Then B.B. Lal left on grounds similar to those given by Jai Gopal Sethi. We, in the meantime, appointed M.L. Nanda, DIG of Police, Punjab, who had a most distinguished career as a Police Prosecutor in Punjab and had also distinguished himself as an executive officer, as the Chief Police Prosecutor in this case. He was notified as a Public Prosecutor by the State Government, and so he could take part in the prosecution on his own right. He became our mainstay in this case and outlasted several counsels and stayed till the end. R.K. Kaul, a local Advocate, who had assisted us at the stage of investigation, also stayed with the prosecution till the end.

In October, 1958, J.P. Mitter put up a note to the Government to the effect that without Sheikh Abdullah it would be impossible to prosecute the case successfully. If he were an absconder, the case would have been different; but as he was under detention, not to produce him as an accused for open trial, when he was the leader of the conspiracy, would constitute a serious and irreme-

diable flaw and would give cause for legitimate charges by the Defence that the Government had skeletons in the cupboard and so it did not dare bring Sheikh Abdullah to trial. We all met at Pandit Pant's place, where the Law Minister was also present, and Pandit Pant then agreed with J.P. Mitter that the Sheikh should be prosecuted and on his advice Pandit Nehru also ultimately agreed. Bakshi also finally acquiesced in this. So, a supplementary complaint was filed in court against Sheikh Abdullah on the 23rd of October, 1958 and the trying court joined this case with the case against the other accused persons.

Then J.P. Mitter left because of some differences with the Kashmir Government over the political line he wanted to adopt in the conduct of this case. We were again in search of a senior and experienced lawyer who would agree to stay at Jammu for the whole period, and the Law Minister appointed Nageshwar Prasad, an ex-Judge of the Patna High Court, who was considered to be the best criminal practitioner in Eastern India. Pandit Nehru at this time, finding our difficulty about Prosecution Counsels, summoned G.S. Pathak, who was then a Member of the Rajya Sabha, and made a personal appeal to him to take up the case. For G.S. Pathak to take up this case was very difficult as he was very busy with his professional work. But the call of Pandit Nehru was irresistible and so he became the Senior Counsel. Gopinath Dikshit, Member Lok Sabha, also came with him. However, G.S. Pathak and Gopinath Dikshit stayed at Delhi, and the main brunt of the case fell on Nageshwar Prasad. After working on the case for some months, Nageshwar Prasad was also convinced that the case was perfect and gave out before Pandit Pant that in his long experience of criminal cases he had never handled such a big conspiracy case which was so fool-proof. The accused appointed a famous British lawyer, Dingle Foot, of international fame, who brought with him his junior, J.O. Kellock, who stayed at Jammu while Dingle Foot went away after the opening of the case. On the Defence side there were several local lawyers who did the day to day work and more than one Delhi lawyer also lent a helping hand, particularly when petitions etc. came up before the High Court. Dingle Foot's appointment was sponsored by Pakistan,

who also paid the fees. Large sums came to the Begum, both directly from Pakistan and through the contact in Pakistan High Commission, for conducting the defence.* Mridula Sarabhai also opened her purse strings liberally for the Sheikh's defence.

Sheikh Abdullah's greatest supporter in Delhi, as mentioned earlier, was Mridula Sarabhai. Single-handed she carried on an unrelenting propaganda against the Bakshi Government and the Government of India (without mentioning Pandit Nehru), the IB and the Security Forces in Kashmir, calling them the conspirators responsible for the Sheikh's incarceration. One must give credit to her tenacity and single-mindedness for the way she pursued her efforts and, in the end, did actually succeed in converting a large number of MPs and other eminent personalities to the view that the prosecution against the Sheikh should be withdrawn. She knew human psychology and was well-versed in methods of propaganda and she knew that if one repeated an allegation a hundred times, people might start believing that there was some truth in it. Pandit Nehru, of course, was always kind and tolerant to her, though on many occasions he told me that she was completely misguided. But he felt that in free democratic India even such persons should be given the freedom to canvass their views. When the Sheikh was released temporarily in January, 1958, Mridula immediately joined him in Srinagar and helped him in his propaganda work. Nobody could accuse Mridula Sarabhai of any anti-Indian feelings, but, unfortunately, she never realised that she was being exploited by extremely anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani people who used her house, her car, her telephone, her money, and almost everything she possessed in order to carry on a conspiracy against India with the help of Pakistan. Even Pir Maqbool Gilani's escape to Pakistan was probably within her knowledge. She, however, met one redoubtable opponent in Pandit Pant and all her pleadings and propaganda left him cold. Ultimately, the Home Minister had to take cognizance of her activities, which were becoming more and more pronouncedly anti-Indian, and order her detention under the Preventive Detention Act. Though Pandit Nehru himself was most reluctant, he agreed to this step because there was no other

* Exhibits No. P-212 and P-257 in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.

alternative and all his personal efforts to correct her had failed.

Immediately after the complaint was filed, and even before the case was opened in court, the accused started delaying tactics and on various issues made over a dozen references to the High Court and three to the Supreme Court on flimsy grounds and these were all rejected; but they inevitably delayed the opening of the case from May, 1958 to April, 1959. So eleven months had been lost in simply getting over the preliminary objections raised by the accused persons without the Prosecution having been able to tender a single witness. Even when the case opened, at every opportunity the accused asked for adjournments and delayed the proceedings; and though the case was then going through the committal stage, all Prosecution witnesses, even formal witnesses to house searches and recoveries, were subjected to long cross-examinations with the only purpose of delaying the completion of the committal stage as long as possible.

When Sheikh Abdullah was brought to the court for the first time on October 24, 1958 he was in a mood of bravado and immediately assumed command over other accused persons. He occupied seat No. 1 displacing Afzal Beg who had so far led his colleagues. When the case opened he would address the court in commanding tones and assumed a haughty posture and said he would expose the prosecutors. But, after the opening address and the leading in of some evidence regarding the Begum's activities, he became crest-fallen and receded to the background, restoring the No. 1 seat to Afzal Beg.

However, the Prosecution which had opened the case in April, 1959, was able to close it on June 17, 1960 after examining 229 witnesses and exhibiting nearly 300 documents. This was a record to be proud of because in few conspiracy cases of this magnitude in India, with obstructions raised at every stage, had the prosecution been able to complete its evidence so speedily. This was all due to the ability and patience with which Nageshwar Prasad conducted the case ably assisted by M.L. Nanda. In spite of all the insults that were heaped upon him, Nageshwar Prasad remained cool and would not be provoked and his imperturbable temper blunted all the thrusts aimed at him.

Then came the turn of the accused to be examined by the court under section 342 Cr. P. C. Each of them made a very lengthy statement which was almost unadulterated political propaganda. These propagandist statements were later published by the Plebiscite Front in the form of books and freely distributed in the valley. This drama went on for seven long months and ultimately ended in March, 1961. Arguments then started and though the Prosecution Counsel presented his case in a business-like way, confining himself only to the facts of the conspiracy and the violent acts perpetrated in pursuance of it, the counsels on the side of the defence again used their arguments to make political propaganda, and when one ended, probably due to sheer exhaustion, another started and continued as long as he physically could. Even this process ended in October, 1961. The magistrate then took three months to deliver his judgment.

This filibustering tactics cost the accused nothing. They would have been in jail, under preventive detention, in any case. The open trial gave them the advantage to carry on their propaganda from the court. The leading accused like Sheikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg were enjoying all the facilities in the Special Jail. Their families were paid handsome allowances; all the educational expenses of their sons in colleges were met and they lived like Nawab's sons; the prisoners got special diet in jail; their rooms were fully furnished and fitted with aircoolers in summer; and there was no restriction on interviews with relatives and friends. The special considerations they got from the Government gave them an exaggerated notion of their importance.

On January, 25, 1962, the magistrate passed orders committing all the accused persons to the Court of Sessions. The following extract from the committal order would show that the Prosecution had been able to establish a *prima facie* case against the accused persons:

"The evidence—oral and documentary—discussed heretofore, and the circumstances of the case, would appear to make a *prima facie* case and sufficient grounds for holding the conspi-

racy proved as alleged by the prosecution, to hold that the accused present in the court, and the absconding accused, as also the Pakistani officials who are accused in this case were, among others, members of this conspiracy. In short, the prosecution would appear to have *prima facie* proved this conspiracy against these accused persons to warrant these accused persons being committed to the Court of Sessions to stand their trial for a charge under section 121-A Ranbir Penal Code and under section 120-B Ranbir Penal Code read with Rule 32 of the J and K Security Rules, Samvat 1996 and under that rule 32."

An offence under section 121-A of the Ranbir Penal Code was punishable with transportation for life and that under section 120-B of the Ranbir Penal Code would be punishable with death or transportation for life—as in this case several murders had been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is worth mentioning that out of the 229 witnesses mostly from the Kashmir valley, who were produced by the Prosecution, only one man, who had been convicted in a bomb case, turned hostile and all the others remained true to the statements they had made during the investigation. This was remarkable, because they were giving evidence against Sheikh Abdullah, the Sher-e-Kashmir, who was supposed to be the undisputed leader of the valley and on whose behalf persistent propaganda was being carried on that he would soon come back and take over the government and all the supporters of Bakshi would meet their deserved fate. Many of these Prosecution witnesses were subjected to threats and intimidation by members of the Plebiscite Front, but yet they stood fast.

8 Propaganda Tells

THE ACCUSED PERSONS made every possible effort to delay the completion of the trial. Often they created scenes in the court. The Prosecution Counsel and M.L. Nanda were often insulted and ridiculed and it was with great difficulty that they could maintain their dignity. Many times the accused almost non-cooperated with the court. They even insulted the magistrate. On the slightest pretext they moved for revision in the High Court, forcing an adjournment of the case. Unfortunately, the Kashmir Magistrate could not take a strong attitude and so the accused had things very much their own way. But, whilst the accused delayed the proceedings of the case at Jammu by placing every form of obstruction to the proceedings at every step, their propaganda machinery in Delhi, working under Mridula Sarabhai, went on alleging that it was the Prosecution which was deliberately delaying the trial because it had really no evidence against Sheikh Abdullah and others and was, therefore, afraid of exposing its case before the Defence, and was resorting to this tactics in order to hold these accused persons in indefinite custody on the excuse of a trial. Most of the blame was ascribed to Bakshi though, of course, Bakshi himself had nothing to do with the conduct of the prosecution. The propaganda took such a persistent and virulent shape that even Pandit Nehru was swayed by it and on several occasions he enquired from me why the case was moving at a snail's pace. I gave convincing replies, both orally and in writing, mentioning how delay was being caused by the accused, how many adjournments they had sought for and how they had deliberately wasted time over futile cross examinations. Sri G.S. Pathak had also told him the same thing. Though Pandit Nehru fully understood that the accused themselves were responsible for the delay, yet he was upset at the fact that delay had taken place and we had been unable to prevent it.

In April, 1962, when Pandit Nehru was ill, he made the first move to get the case withdrawn. At his instance, a petition was drafted by the Senior Counsel and sent to Bakshi Saheb for consideration. On coming to know of this I met the Prime Minister and protested to him against this step without consulting me. I also sought the assistance of Krishna Menon, who was then the Defence Minister, and he also supported me and spoke to the Prime Minister about the inadvisability of withdrawing the case when it had been committed to the Sessions and was about to open in that court. On seeing my strong objection to the case being withdrawn, Pandit Nehru suggested that I should visit Jammu, where the Kashmir Government was then sojourning, meet Bakshi and other leaders and discuss all the points in favour of and against its withdrawal. So, I went to Jammu on April 9 and met Bakshi Saheb, with whom I had a long discussion. I convinced him that it would be quite inadvisable to withdraw the case at the stage of its Sessions trial, because the Government would then allow itself to be subjected to the legitimate criticism that it had detained the accused persons for nothing all these years and would come to ridicule. Moreover, the withdrawal would mean that the evidence collected over nearly five years of hard work could not be used against the Sheikh and the other accused persons again in the future. Also, in the process of tendering evidence we had exposed some of our most secret links and all this would be futile. Bakshi agreed with me but asked me to consult others also. I then met D.P. Dhar, who had earlier re-joined the Government, and he was also opposed to the release of the accused persons. I met the Sadar-e-Riyasat, who very strongly objected to this proposal. His argument was that for years the Government had borne criticism throughout the world for detaining Sheikh Abdullah without trial and now that there was a cast-iron case against him, the validity of which had been proved in the lower court, politically it would be extremely unwise to release him without completing the trial. If after conviction the accused were pardoned, that would be a different matter, but by withdrawing the case at this stage the Government would unnecessarily invite a host of charges and accusations

against itself, to which there could be no convincing reply. I consulted several other important persons and also the Inspector-General of Police and they were also of the same opinion. When I reported to Bakshi the result of my consultations with various people, he said that it would be best to proceed immediately to Delhi and talk to the Prime Minister personally. So, the same night Bakshi and I left Jammu by car, caught the train at Pathankot and reached Delhi the next morning. We met the Prime Minister separately, giving our views in this matter and I also communicated to the Prime Minister the views expressed by D.P. Dhar, the Sadar-e-Riyasat and other persons whom I had consulted. The Prime Minister then agreed that the proposal to withdraw the case need not be pursued.

Here I would digress a little from the Kashmir Conspiracy Case and come back to the general situation in the State. When in 1957, Pakistan found that Krishna Menon's strong attitude and the Russian veto had put the Kashmir case practically in the cold storage in the Security Council and the planned revolution, which she had intended to bring about at least in the valley with the help of Sheikh Abdullah and others, did not come off and instead most of the important Pakistani supporters found themselves in jail facing trial, she decided on reviving the case before the Security Council by adopting other methods. Hence, during the period from 1958 to 1961, Pakistan made planned efforts for massive infiltration of unarmed *Satyagrahis* consisting mostly of ex-residents of the State. Pakistan expected that these infiltrators were bound to be stopped by the Indian Security Forces and in the process many would be killed and this would rouse world opinion against India and would give Pakistan an excuse to raise the Kashmir issue once again in the Security Council as a matter affecting world peace. Though Bakshi was in favour of taking strong action, Pandit Nehru's view was that we should go slow and not shoot these trespassers so long as they remained non-violent. Therefore, it was decided to arrest them in bulk and, after detaining them for a few days in the frontier areas, push them back into Pakistan. Lt. Gen. Choudhury was then the Corps Commander at Udhampur and with his help an elaborate plan was prepared for establishing

detention camps surrounded with barbed-wire fencing at various places on the routes of possible infiltration behind our army lines to hold the infiltrators if they came in large numbers and then to throw them back into Pakistan at a suitable opportunity. The Kashmir Government fully cooperated in these arrangements. We did not make these arrangements in secret; rather we gave them some publicity to let Pakistan know that the infiltrators would be dealt with strongly. Probably, having come to know of the preparations on our side, Pakistan gave up this attempt. No *Satyagrahis* were also forthcoming in the circumstances. This plan was revived in 1961 but was again given up for the same reasons.

However, the nature of the terrain in the frontier was such that it was impossible to check infiltration completely. Every yard of the frontier could not be guarded all the 24 hours; to do that would have been prohibitively expensive both in money and manpower. This, however, gave Pakistan the opportunity to infiltrate intruders in dribbles and once they infiltrated and got shelter amongst the friendly people, it was difficult to detect them and impossible to drive them out because of political pressures. So, their numbers went on swelling. The full impact of this was felt in 1965.

From 1959 our relations with China also deteriorated. This required prolonged visits by me to Ladakh, NEFA and other northern frontier areas to strengthen our intelligence network on this frontier. I then left the supervision of the Pakistan side of the work to Balbir Singh and the Deputy Director at Amritsar. In 1959, when I was in London, I heard that the Chinese Ambassador in Karachi had approached the Foreign Office of Pakistan with the proposal that, as China's relations with India were deteriorating, China would like to have a new look at her relations with Pakistan, which till then had not been good because of Pakistan's participation in the SEATO, and that it would be in the interest of Pakistan also to do the same; and on the issue of Kashmir the two countries might be able to come to an agreement. On my return to Delhi I reported this to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and the Defence Minister assuring them that my information was authentic, because it came from a high and unimpeachable

source. The subsequent development of China-Pakistan friendship had its origin in this and as China became increasingly hostile to India, her utterances became correspondingly favourable to Pakistan. Subsequently, during Bhutto's visit to Peking, the question of demarcating the northern boundary between Gilgit Agency and Sinkiang was also mooted, though legally Gilgit Agency belonged to India and Pakistan had no right to barter away a portion of it.

In December, 1960, Sadiq, D.P. Dhar, etc., finding that they were wasting their time in the Democratic National Conference which was making little progress, rejoined the National Conference and Bakshi restored them to their original positions in the Cabinet. The Democratic National Conference then became a purely communist organisation.

On April 30, 1962, the acting Mir Waiz (the highest religious dignitary in Kashmir valley) died. The real Mir Waiz, Maulavi Yusuf Shah, had gone away to Pakistan during the partition and his uncle Maulavi Atiqullah had then been proclaimed the Mir Waiz by the Kashmir Government and he had been acting as such till this time. On Maulavi Atiqullah's death, Bakshi Saheb appointed Maulavi Mohd Farooq, the 22-year old nephew of Maulavi Yusuf Shah, as the Mir Waiz with much fanfare. As subsequent events would show, this person soon became the rallying point of anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani elements in the valley.

By the time the Conspiracy Case opened in the Sessions Court in the month of April, 1962, Nageshwar Prasad had left because he was ill. He had done great service and had successfully built up this complicated case brick by brick. His was a monumental effort and he had exercised great patience and forbearance meeting all jeers, ridicules, etc. from the accused calmly. We then appointed Har Prasad, Assistant Advocate-General of Punjab, as the Chief Counsel at Jammu, and G. S. Pathak assisted by G. N. Dikshit continued to be the main Adviser at Delhi. When sanctioning the prosecution, Pandit Pant had clearly laid down that the case should be built entirely on the basis of criminal conspiracy and evidence of criminal acts only should be laid and politics should be eschewed as far as possible, because the

introduction of politics would give an opportunity to the accused persons to try to mislead the court and deliver long political speeches and sermons. As apprehended by Pandit Pant, the accused from the very beginning tried to bring in politics and re-open the question of accession and the validity of the Constituent Assembly. But Nageshwar Prasad had cleverly avoided all this trap and built up his case purely on the basis of a criminal conspiracy to overawe the Government by criminal acts for the purpose of overthrowing it.

When the case was due to be opened in the Sessions Court on April 16, the question arose whether the Prosecution Counsel in his opening speech would deal with political matters or avoid it. On this there was a difference of opinion between G.S. Pathak and the Law Minister, A.K. Sen, who went by Pandit Pant's injunction against the introduction of politics. I personally was also of the same view as A.K. Sen, because in the committal stage we had eschewed politics completely on the prosecution side. As this difference could not be settled even at the intervention of the Home Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, a meeting was held with the Prime Minister on April 15 at which the Home Minister, the Law Minister, G.S. Pathak and myself were present. Pandit Nehru, after hearing both the sides, gave the opinion that politics could not be eschewed from this case and allowed the Senior Counsel to introduce politics wherever he found it necessary, but enjoined on him not to make politics the main basis of his arguments. To quote his words, as far as possible, he said: "This is all politics. How can we avoid politics? The accused committed all these outrages or planned to commit them due to political motivation. It would be incongruous to say that there was no politics in it". Then suddenly to our utter surprise Pandit Nehru started talking bitterly against Sheikh Abdullah's communalism. He traced the Sheikh's history from 1930 onwards and mentioned how he had started his career with the Muslim Conference, which was an out and out communal organisation. He said that as a result of pressures from outside and also seeing the development of the States People's Movement in the rest of India and for purely tactical reasons and probably under the advice of some of his more liberal

followers, the Sheikh had converted the Muslim Conference into the Political Conference to give it a non-communal appearance. At this time Pandit Nehru suddenly looked at me and enquired whether I had not come across some information of possible British connivance in that movement. I replied in the affirmative. He continued his talk against the Sheikh and mentioned all his communal activities throughout the period he had acted as the National Conference leader. It was the Pakistani aggression which had mellowed him a little for a short time, because the tribals had committed gruesome atrocities on the Muslim population in the valley. But, as soon as he became the Prime Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his anti-Hindu activities. In contrast, he praised Bakshi and Sadiq for their completely non-communal outlook and said that these two were really secular-minded persons who required all support from India. Pandit Nehru said that all trouble in Kashmir was due to the Sheikh's communal outlook and it was he who was not allowing the State to settle down to peace and stability. The Sheikh always talked about the rights of the Muslims forgetting that the Hindus also formed nearly 35 per cent of the population of the State and he never showed any consideration for them. Pandit Nehru mentioned that politically he and the other Indian leaders had to go along with the Sheikh for a considerable period and they had also helped him and played him up hoping that by coming in contact with secular India, where Muslims and Hindus and persons of all other denominations were living together and enjoying a peaceful life, Sheikh Abdullah would be able to get rid of his communalism; but communalism was a disease with him and he could never get rid of it and his entire outlook and behaviour was based on the fact that Kashmir valley had a Muslim majority. Therefore, he was not at all surprised that the Sheikh had conspired with Pakistan to overthrow the non-communal and secular Government of Bakshi and Sadiq. What Pandit Nehru said was factually correct and was similar to what Sardar Patel had stressed to me in 1949. At the end, he wished G.S. Pathak a success and concluded by saying that he himself was allergic to these protracted political trials and he suggested that every effort should be made to expedite it.

Pandit Nehru's sudden outburst against the Sheikh came as a great surprise to us, including Sri Shastri who had known him the longest and was one of his closest associates in the political field. He and I came back together to his place, and on the way, Shastri expressed much surprise at the vehemence with which the Prime Minister had spoken against the Sheikh's communalism. He felt that the Prime Minister had suppressed these feelings in his heart for a long time and ultimately they could not be contained any longer and had suddenly burst out. Pandit Nehru had hoped all this time that Sheikh Abdullah would change but all his hopes had been dashed to the ground.

When the Chinese attacked India in October/November, 1962, Sheikh Abdullah wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, which the latter showed to me some time afterwards. In this letter, there was not one word of regret or expression of sorrow at what the Chinese had done; instead there was a sermon directed at the Prime Minister about the mistaken policy which India had been pursuing in respect of Kashmir and Pakistan and the need of India, Pakistan and Kashmir unitedly working for peace in the sub-continent and the world. Though not openly expressed, it was quite apparent from the tone of the letter that there was an undercurrent of pleasure in India's humiliation. After I had read the letter, Pandit Nehru asked me what I thought of it. I replied that the Sheikh had not in any way changed his views, nor had he expressed the slightest sorrow at India's humiliation, nor had he condemned the Chinese for their outright aggression. We also knew through our contacts in the jail that the Sheikh was not only disparaging India but he was denigrating the Prime Minister himself in most violent terms. Moreover, the Sheikh was talking in the same way as the British and the Americans were doing. Hence, I advised that no notice should be taken of this letter. Bakshi Saheb, when he was consulted, was of the same view. So, nothing was done.*

*At this time the Prime Minister was under considerable pressure from the British and the Americans to resolve India's differences with Pakistan. Though not spelled out in so many words, the plain intention was that the extent of aid to be given to India against China might depend on India being

In the meantime the sessions trial had started in August, 1962. The pace of trial not only did not improve but, in fact, slowed down further. The Defence restarted its tactics to delay and obstruct the proceedings in every way possible. The accused knew that the case against them was water-tight and all the Prosecution witnesses except one had stood their ground even in face of massive cross-examination. The whole pattern of the case was quite clear. The accused, of course, knew their own guilt, and now after the committal order they also knew that legally their offences had been fully established in the lower court. They also knew that the offences with which they had been charged were punishable with death or transportation for life. The committal order proved *prima facie* that they had not only conspired to bring about a revolution in the State but had actually encouraged many acts of violence which had resulted in loss of life and destruction of property. If the trial was completed, they would be ruined for ever. Hence, it was in their interest to delay the proceedings hoping that something would turn up in the political field in the meantime, as a result of which the Prosecution would be forced to withdraw the case. Probably, the Chinese aggression gave them further hopes that India would have to settle the Kashmir issue politically very soon. So, the case dragged its feet and it was impossible to give at any stage an accurate forecast when it would end. Mridula Sarabhai had, in the meantime, been released. Even in spite of the lower court's judgment, she carried on her virulent propaganda trying to prove that the entire case was false and that it was, in fact, the Prosecution which was delaying the proceedings.

Pandit Nehru again became impatient at the delay and wrote a letter to Bakshi Saheb in September, 1963, suggesting that the case should be withdrawn. After issuing the letter, he showed it to me. I again protested and said that when the case had been com-

able to repair her fences with Pakistan and concede her demands, however unreasonable they might be. So, to counter this pressure, Pandit Nehru was probably considering whether it would not be preferable to make up with Sheikh Abdullah. When the British and American representatives made similar suggestions to Morarji Desai, the latter bluntly told them that aid or no aid, India would not accede to the unreasonable demands of Pakistan.

mitted to the Sessions, to withdraw it without completing the trial would amount to the Government's showing lack of confidence in the Prosecution itself. I reminded the Prime Minister of the letter which the Sheikh had written to him during the Chinese aggression and told him that the Sheikh had shown no disposition to change and, in fact, he was now even more bitter and hostile than he had been at any time in the past. The Prosecution was not in any way responsible for the delay, and as the accused knew the fate that awaited them, they were holding up the trial at every stage. The Prime Minister then said that he firmly believed that the evidence that had been adduced in court was correct and he reminded me that he himself was responsible for sanctioning the prosecution. But the matter needed rethinking as five years had passed since the prosecution had been sanctioned in 1958 and yet there was no end in sight. He asked me how long I thought the case would take to be completed in the Sessions Court. I replied that at the rate it was progressing the prosecution case would take at least one more year; then the stage of Defence would come and from the big list of witnesses which the Defence had submitted it would take at least another year to get through the Defence witnesses. Then there would be arguments and finally the judgment. So, I felt that a minimum of another three years would be required, but conceivably it could take longer. The Prime Minister then said that it would be impossible to convince the people at large about the truth of the case when it was dragging on so long; and though it was the tactics of the accused to prolong it, the fact remained that the case had been considerably delayed. He mentioned that as many as forty-nine Members of Parliament and even Jayaprakash Narayan had written to him urging the withdrawal of the case and, though there was no doubt that this was all due to Mridula Sarabhai's propaganda, yet he could not but take note of this mounting public opinion even in India against this case. Public opinion in Kashmir also wanted the case to be withdrawn. When the public could not be convinced about the need of the trial, it was futile to continue with the prosecution. I did not agree and I suggested that if he consented I would go to Srinagar again and judge what would be the public reaction to the step

suggested by him. The Prime Minister accepted this suggestion.

So, I went to Srinagar on September 21 and stayed there for about a week. I had prolonged discussions with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, G.M. Sadiq, D.P. Dhar, Mir Qasim, the Sadar-e-Riyasat, Bakshi Abdul Rashid, the IGP and the IGP-designate and I found a unanimity, though for quite different reasons, amongst all these persons that the case against the Sheikh should not be withdrawn. Bakshi Saheb said that after the letter which the Sheikh had written to the Prime Minister in November, 1962, he deserved no consideration. The Sadar-e-Riyasat spoke in even stronger terms and said that it would be very unwise to withdraw the case against him when the prosecution had been able to establish the charges completely in the lower court and hearings were going on in the Sessions Court. All were unanimously of the view that the withdrawal of the case at this stage would have a very bad effect in the valley and would unsettle the atmosphere again as it had done in January, 1958, when the Sheikh had been released from detention. This would imperil India's security when she was faced with another hostile power like China. Moreover, the withdrawal of the case would mean that if the Sheikh and his friends reverted to such activities on release, which they were sure to do, no legal action could be taken against them and all the material that we had collected with so much trouble and care would be lost for ever. We would also be betraying the confidence of the large number of persons of all ranks in life, who had reposed so much faith in the administration and had come forward to depose against the accused persons. They would now feel very insecure and even their lives might be endangered.

I came back to Delhi after collecting all this opinion and reported to the Prime Minister what each one had individually said and what the collective opinion was about the withdrawal. Pandit Nehru accepted these views and allowed the case to continue. But, as subsequent events would show, the case could not proceed for very long after this for quite different reasons.

9 The Kamaraj Plan

I WAS TOURING Ladakh in June, 1963. On June 22 I landed at Srinagar in the morning to meet the Prime Minister who was then camping at Pahalgam, and then to go back to another part of Ladakh by a flight which would be more convenient from Srinagar. The Prime Minister wanted my assessment of Chinese concentrations on our border and our own preparations to meet any threat. At the Srinagar Guest House I met Bijoy Patnaik, Chief Minister, Orissa. He also travelled with me in the same car to Pahalgam. During the journey, Patnaik unfolded to me a plan which subsequently came to be known as the Kamaraj Plan (I do not know who conceived it first). According to it, the senior Congress leaders would leave the administration and go to the country and work for people's participation in the democratic revolution which was developing throughout the country. Patnaik felt that the youth of India had so far been unresponsive and there was really no people's participation in the tremendous constructive work which the Central and the State Governments had undertaken. People looked upon all this as a gift from above, i.e. the Government. They liked a particular constructive work or disliked it and praised or blamed the Government accordingly, but they did not have the feeling that this was their own work. In this matter people's attitude had not changed from the British times. What was needed was that the senior leaders, instead of sticking to office, should go into the country and work up people's enthusiasm, whilst younger men should take charge of the reins of government. There should be a composite team consisting of politicians and services to administer the State. (He was not clear how the services could be retired so early as to leave only young men behind). He felt that this was the only way to avert

a catastrophe which was gradually approaching the country and of which all the opposition political parties were taking advantage. His view was that because people lacked the sense of participation, so they magnified even small shortfalls and started big agitations on very minor issues. This was because the people made the Government responsible for everything and themselves did not accept any responsibility. He wanted to ensure that the younger generation, who should be the real makers of India's future, should from the very beginning taste the labour and fruits of all the work that was being done in India and identify themselves completely with it. He argued that in India renunciation and sacrifice had been recognised as the main virtues and, unless the big leaders sacrificed their offices and went back to the field, they would not be able to maintain their hold on the country.

I was not in agreement with him. Though I agreed that in India there was yet no feeling of people's participation in the great developmental effort, yet Patnaik's solution, to my mind, could not carry us far. With the disappearance of the experienced administrators, the Government machinery would become inefficient. In a party government, the achievements and the failures of the administration were ultimately reckoned as the achievements and the failures of the party itself; and the party would win or lose in elections only on the basis of the results it could show in the administrative field that is through the governmental machine which it controlled. Patnaik, on the other hand, felt that unless the leaders were prepared for sacrifice and renunciation, people would not be led by them any more and the disillusionment with the leadership and general cynicism, which were gradually gaining ground, would deepen as the days passed by. Finally, with the disappearance of Pandit Nehru from the field—which event could not be very far away—the one shining leadership and unifying force would be lost and the country would disintegrate. He said that he himself was ready to hand over to the country all the property which he had acquired after years of toil. I told him that renunciation and sacrifice for a political motive could not be called meritorious and would not convince the people. Mahatma Gandhi had sacrificed his all

because of his inner spiritual fire and his total identification with the masses. But many others who had also pledged similar sacrifices but with political motives did not go very far and as soon as they got power or lost it, they exhibited their inner weaknesses. If Patnaik gave away all his property to the country, a few people would no doubt praise him but others would say that he had much more hidden away and that was why he was able to make a show of this generosity. If property had to be given away, it should be done by legislation.

We talked like this without convincing each other till we reached Pahalgam. We lunched with Bakshi Saheb, and then I went to see the Prime Minister. After completing my work with him, I came back and started reading newspapers, which I had not seen for several days since I had left Delhi. In the meantime, Patnaik went to see the Prime Minister to talk about the plan which he was unfolding to me during the journey and he was with Pandit Nehru for over two hours. We ultimately left Pahalgam in the evening reaching Srinagar rather late. On the way I asked him what was the result of his discussion with the Prime Minister. He said that the Prime Minister had heard him with interest and had made many comments, but he did not "bite". Next morning I went to another part of Ladakh and returned the same day. I had twisted my ankle badly at Pahalgam the previous night and so in the afternoon I was confined to my room. Patnaik came in and had more discussions with me. He informed me then that the previous day when I was meeting the Prime Minister, he had discussed this plan with Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, who had approved of the idea. Before coming to Srinagar he had also discussed this with Kamaraj and several other Congress leaders and they were all in agreement with him. We continued our desultory discussions for several hours that evening. I thought at that time that it was a case of loud thinking on the part of Patnaik. He was testing the validity of his thoughts by subjecting them to my criticism.

The Kamaraj Plan became a reality in August, 1963. Bakshi and Patnaik were two vehement supporters of this plan and Bakshi offered his resignation along with the other Chief Ministers

and Union Cabinet Ministers. Not only did Bakshi submit his resignation but he was insistent that it should be accepted. He met Pandit Nehru on two successive occasions and then canvassed his case for resignation with Indira Gandhi and also with the then Home Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, who himself was also keen to go out. Pandit Nehru ultimately accepted his offer, and on the fateful day on which the resignations of several Union Cabinet Ministers and State Chief Ministers were announced Bakshi's name was also included. I met Bakshi that evening at the Kashmir House at Delhi and he said that he wanted to strengthen Pandit Nehru's hands by joining the Congress. He felt that many of the people, who had submitted their resignations, were not sincere, and, therefore, he wanted to lead the way. Also, he felt that his coming out in the field and working in India would improve the communal atmosphere and bring back into the Congress fold large masses of Muslims who had been estranged during the last few years over the happenings in UP and Madhya Pradesh. He was full of enthusiasm about his future plans. When I enquired who would succeed him, he said there was no difficulty and named G. M. Sadiq. Apparently, he had promised to the Prime Minister that he would see to it that Sadiq was elected the Chief Minister. Bakshi's words had a ring of sincerity and earnestness in them.

On his return to Srinagar, Bakshi was received with great honour and there were large processions. Doubts were expressed in many quarters whether, with his strong hand removed, it would be possible to maintain peace in the valley and in the frontier areas. A move started to persuade him to withdraw his resignation. He came back to Delhi after a few days and I met him again, but I found him quite firm in his mind that he had done the right thing. He said that he was not going to resile from his position, though there was a lot of pressure to make him do so.

A few days after the action taken on the Kamaraj Plan I had a long talk with the Prime Minister. I mentioned to him about my conversation with Bijoy Patnaik the previous June and repeated all the apprehensions which I had expressed to him. Pandit Nehru

said that he himself was keen to go out of the Government and work in the field, but the problems of the country were becoming so acute and he was getting so involved in them that he felt that it might look like a case of desertion if he left at this stage. He further felt that the Chinese invasion of India the previous October had shown up many of our weaknesses as well as our strong points and it was necessary to remove these weaknesses as soon as possible. I pointed out the scramble for power which had already started in more than one State and felt that all these would lead to further disunity and consequent instability. I also said that I did not see any plan for utilising in the actual field the senior Congress leaders who had gone out of office. Pandit Nehru said that the action had been taken with a big idea, but the results, of course, could not be foreseen. And, he hoped that there would be no difficulty in the administration and that the leaders now out of office would be able to bend all their energies in the organisational field.

To my mind the implementation of the Kamaraj Plan really wrought havoc both in the political and the administrative fields in India. It brought about serious disunity in the Congress practically in all the States and more and more splinter groups were formed in the ruling party to put particular persons in power. Much of the political backsliding that took place in 1964 and 1965 could be traced to the Kamaraj Plan and this was most apparent in States where the Kamaraj Plan was immediately applied by removing the Chief Ministers, i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Madras. Many leaders who went out of the Government, immediately formed splinter groups and internecine party struggles started in practically all States. The final result of this was the complete debacle of the Congress in Kamaraj's own State, Madras and in several other States of India during the general elections of 1967.

However, in this story, I am concerned with the effect of the Kamaraj Plan in Kashmir only. In this State, there were serious difficulties about the succession. Though changes had been effected in all the other States, in Kashmir Bakshi's successor had yet to be elected and to assume office. So, when I was going

to Kashmir in the month of September in connection with the Sheikh Abdullah case, the Prime Minister asked me to find out why there was this delay in the formation of the new ministry. He desired that Sadiq should be unanimously elected the new leader of the legislature. During my stay in Srinagar, I pursued this question with Bakshi on one side and the Sadar-e-Riyasat, Sadiq, D. P. Dhar and Mir Qasim on the other. I found that the strongest contender against Sadiq becoming the Chief Minister was Bakshi Abdul Rashid, an MLA and the General Secretary of the National Conference. He insisted that there should be a free election as had been held in UP and Bihar, and he was certain that he himself would be elected the leader of the legislature party. Bakshi himself was quite opposed to Abdul Rashid becoming the Chief Minister, as he felt that though Rashid was a good organiser, he was too young and did not have sufficient stature and so he would not be quite acceptable to the people at large, though he no doubt had the National Conference behind him. He was all for Sadiq becoming the leader. He seemed to be quite sincere about it but I found that he had a lurking fear in his mind that Sadiq might use his office to lower Bakshi's position in the State. This fear had been aggravated by the fact that Sadiq had given out that he must be given a free hand to form his ministry and he had planned to exclude all Bakshi's supporters from it. The Sadar-e-Riyasat was keen that the change in the Government should take place quickly and that Sadiq should be given a free hand, and Pandit Nehru should force Bakshi to resign at once. Earlier Bakshi had openly declared that he would get the Sadar-e-Riyasat out of Kashmir. The fact that the Sheikh, Beg and Bakshi were instrumental in humiliating his father was probably still rankling in his mind. I was surprised at this bitterness of the Sardar-e-Riyasat against Bakshi. But after long talks with me, he recognised Bakshi's predominant position in the valley and agreed that this could not be overlooked, and his wishes should be respected in the formation of the new ministry. Thereafter he was instrumental in bridging the gap between the two groups. I found Sadiq was adamant that he must be given a free hand in forming a ministry and he named a panel of five

without any Bakshi supporter in it. He, however, said that he would give an assurance that whatever was the composition of his ministry, he would not be vindictive against Bakshi. I felt that Sadiq was a little unreasonable in insisting on his absolute prerogative in forming the ministry. He would weed out all Bakshi supporters from his ministry but would depend on the strongly pro-Bakshi legislative party to keep him in power. I met Mir Qasim, who was all out for a change and in giving Sadiq a free hand; but he was reasonable and admitted that Bakshi had a powerful position in the valley and this could not be ignored. He promised to use his influence with Sadiq for this purpose. D. P. Dhar suspected that Bakshi was doing the wire-pulling from behind to create this confusion so that ultimately he did not have to go. But when I convinced him that this suspicion was not well-founded, he played his part well and ultimately succeeded in bringing about a compromise between the two groups. So, after a lot of moving about between the Sadar-e-Riyasat, Bakshi, Sadiq, Mir Qasim and D. P. Dhar and meeting Abdul Rashid, a list of nine ministers with Sadiq as the Chief Minister was agreed upon. This would have five of the Bakshi group and four of Sadiq, including Sadiq himself.

I came back to Delhi with a feeling of success. I had achieved both my objectives. The withdrawal of the conspiracy case had been averted and I had been able to contribute a little towards the solution of Kashmir's succession problem. Pandit Nehru was very happy and he rang up Bakshi in my presence to congratulate him on the agreed list which had been put up and suggested that the change should be effected immediately and Bakshi should come to Delhi to take up organisational work. He told me that Bakshi had responded enthusiastically.

Unfortunately, a few days later we heard that Shamsuddin had been elected the Chief Minister as a compromise candidate and G. M. Sadiq, Mir Qasim, D. P. Dhar, etc. had abstained from joining the new Cabinet. Obviously, G. M. Sadiq, who was a much more senior National Conference leader, could not work under Shamsuddin. When Bakshi came to Delhi later, I asked him why the agreement arrived at in my presence had been reversed.

His explanation was that he could not convince the party members and that they were bent on a free vote and cited the example of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where a similar process had been adopted. But, as he himself was opposed to Abdul Rashid becoming the Chief Minister, he had put up Shamsuddin as the compromise candidate, hoping that he would be acceptable to all. This received very adverse comments in the Press which interpreted that Bakshi had perpetuated his rule by setting up his stooge, Shamsuddin, as the Chief Minister. But it is certain that if the election had been left to the free vote of the legislators, Sadiq had no chance and Abdul Rashid would have been elected with ease.

The trouble that enveloped Kashmir within two months after this and ultimately ended with Pakistan's attack on India in 1965 could be traced to the application of the Kamaraj Plan to Kashmir and the National Conference not accepting the agreed formula of having G. M. Sadiq as the Chief Minister. It was obvious that Shamsuddin would be no match against the disrupting forces that would be let loose with the removal of Bakshi's strong hand, and he would not be able to wield the authority which was needed to keep Kashmir united. Very well meaning and honest though he was, he did not have the personality or the experience of either Bakshi or Sadiq to hold the reins of the Kashmir administration. Bakshi came away to Delhi after Shamsuddin's appointment as the Chief Minister; but was not utilised in any organisational work and was soon to find himself nearly over-whelmed by the forces which raised their heads against him.

10 The Holy Relic Disappears

IN A.D. 1635, when Emperor Shah Jahan was on the throne of Delhi, a destitute traveller with his family arrived at Bijapur in South India (at that time Bijapur was an independent kingdom) from Medina.* He gave his name as Syed Abdullah and claimed that till lately he had been the Mutwali of the main shrine at Medina. He was in bad terms with his cousin, Syed Hashim, who had lodged a complaint against him with the Sultan. On this Syed Abdullah had been summoned to appear in the Sultan's court, but as he disregarded the summons, the Sultan was angered and ordered Syed Abdullah to be banished from the country. So, Syed Abdullah, along with his family, left Medina and came to Bijapur, expecting to find shelter there as the ruler of this kingdom was also a Shia. Syed Abdullah or to be more correct Hazrat Syed Abdullah claimed that he was a direct descendant of the Prophet. He had with him a strand of the holy hair of the Prophet (called hereinafter the Moe-e-Muqaddas or the Holy Relic) and claimed that this had come in inheritance to Hazrat Imam Hassan, grandson of the Prophet. Further in this lineage, the Holy Relic came into his possession in 1044 Hijri (1633 A.D.). The Ruler of Bijapur was generous to Syed Abdullah and, in consideration of his high status, bestowed a "jagir" on him. Syed Abdullah lived peacefully enjoying his "jagir" till he died twenty-three years later, when the "jagir" passed on to his son, Syed Hamid, who inherited the Holy Relic also. When in A.D. 1686, Aurangzeb attacked

*There are several stories about the coming of the Holy Relic to Hazrat-bal. None is absolutely correct in details. The story narrated here was collected from the Nishan Dez in whose family it has been coming on for generations. This has also been checked against the "*Tarikh-e-Hassan*" (Hassan's *History of Kashmir*). So, it is likely to be more reliable than other stories.

Bijapur and, after defeating the King, annexed it to his empire, Syed Hamid lost his estate and fled to Jahanabad where he lived in penury.

Here Syed Hamid came in contact with a Kashmiri trader, Noor-ud-Din Ashwari by name, who had a shop in the bazar. The two became friendly and Noor-ud-Din helped Hamid financially a good deal. In course of time Noor-ud-Din came to know that Hamid had several relics with him, including the Moe-e-Muqaddas, and requested his friend to give him one of them preferably the Moe-e-Muqaddas, but Hamid did not agree. However, the same night Hamid had a dream in which the Prophet asked him to hand over the Moe-e-Muqaddas to Noor-ud-Din. So, Hamid complied. After some days, Noor-ud-Din had a dream in which he was asked to take the Holy Relic to Kashmir and establish it there on the bank of a lake. So, Noor-ud-Din closed his business at Jahanabad and, with this precious possession, he started for Kashmir but fell ill at Lahore on the way. He used to give Deedar (exposition) at various places on the way and this news reached Aurangzeb, who was then in Deccan, fighting the Marathas. On hearing this, Aurangzeb ordered that the Holy Relic should be produced before him and Noor-ud-Din kept in prison. Medanish, Noor-ud-Din's servant, accompanied the Holy Relic back to Deccan, where Aurangzeb, after testing it in the traditional manner, was convinced that the Relic was, in fact, a strand of the Prophet's hair. He did not consider that such a precious Relic should be kept with a private person, and so he ordered it to be taken away from Medanish and sent to the Dargah Saheb at Ajmer for preservation. Noor-ud-Din continued to languish in prison.

But, soon after the Holy Relic was installed at the Dargah Saheb at Ajmer, Aurangzeb had a dream in which the Prophet commanded him to restore the Holy Relic to Noor-ud-Din and send it to Kashmir immediately. So, Aurangzeb sent words that the Holy Relic should be restored to Medanish and that he should be given some money and escorted to Kashmir. By the time Medanish reached Lahore, Noor-ud-Din had passed away. He had been ill and the shock of being dispossessed of the Holy

Relic and being put in prison was too much for him.

Medanish had Noor-ud-Din's body exhumed and along with it and the Holy Relic he left for Kashmir escorted by an armed guard and several holy persons. The Holy Relic arrived at Shopian in 1700 A.D. with royal pomp and was received by Governor Mir Fazil Khan, who ordered it to be kept in the Khanqa Naqashband shrine in Srinagar. But the space available there was not sufficient for the large crowds which used to assemble at the time of "Deedar". So, under the Governor's order the Holy Relic was moved outside the town to Bagh-e-Sadiq Khan built by Shah Jahan on the bank of the Dal Lake. The place where the Relic was kept came to be known as Asar-e-Sharif (Relic Shrine). Due to the presence of the Moe-e-Muqaddas on its bank the lake gradually acquired the name Hazratbal (Bal in Kashmiri means lake) and the mosque came to be known as the Hazratbal Mosque. Gradually the present Hazratbal village grew round it.

Even when removed to the mosque, Noor-ud-Din Ashwari's descendants kept control over the Holy Relic and they were the only people who were entitled to exhibit the Holy Relic (i.e. give Deedar) to the public, and they, therefore, gradually came to be known as the Nishan Dez or the persons who could exhibit it.

The Moe-e-Muqaddas or the holy hair of the Prophet is fitted in an erect position in a quartz container. The bottom is held in a silver cap which cannot be removed and the top of the hair is slightly curved. The container is constructed like a thermometer tube, opaque on one side, and the holy hair can be seen only from the side opposite. It cannot be seen from any other position. At the top of the container there is a cylindrical lid tapering to an end. The container is mounted on a round silver base. Both these parts are fitted into the main cylinder containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas but can be removed easily. The overall length of the tube, its lid and the base is about five inches and this whole object is used for exposition. It is kept in a gold embroidered narrow bag fastened at one end by a thin string. This bag is wrapped up in a piece of green velvet and kept in a walnut box. Large silver trappings called "galtani" are fitted to the base when the Moe-e-Muqaddas is brought out for exhibition. These,

however, are kept separately*. The walnut box containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas and the silver trappings are kept in a wooden shelf mounted on a wooden table. This is kept in the centre of a room about five feet square with only one wooden door in front, which is kept double locked all the time. There is a long passage in front of this room and this ends in a glass-fronted door. There is also a glass door at one side of the passage. Normally, male pilgrims sit at the front door and women at the side. An offering box is kept outside where people deliver their offerings. Double locks mean that two of the Nishan Dez have the keys and they would normally be present for opening the door of the inner room but this formality was often dispensed with and the Nishan Dez on duty brought both the keys. Besides the Nishan Dez, no one has access to this inner sanctuary. A few specially privileged people are allowed on rare occasions inside the passage but no further. The front door of the passage is locked from inside and the side door from outside. The construction of the doors of the passage and even of the inner sanctuary was ramshackle and they could be forced open with very little effort. The wooden shelf had only a small lock which could be broken even by hand and the walnut box was not kept locked. It is surprising that the Moe-e-Muqaddas, which was considered to be dearer than their lives by the Kashmiris, was kept in such an unprotected way. But this is the general pattern in most religious places and enough care is not bestowed on the protection of such holy relics, whether in a temple, church or mosque, and it is not difficult for burglars to remove such holy objects. But probably it goes against the sanctity of the object itself if it is kept chained and locked and surrounded by protective bars. So it is left more or less unprotected. It protects itself.

As the tradition goes, the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been stolen or surreptitiously removed on two previous occasions, but on both these occasions it came back to Hazratbal by a miracle. It is believed that the Moe-e-Muqaddas which had by its own grace

*The silver cap and round base, the 'galtani', the narrow bag, the piece of velvet and the walnut box have been with the Moe-e-Muqaddas ever since it came to Hazratbal. (See App. I for full description.)

travelled from Arabia to India to be established near the Hazratbal Lake in Kashmir would not allow itself to be removed for any considerable period from its place of rest and would always come back.

There are only ten days in the year, all connected with some events in the Prophet's life, on which the Holy Relic is exposed to the people. The method of exposition is that on any of these days, one of the Nishan Dez, who would be on duty, would bring the quartz tube containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas with the large silver trappings on the balcony of the Hazratbal mosque, and from there show it to thousands of pilgrims congregated in the huge yard in front. Only those who were on the balcony could see the tube but, except the Nishan Dez, none could see the strand of the hair as it could be seen from only one side and by holding the quartz tube quite near the eyes. But the sight of any part of the container was holy and the pilgrims went back satisfied with having seen the Moe-e-Muqaddas. Besides exposing the Moe-e-Muqaddas to the congregation of pilgrims on these ten fixed days, the Nishan Dez sometimes gave private expositions in return for a substantial amount. Not many were fortunate, because naturally the Nishan Dez were jealous about their rights and would bring out the Moe-e-Muqaddas only on being paid a considerable reward. All the money received as offerings to the Moe-e-Muqaddas was used as personal income by the Nishan Dez and it did not go to augment the mosque fund.

December 20, 1963 was the last day when a "Deedar" of the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been given. This was the Friday following the Miraj-e-Alam. After the Deedar, the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been put back in its place by the Senior Nishan Dez, Rahim Bandy, in the afternoon. In the evening of December 26 a private exposition was given to a person by the same Nishan Dez and the latter claimed to have replaced the Moe-e-Muqaddas at the proper place. Thereafter, the Nishan Dez had gone to his home. Besides a few pilgrims who prayed at the mosque till about mid-night, nobody remained in the mosque prayer hall, which was in front of the room where the Moe-e-Muqaddas was kept. But by midnight due to severe cold all these pilgrims had

also left and the prayer hall was empty. In the early morning of December 27, Rahim Bandey found that the side door of the passage leading to the room housing the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been broken open and both locks of the inner door leading to the sanctuary had also been forced open. The lock of the front door of the passage had also been forced from inside. The wooden box containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been taken out from the small wooden shelf, in which it had been kept, after forcing open the shelf, and the small bag containing the tube with the Moe-e-Muqaddas inside had been removed leaving the velvet covering, the trappings and the wooden box behind in the shelf.

The news about the loss of the Moe-e-Muqaddas travelled like wild fire throughout the snowbound Kashmir valley. Large crowds started collecting at the mosque from early morning and by the afternoon thousands of people were marching through the streets of Srinagar, protesting against the theft, demanding its immediate restoration and asking the Government to punish the perpetrators of the crime. The town observed a spontaneous and complete *hartal*. There was no doubt that the sentiments of the religious people of the valley had been deeply hurt due to the sacrilege committed in respect of something which they held to be highly sacred and dearer than even their lives. In these circumstances, the police and the local authorities found it difficult to control the crowds, because any action by them would have further exasperated the people. Unfortunately, Bakshi Abdul Rashid, General Secretary of the National Conference (nephew of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad), arrived there in a jeep and, with good intentions but in his usual tactless and brusque manner, told the crowd to disperse and not to create any trouble and further added that, as on previous occasions, the Holy Relic was sure to come back, as there was nobody in the world who could remove the Relic permanently from its place of rest. Far from soothing the disturbed feelings of the crowd, Abdul Rashid's presence served like a red rag to the bull, and the crowd attacked him. He was rescued with difficulty by the police. The crowd then in its anger went to a hotel and a cinema house owned by Bakshi Abdul Majid, brother of Bakshi Ghulam Mohd,

and set fire to them. When the police tried to intervene, the crowd attacked the police also and set fire to Kothibagh Police Station, whereupon the police had to open fire killing three persons. This incident somehow or the other turned the anger of the entire Kashmiri population against the Bakshi family and the Kashmir Government. A rumour was set afloat that the Bakshi family was responsible for this outrage. No doubt some interested parties were bent on destroying Bakshi's image for ever in the valley. It was normally inconceivable that Bakshi, who had done so much for the improvement of the Hazratbal mosque and who himself held the Moe-e-Muqaddas in high respect, would do anything which might amount to showing disrespect to it. And, though the crowd dispersed later in the evening, large crowds again assembled the next day and a continuous *hartal* was observed in Srinagar and many other parts of the Kashmir valley for many days at a stretch from December 27.

Bakshi Ghulam Mohd was in Delhi at this time and on hearing about the disturbances he left for Srinagar immediately. D.P. Dhar was also in Delhi, but Sadiq and Mir Qasim were in Srinagar. The Kashmir Prime Minister, Shamsuddin, was at Jammu, but, on hearing of the trouble, he arrived at Srinagar on the 27th evening but thereafter remained confined to his house, because he could not stir out as the crowds were so hostile. I had been away from Delhi touring North Bengal and I returned to Delhi at midnight on December 27. Hooja informed me of what had happened in Kashmir and he added that a senior Deputy Director had been sent to the valley immediately to take charge of the investigation of this case. I immediately saw the seriousness of this development and realised that we were going to be placed in a very difficult position in Kashmir.

The weather was atrocious in the Kashmir valley. The air service had been suspended and the road from Jammu to Banihal had been breached at several places due to snowfall and rain and all traffic had come to a standstill. Fortunately, the telephone line was working, though extremely indistinct, and from next morning I remained in constant touch with our office in Kashmir, the Kashmir Prime Minister and the Inspector-General of

Police either on telephone or on wireless. I heard that large crowds had collected everywhere and they were extremely excited and were planning even to attack the All India Radio Station at Srinagar as, according to them, the account given of the previous evening's happenings by the AIR was not correct. Police guards had been posted everywhere, and the Kashmir Government urgently required more armed police. We made arrangements for moving a Punjab Armed Police battalion from Jullundur and a Central Reserve Police battalion from Neemuch immediately.

Things looked grave indeed and I kept the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, Nanda, informed throughout the day about the developments. In the evening I was called by the Prime Minister to whom I reported all that I had been able to gather till then. He was visibly distressed and said that the Holy Relic must be recovered, and enquired as to who was doing the investigation. I replied that one of our senior Deputy Directors had been sent for this purpose, and that I was also sending other investigating officers who had previously worked in Kashmir to assist him. I informed him that I myself intended to go there the next day if there was a plane service. The Prime Minister felt a little relieved and he again stressed that the Holy Relic must be recovered and the case must be thoroughly investigated and no pains should be spared. He wanted to be kept informed three or four times a day about the developments, and he said that he would not mind even if he was roused from his bed at night if there was anything serious. He enquired from me if he himself should go to Kashmir to appease the people, but I dissuaded him saying that unless the Moe-e-Muqaddas was recovered his going there might produce an adverse effect. A visit by him after the recovery would certainly be useful.

On December 29, I remained in touch with Kashmir the whole day. The weather continued to be very bad; there was no plane service; the road service was also paralysed; but I got information that both Bakshi and our officer had been able to get through after walking several miles, and that thereafter the road had been breached at many other places over a length of several miles and

it was not possible even to walk through this area. The previous day's happenings were repeated on the 29th as well as on the 30th. From the accounts that we were receiving it seemed that the entire Kashmir valley was breaking up and something had to be done within a week, otherwise there was every danger of a conflagration with Pakistan over this. The Pakistan Radio, of course, was gloating over the incidents in Kashmir and was loudly accusing the Government of India for having engineered the theft of the Moe-e-Muqaddas in order to humiliate and completely suppress the Muslims of the Kashmir valley. What a fantastic idea! But, unfortunately, there were people in Kashmir who were moved by this form of propaganda. On the 30th, Bakshi telephoned to me from Srinagar and said that the situation was extremely grave and was deteriorating every day and wanted more police to be sent and also suggested that I should myself come over without delay. Shamsuddin also said the same thing. The DD, when contacted, said that no clue had been found of the Holy Relic and that it was difficult to do any investigation—so excited had the people become. We had a new Assistant Director in Srinagar and he also painted a most gloomy picture.

So, on December 30, I felt that I could not stay in Delhi any longer and resolved that I must go to Srinagar. The Indian Air Corporation gave me no hope about a flight on the 31st morning, as all the meteorological forecasts said that the weather would remain bad for an indefinitely long period. The Indian Air Force, however, agreed to make a try and give me a plane for this purpose. I met the Prime Minister in the evening of the 30th and told him that I was hoping to go to Srinagar the next morning and I also said that it was quite likely that I might not be able to accompany him to Bhubaneshwar in the first week of January. The Prime Minister expressed much concern about my safety and enquired how I would go. I told him that the Air Force was giving me a plane which would make an attempt to land at Srinagar, failing which I would land at Jammu and try to make my way by road. The Prime Minister asked how it would be possible for me to go when the road also was breached at many places. I said that I would walk and, as it was not certain when the air service would

open, I did not want to delay my departure any longer. He kept silent for some time and then said that this was a very dangerous mission. Then probably he was thinking aloud when he told me, "Yes, I think you had better go", and expressed his concern that probably everything that had been done in Kashmir over the last fifteen years was going to be lost in one stroke as a result of this unfortunate incident. He enquired about the progress of the investigation. Of course, there had been no progress, because the conditions in the valley were such that no work could be done calmly. He again stressed that unless the Moe-e-Muqaddas was recovered it would seriously jeopardise India's position in the valley. When I was leaving he again called me back and said God would be with me in this endeavour, and that he was sure that I would succeed. I was very moved by his concern for my safety and by the trust he reposed in me; I could not speak and came away quietly.

Next morning I left by an IAF Viscount. As I had made an early start, I had not seen any newspaper before leaving my house. When the plane started, I opened a copy of *The Hindustan Times* and there I saw, to my consternation, in big headlines, the news of the Prime Minister's radio broadcast to the people of Kashmir the previous night, mentioning that he was sending his seniormost Intelligence Officer to Srinagar to take charge of this case and to recover the Holy Relic and punish the culprits. The Prime Minister appealed to the people of the valley to keep calm and hold their patience and cooperate with this officer and promised that the Government of India would do everything possible for the recovery. Apparently, the Prime Minister, out of his concern for me and to make my work easier, had given this broadcast after I had left him the previous night. He certainly had not planned to do so before my visit, because otherwise he would have mentioned it to me. In any case, before I met him on the 30th evening, he had no knowledge that I intended to make an attempt to reach Srinagar the next day. As an Intelligence Officer I had always shunned publicity and had tried to keep my name out of the press, and I was dismayed that, by publicising my visit to the valley and praising my alleged qualities, he had made my

work more difficult because the accused persons would now take more care to cover their tracks. Moreover, if I failed to recover the Holy Relic—and the prospects certainly looked extremely gloomy—I would cut a sorry figure. The Pakistan Intelligence would laugh at my discomfiture and I would be exposed to ridicule. So, during the plane journey I kept worrying over this advance publicity given to my visit because I had very little hope of my mission ending successfully as till then we had no clue at all.

The IAF Viscount crossed Banihal, which was clear, at great height and flew over the Kashmir valley for fifteen minutes. But the fog was impenetrable without any visible break, and so the plane could not land at Srinagar. It returned and landed at Jammu. My own officers as well as those of the Kashmir Government met me at the airport and informed me that though cars and escorts had been kept ready to take me straight-away towards Banihal, the road was not only not motorable but at many places one could not even walk across with safety. However, I was determined to push on, and asked that my suitcase and bedroll be off-loaded. At this time the IAF Station Commander of Jammu came forward and told me that though the Viscount had failed to land at Srinagar, he would try to fly me in a Dakota. As Banihal Pass was clear, he would be able to get into the valley easily. He further said that even if there was a slight break in the fog anywhere he might be able to get through it and land with his slow plane, which the Viscount could not do because of its much greater speed. He said there was some risk in this, but in view of the importance of this occasion, if I agreed to take the risk, he would try to fly me into Srinagar. I replied that there was no risk so far as I was concerned and he should consider the flight from the point of view of his own regulations. I left the arrangements for the road journey intact at Jammu, because after having seen the impenetrable fog over the valley I had no doubt that we would be back in Jammu in an hour's time. The Station Commander piloted the plane himself and crossed Banihal without difficulty, but then came on the top of the thick blanket of fog which had settled deep on the valley. He flew

round and round and from the window I could hardly see any break. After circling over the valley several times, suddenly the plane dived in the fog and went down and down and even the tips of the wings became invisible. It seemed that we had been diving through the fog for a long time but it must have been only a couple of minutes when suddenly about a hundred feet below me I saw the valley of Kashmir. The pilot told me that he had seen a little break and taken the chance and this had worked, but he would not repeat the performance. His regulations prohibited landing if the fog was at a height of less than one thousand feet but on this day it was less than two hundred. We landed at the ice-bound Srinagar airport. I was met by Thakur, the Inspector-General of Police, one Deputy Inspector General and our Assistant Director. After thanking the pilot for all the trouble he had taken, I left the airport in Thakur's car.

Everything was white with snow. The tall poplars looked like white-headed sentinels keeping watch on the road. The Chinars had masses of snow on their branches. The tops of houses were all white; most of the fields were white with more than a foot of snow. We did not talk much in the car as I was deeply engrossed with this enchanting scenery. As we entered the town, it looked like a ghost city; everything was closed and it seemed that time had stopped here. We drove through some lanes as, according to the Inspector General, the main roads were blocked by processions or meetings. Even in the lanes few people could be seen. The cold was numbing. The *Bara Kalaan*, i.e. the great winter, had set in the valley with great intensity. Ultimately, we arrived at the Guest House and I started my work immediately.

II The Holy Relic Comes Back

AT THE GUEST HOUSE, over lunch and afterwards, I had long talks with Thakur, our Deputy and Assistant Directors to get an up-to-date account of the developments and an accurate assessment of the state of feelings of the people. Then I was ready to go out to the town to judge for myself what the situation was like. But Thakur said that it would not be safe for me to go out because of the hostile crowds who might not let my car pass and might resort to violence. In any case all the main roads were blocked by several parallel mile-long processions and I could go out only when the processions had terminated. But my aim was precisely to see the processions, drive through them and talk to the crowds to assess what their temper was like. Not to go out when the processions were on would defeat my purpose. So, I insisted that we should go out without any more delay. Thakur reluctantly agreed. We put on a black flag in our car, as a mark of the sympathy we felt with the people about their loss and started off. We were stopped as soon as we came up against a procession; but my name seemed to work like magic and the volunteers escorted my car through the crowd without any difficulty. People gathered round my car and often stopped it to tell me that I must recover the Moe-e-Muqaddas and they invoked God's blessings on me. It was only then that I realised the service Pandit Nehru had done to me by commending me to the people of Kashmir. By his unerring instinct, Pandit Nehru, the idol of the Kashmiri people, by mentioning me in the previous night's broadcast as his personal representative, had sold me to the people of Kashmir and so I was given the freedom by the people to move about freely as I liked. I found that Thakur, who also generally travelled with me, was popular, though he was a Hindu. The Assistant Director being my representative also got a free pass.

What I saw in the town was something which I had never seen before in thirty-five years of my executive service dealing with law and order. Everything was closed: offices, schools, shops, cinemas, restaurants. An Action Committee had automatically been formed and come to the forefront with Maulavi Mohd Farooq at the head. (This is the person Bakshi Saheb had appointed two years earlier as the Mir Waiz). *Langars* (eating places) had been set up at various places in the town; volunteers of the Action Committee were stopping vehicles from passing and enforcing the *hartal*; large crowds were coming from villages carrying food, bedding and even fuel for warming their bodies. There was no end to the streams of people and all the main roads were blocked by thousands of people and the smallest procession was at least a mile long covering the entire width of the road including the footpaths. The temperature was ranging at night to several degrees below the freezing point and during the day it was no warmer; the sun never came out and it was raining and snowing all the time. All play grounds and other places of meetings were frozen with several inches of solid ice on the surface and yet three public meetings had been held the previous day collecting between fifty to seventy thousand people in each meeting. The people remained seated on the ice with snow falling from the top, hearing the speeches of the Action Committee members for hours at a stretch. A vehicle, to be able to come out on the public roads, had to carry a black flag given by the Action Committee. Without such a flag, the vehicle might be burnt and destroyed. The black flag ensured that the vehicle would not be attacked, but it did not denote a permit to move about. All military vehicles had been taken off the road rather than hoisting the black flags. The Ministers were virtual prisoners confined to their houses with police guards protecting them. All public institutions and offices were guarded by armed police. It was clear that the Government writ did not extend even to its own offices as they were closed and most of the staff were also amongst the crowd. It was the Action Committee which was ruling the city. The Committee regulated the hours of *hartal*, fixed small periods when groceries and vegetable shops could be opened

for the convenience of the people; determined routes of processions and their timings and places of meetings. Every wall of the city was full of posters issued by the Committee and every house had a black flag. The Hindus had also made common cause with the Muslims, but in the Action Committee there was no Hindu. Our AD however seemed to have worked tirelessly. He had his men everywhere and was in touch with any development that took place anywhere in the town. Not only that, he also had a full picture of all that was happening in the rest of the valley.

Evening was approaching when we completed a full round of the town in the course of which we passed through several processions. We also visited the Cinema House and the Police Station which had been set on fire and also the place where the police had opened fire in self-defence. I then suggested that we should go and inspect the Hazratbal Mosque. But Thakur vehemently objected and said that he could not let me go to the mosque in the dark as, according to him, the situation there was tense and serious. There was a large excited crowd always present and there was every likelihood of its turning violent on seeing me. I should not tempt the crowd too often. He wanted to make proper security arrangements before letting me go there and suggested that my visit be postponed to the next day. But I was determined to visit Hazratbal that very evening. So, accompanied by the Assistant Director only I slipped out of the Guest House and arrived at the Hazratbal Mosque when it was dark. As soon as the crowd heard that I had come they made way for me and they blocked the passages to prevent others from entering the mosque and clustering round me, so that I could minutely inspect the inside of the mosque and the place from which the theft had taken place without any interference or disturbance. It took me nearly two hours to do this and the crowd remained patiently outside the mosque only shouting slogans urging the recovery of the Holy Relic. When I left the mosque and came to my car, a few of the leaders in the mosque and from the crowd came and wished me success. I told them that I might have to come back during daylight the next day and they assured me that

whenever I chose to come I would get free access to the mosque. They also promised to make freely available to me any persons connected with the mosque whom I wanted to examine. This was in contrast with the position prior to my arrival when the police had not been able to examine any of the persons who could be in the know due to their non-availability. I came back to the Assistant Director's office at night. The telephone line was down. So, I could not talk to the Prime Minister. I sent a long wireless message to him narrating in detail the happenings in the valley as seen by me and concluded by stating that the administration had completely collapsed and no vestige of it remained visible except the armed police guards. The crowds were not destructive but any provocation from anywhere, real or imaginary, might so upset them that they might in an instant become uncontrollable and break out into violence as they had done on the 27th. I sent another message to Balbir Singh, who was holding the fort in my absence from Headquarters, to send two more battalions of armed police at once as I did not want to take any risks.

The next morning, that is on January 1, 1964, was a repetition of the previous day. The weather remained atrocious. I moved about the whole day from place to place, met Shamsuddin and Bakshi and also Sadiq and Mir Qasim. I wanted that the two groups of the National Conference should now close their ranks and work together to face the calamity which had befallen Kashmir. Crowds on this day were still larger. However, in the morning I could spend three very useful hours at the Hazratbal Mosque making further searches and investigation. By these two prolonged visits, I was able to draw my conclusions as to the way the incident must have taken place and the people who might be responsible for it. The locks had been broken open between midnight and 3 a.m. on the night of December 26/27. Locks of both the front and the side door had been broken. This was not necessary as the breaking of one lock was enough to allow entry and this could be the lock of the side door only which was locked from outside and not the lock of the front door which was locked from inside. The latter could be broken only after entry

had been effected. Unless the culprit knew how and where exactly the Holy Relic was kept, it would have been difficult for an outside burglar to lay his hands on it. Only the bag containing the glass tube with the Holy Relic in it had been removed leaving even the velvet covering and the silver trappings behind. The culprit must have been one whose presence in any part of the mosque including the passage in front of the sanctuary at any time of the night would not rouse any suspicion. Before starting his work of lock-breaking, he must have walked over all parts of this big mosque to make sure that everybody was sleeping and no one was likely to disturb him in his work. As on the previous evening, on this day also I was given complete freedom to inspect every part of the mosque and was allowed to go even to the holiest of the holy places where none except the Nishan Dez would be allowed, and this was all because of Pandit Nehru's broadcast. The congregation was large but the shouts were for the return of the Moe-e-Muqaddas and punishment of the guilty. The crowd kept order and did not flock inside the mosque and so did not hinder my work in any way.

The Action Committee led by Maulvi Farooq called on me in the afternoon and after referring to Pandit Nehru's broadcast insisted that I must give them an assurance that I would restore the Holy Relic and bring to book whoever was guilty of this outrage, however powerful he might be. I told them that I could only promise that I would do my best but I was in no position to say that I would succeed. I assured them that I was not afraid of anyone and whoever was concerned in this case would be brought to book if we could successfully work it out. The culprit's position would not protect him. The members of the Committee were rather disappointed that I had not promised them recovery, a promise I was in no position to make at that time, but were reassured that his social, official or political status would not protect the culprit from my hands. The Committee left me after two hours' talk in a friendly atmosphere and promised to convey to me any information it might get which might provide a clue. It was clear to me that when the Committee members were referring to high personages, they were really aiming at Bakshi

Ghulam Mohd. But they would not openly mention his name.

That evening, I again went to our office and sent messages to Delhi, calling for more CRP and police units. I talked to the Sadar-e-Riyasat, who was still then at Jammu, requesting him to come to Srinagar immediately, because I apprehended that, if we failed to recover the Holy Relic, there might be need for the President's Rule to be promulgated in Kashmir, though I myself was of the view that this should be avoided as far as possible for obvious reasons. I also sent another long report to the Prime Minister giving a full description of the day's happenings, but could report little progress towards the recovery of the Holy Relic. I mentioned that I had requested the Sadar-e-Riyasat to return to Srinagar immediately.

January 2, 1964, looked gloomier still. Weather still remained bad, the processions were still larger, the *hartal* was complete; and everything was at a standstill. I made several visits to Sadiq, Bakshi and Shamsuddin, and they also in their turn visited me. In between these visits, I went to the AD's office several times to get the latest information of the developments not only in the city but in the whole valley. I also went to the Investigation Centre set up for the Holy Relic case to see the progress in the enquiry and give directions. I also met several other people who might be in the know of the case. The Action Committee met me again on this day. Farooq complained that in spite of my promise to them that no one, by virtue of his position, would escape the hands of law, I had not yet arrested Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. I replied that my investigation had so far not disclosed any suspicion against Bakshi; nor in their talks with me the previous day they had named any suspects. So, I did not understand how the question of his arrest at this stage could arise. Farooq then said that they all suspected him and so I should arrest him. When I asked him and other members of the Committee what were their grounds for suspicion, they could not give any. I then advised them that if they had any material, they should produce it so that I could take action on it. All the information given by the Committee, in furtherance with their previous day's promise, was taken down and we started working on them.

The propaganda on this day took a very sinister form. The demand for Sheikh Abdullah's release, which had so far been made in a subdued tone, became open and vociferous; and this demand was made in every public meeting held on this day. It was propagated that Sheikh Abdullah was the only person who could restore peace in the valley and the people would not accept the words or the leadership of anybody else and the inference was that even Pandit Nehru was not acceptable. Similarly, the demand for the arrest of the guilty—really meaning Bakshi Ghulam Mohd without actually naming him—was also repeated. I noticed that there was an undercurrent of propaganda against any action which the Government of India proposed to take in this matter either in the investigation of the Holy Relic case or in bringing about general peace in the valley. The Sheikh was the only person who could be trusted to do this. Posters were issued demanding the intervention by six or seven Muslim countries, including Pakistan, and stressing that only a solution by the United Nations through the medium of these Muslim countries would be acceptable to the people of Kashmir. It was no longer a subject for India alone; it was an international matter affecting the whole Muslim world. Of course, what was being circulated in the posters was a repetition of what was coming out in the form of propaganda and directions to the Action Committee and to the Muslims of Kashmir through the medium of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radios. These two continued the most virulent form of propaganda, making India wholly and solely responsible for the disappearance of the Moe-e-Muqaddas with the set purpose of breaking the morale of the Muslim population once for all. Muslim feeling was sought to be roused against the Hindu rulers of India who had outraged Islam and a Jihad was being called. The Kashmiri was told that he was not alone. The whole of Pakistan and indeed the whole of the Muslim world was behind him. This was the opportunity for him to rise and throw away the chains of slavery for ever. So persistent was this propaganda and so strong was the Pakistani lobby in the Kashmir valley, led by the Action Committee, that large numbers of people in the valley started believing this slander

Besides Maulvi Farooq, whose uncle Maulavi Yusuf, the real Mir Waiz of Kashmir, who had run away to Pakistan and was carrying on anti-Indian activities and propaganda from there, several others in the Action Committee had strong pro-Pakistani bias and various Pakistani connections. The Action Committee also contained members of the Kashmir Political Front of Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra, an organisation which stood for outright accession to Pakistan and of the Plebiscite Front whose demand for a plebiscite was only a camouflage for such accession. Razakars, whom the Sheikh had recruited in 1958 before his arrest, also came to the forefront and made arrangements for all processions and meetings, *hartals* and *langars*, and administered threats and intimidation to those who were loyal to the Government. I reported all these developments in detail to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister in the afternoon and mentioned that if this trend in the propaganda continued, we would soon have to take action against the members of the Action Committee, including Farooq, and the leaders of other hostile groups like the Plebiscite Front and the Political Front and also against the Razakars.

We were in a very difficult position. Whereas the Shamsuddin Government was completely paralysed and could not function at all, the rival group in the National Conference, led by Sadiq, was happy over the discomfiture of the Bakshi group in this episode, but was not willing to take over the responsibility of running the government at this juncture and waited for action by the Government of India. It was impossible for us to take any preventive action against the crowds which immobilised life in the valley. The vast majority of them did not bother about politics but had been deeply hurt by this sacrilege. If any force was used to prevent their entry in the town or to throw them out, they would deeply resent such action and could then legitimately complain of interference in their religion. Moreover, there would be propaganda throughout the Muslim world and even in other countries that the Hindu police had used force against peaceful Muslim crowds which had collected only to express their deep sorrow at the loss of the holiest of the holies, the Moe-e-Muqaddas.

The repercussions in the Muslim world might be serious. India's enemies abroad would be very happy and Pakistan would use this as a lever both to move the Security Council and to introduce her forces into the valley. It was abundantly clear that the Muslim mind, which had been hurt over the loss of the Holy Relic, was being systematically exploited by Pakistan and her agents in Kashmir. But action taken against the crowds would give more grist to Pakistani propaganda and the people would be further exasperated. So, we held our patience, though we had enough force by then to enforce our orders.

All these developments made me think deeply about the possible courses of action open to me. To restore peace in the valley it was absolutely necessary that the general mass of the people should be weaned from the new leaders of the Action Committee, the various fronts and the Razakars, who had to be isolated by convincing the people that their propaganda was all wrong; but the people would not be satisfied unless the Moe-e-Muqaddas was recovered, and only the recovery of the Moe-e-Muqaddas could save the situation. No other administrative action could produce any satisfactory and lasting result and the situation might become worse and even open the gates for large-scale infiltration of tribals and even Pakistanis leading to a state of undeclared war. In fact, Pakistan had planned since two years to send infiltrators in large numbers and that plan was still in the offing. So, any action without the Moe-e-Muqaddas would only act as a further irritant and would excite and antagonise the people further. So the Moe-e-Muqaddas had to be restored. Pandit Nehru had made a promise to the people of the valley that this would be done. I had to redeem that promise.

The pattern of the conspiracy was clear. Pakistan had tried many steps since Kashmir's accession to India, including the invasion by tribals, outright attack by the Pakistani Army, innumerable sabotages, explosions and conspiracies but had not been able to bring about any large scale disturbance in the placid atmosphere of the valley. But now by one single stroke the entire valley had been put into a state of turmoil and the people's anger had been fully roused. The Sheikh's release and Bakshi's head

were being demanded, because the Sheikh was identified with the pro-Pakistani groups and Bakshi as a loyal Indian. We had by then enough material to give us certain clues and all these clearly pointed to a Pakistani conspiracy. Indeed, a couple of months earlier, an agent of Pir Maqbool Gilani, an absconder in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case, had come with the purpose of doing similar mischief in another mosque but had not succeeded. But whether I could catch the perpetrators of the crime or not, whether I could collect enough evidence against them or not, or whether I took any other steps, one thing was certain that the Moe-e-Muqaddas had to be found. And to do that we now bent all our energies.

I sent for M. L. Nanda from Jammu where he was conducting the Kashmir Conspiracy Case. We formed interrogation teams with officers who had come from Delhi and Amritsar and, helped by the Kashmir Police, started an interrogation centre to examine all suspects. I sent for Mehra who had been the Inspector-General of Police in the State for a long time and was now the Chairman of the State Public Service Commission stationed at Jammu. I also requested D. P. Dhar to return to the valley to assist me in this work. Mir Qasim was also of much assistance and Bakshi was always ready to do whatever I asked of him. It was gratifying that, in spite of all the virulent propaganda that was being carried on, large groups of people of the valley, who saw how the trend of public opinion was being gradually turned against India and in favour of Pakistan by the Pakistani agents, also came forward to assist in the work. I left our DD and M. L. Nanda in charge of the investigation, interrogation, searches, arrest, etc. and myself with the AD's intelligence network concentrated on the intelligence side of this work. After all it was a purely political case and criminal investigation alone would not give us the result. I kept Balbir Singh at Delhi regularly informed about all that was happening and all the steps that I was taking and on him fell the onerous task of running to the Home Minister and the Prime Minister, the Defence and the Home Secretaries and the Chief of Staff, keeping them fully apprised of all the developments that were taking place and

processing the demands for further assistance in men and materials that we considered necessary. He rose fully to the occasion and moved all the forces and equipment that I required by road, rail and plane and even though the weather continued to be bad, and the regular plane services were not operating, the IAF and some other organisations were able to land at Srinagar most of my requirements of officers and men.

I was wondering why the Sadar-e-Riyasat had not come to Srinagar yet and I was wanting to ring him up at Jammu when I heard from Balbir that the Sadar-e-Riyasat had flown to Delhi on the 2nd morning and there had been long meetings between the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Sadar-e-Riyasat, the Chief of Army Staff, etc. on the basis of my telegrams and that it was being seriously mooted that the Sadar-e-Riyasat would go to Srinagar the next day accompanied by the Home Secretary and several other officers and an Inspector-General of Police to take over the administration from the local Government. In other words, this would amount to the Sadar-e-Riyasat's rule being enforced. I was upset about this, because I saw clearly that the Sadar-e-Riyasat's rule would make things even worse, because that would be used for further propaganda to the effect that even the last vestiges of Muslim rule in the valley had been destroyed and the Indian Government had come out in its true colours and had forced back on the valley the hated Dogra rule from which the people had freed themselves after more than a decade of struggle and sacrifice. There was every possibility of the crowds getting further excited by this and even breaking out in violence and if force had to be used it would be a calamity beyond measure. Hence, I asked Balbir Singh immediately to meet the Prime Minister and the Home Minister and urge on my behalf that the present Government should continue unless something more serious did take place. I agreed that preparations should be kept ready in Srinagar to take over the administration at a short notice, if necessary. In fact, I had requested the Sadar-e-Riyasat to return to Srinagar for that very reason. As the Home Secretary would also be available in Srinagar he could decide which could be the proper moment. I did not agree

to the replacement of the Inspector General of Police as Thakur was doing excellent work and was of great help to me. Such a step would demoralise the Kashmir Police. Other services would also be demoralised if their heads were changed now. I also explained that excepting the first day's outbreak of violence there had been no violence so far in the sense that no actual attacks had taken place on public or private places, and it was not by violence but by the very gravity of the occasion and by their sheer numbers and the *hartal* that the crowd had immobilised the life not only of the city but also of the valley. My advice was accepted both by the Prime Minister and the Home Minister and it was decided that we should wait for further developments. When the Sadar-e-Riyasat asked the Prime Minister what he should do in the circumstances, the Prime Minister advised him to go and talk to the people. I had a well-founded fear in my mind that any change in the *status quo* at that time might lead to my plans going awry completely and we would be faced with the prospects of the Sadar-e-Riyasat's rule without the Moe-e-Muqaddas back in its place. The consequence could be serious and far-reaching.

January 3 saw the repetition of all that had happened on the previous four days with the only change that the meetings were bigger and the processions even larger. The grocery shops had been opened for an hour in the morning to enable the people to buy their essential needs at the time fixed by the Action Committee. The speeches that were delivered at the meetings on this day were more bitter than those on the 2nd and certain veiled but otherwise quite clear attacks were made on all Indian leaders, including Pandit Nehru. Ridicule was sought to be heaped on the investigation that was being conducted. A copy of a letter alleged to have been sent by Sheikh Abdullah to Pandit Nehru was circulated in the form of a poster. In this letter, Sheikh Abdullah had referred to his previous letter written in November, 1962, in which he had advocated a triple alliance of India, Pakistan and Kashmir to bring about peace in the sub-continent and further pointed out to the Prime Minister the want of wisdom on his part not to have acted on the suggestion and to have continued to support

the rule in Jammu and Kashmir by his stooges who had no real following in the valley and whom the people would not recognise as their leaders. Without mentioning that the Prime Minister should release him, he stressed that the Prime Minister should accede to the people's demands and do the right thing before the situation went completely out of control. In other words, the Sheikh warned the Prime Minister that unless he was released and the administration handed over to him, as demanded in the public meetings, peace would not be restored in the valley. Based on this letter, strong and persistent demands were made at the public meetings for the Sheikh's release. More posters came out demanding an independent tribunal consisting of judges nominated by three Muslim countries to try the accused persons in the Holy Relic case. It was even urged that the recovery itself should take place under the guidance of Sheikh Abdullah and with the approval of these Muslim countries, otherwise people would not accept it. Intervention by the Security Council through the medium of Muslim countries was demanded. On this day very large groups came from the villages, some trudging as long as 20 to 25 miles in that severe weather. They had firewood, food and blankets on their backs or on horses and donkeys, and in that fashion they joined the procession to parade the streets and attend the meetings. More *langars* had been set up and free tea and food were being distributed to anyone who needed nourishment. A Hindu delegation came from Jammu to meet the Action Committee and pledged its support to the agitation for the recovery of the Relic. These Hindu leaders also took part in the public meetings.

The Sadar-e-Riyasat arrived in the afternoon along with the Home Secretary, Viswanathan, and several other officers by road, which had opened to traffic in the meantime. The Sadar-e-Riyasat was piqued by the fact that he had not been authorised to take over the administration immediately, but, after discussions with Viswanathan and myself, agreed that it was better to wait till further developments took place. Viswanathan very readily agreed to take over the political as well as the law and order part of the work from me and leave me free to concentrate purely

on the Moe-e-Muqaddas. It was realised that without the recovery of the Holy Relic, any sudden change in the administration might create more difficulties in the way of restoring order. The GOC, Western Command, also arrived on this day and troops were also alerted, because it was clear that, with every passing day, people were becoming more impatient and might break out in violence any moment. Actually, some incidents of molesting or threatening Hindus had occurred on this day showing that Pakistani agents were trying to give a communal colour to the trouble. The arrival of the Sadar-e-Riyasat with more armed police and officers of the Government of India created a great deal of excitement among the people who suspected that a change-over was imminent. Even Shamsuddin was upset and so was the Inspector General of Police and other senior officers. I assured them that this was only a precautionary measure and no drastic change was contemplated. People accused Bakshi of having engineered this move, though Bakshi himself was strongly opposed to any takeover by the Sadar-e-Riyasat. Sensing the strong resentment against Bakshi, I advised him that evening to leave the valley for a few days, and, on my request, Pandit Nehru also gave him the same advice. Bakshi complied with our request and left Srinagar in the early morning of January 4.

I along with the A D worked till late at night. At one stage we called in Thakur and Ghulam Qadir the DIG, CID, to our assistance. We interrogated a number of persons. We checked and rechecked our facts to be sure that we were on the right track. At last when it was well past midnight we retired to our beds praying that our efforts would bear fruit the next day. There was no more time to be lost.

From the investigation which we had so far conducted, the interrogations of the large number of people whom we had listed in the conspiracy as well as from the examination of a large number of top people in Kashmir of all political shades, it was clear that Pakistan through Pir Maqbool Gilani with the assistance of some of his important contacts in Kashmir, who had received money for this purpose from Pakistan, had arranged the removal of the Moe-e-Muqaddas. This could not have been done without

the knowledge and connivance of one or more of the custodians. Even though the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been removed, it could not have travelled out of Kashmir and even out of Srinagar town. It was still close to the Hazratbal Mosque. Even the worst conspirators in Kashmir would not allow the Moe-e-Muqaddas to go away to Pakistan, because in that case all the importance and sanctity of Hazratbal would be lost together with the means of living of a large number of people who depended on the income they derived from the pilgrims. With the net tightening round them, the culprits were finding the Moe-e-Muqaddas too hot to hold in their possession. This is why a persistent demand had been raised that the very recovery of the Moe-e-Muqaddas should take place under the supervision of Sheikh Abdullah, who should be immediately released. People concerned with this realised that they were tracked and that they would soon be trapped. But if driven to the wall, there was a danger that the culprits might even throw the Moe-e-Muqaddas into the Dal Lake or bury it in the ground. Though they would not deliberately destroy it, but either of these steps would lead to its destruction. It would be impossible to recover the Moe-e-Muqaddas in such circumstances. It would be worse than searching for a needle in a hay-stack. So a line of retreat had to be kept open for the culprits to return the Moe-e-Muqaddas honourably to its place of rest, and this would fit in with the two previous occasions when the Moe-e-Muqaddas had disappeared and had come back. So, we openly withdrew all the guards from the mosque from the evening of January 3 and let it be known that people would have free access to the place. The culprit without the Moe-e-Muqaddas was of no use to us. If the Moe-e-Muqaddas came back, whether the culprit was punished or not mattered little.

The 4th of January dawned and advanced in the same way as the other days during the last week with *hartals*, meetings and processions. There was more visible excitement amongst the people due to the arrival of the Sadar-e-Riyasat. New posters appeared condemning this further attempt of the Government of India to suppress the Kashmiri people. I met the Sadar-e-Riyasat and along with Viswanathan met Sadiq who was joined by Mir

Qasim and D. P. Dhar. Viswanathan tried to persuade Sadiq to take over the Government but at that stage Sadiq would not agree. Why should he pull somebody else's chestnuts out of the fire? He explained that he could come in only after the Holy Relic had been recovered and the situation had become normal. Dhar was reasonable and wanted to help but was afraid of being misunderstood. Mir Qasim was frank and admitted that unless the Moe-e-Muqaddas was recovered, it would be suicidal for his group to step into Bakshi's shoes. Viswanathan and I moved in the town and saw the police reserves at various places. Though I put up a normal appearance, a storm was passing through my mind. I was not much interested in these negotiations. My mind remained fixed on Hazratbal. I had taken every step possible to ensure the safe return of the Moe-e-Muqaddas to its place of rest. If I failed today, there would be little chance left of its subsequent restoration. It might never be found. The consequences would be serious indeed. India's position in Kashmir would then be very difficult. And I would have let down my leader who had reposed so much trust in me.

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At 5 p. m. that day we recovered the Moe-e-Muqaddas! I cannot describe the process which led to its replacement at the place from which it had been removed on December 27. This was an intelligence operation, never to be disclosed. Thakur and I went to Hazratbal Mosque. We entered the holy shrine and the Moe-e-Muqaddas was resting in its old wooden box, broken though it was. We brought out the Moe-e-Muqaddas with great reverence, carried it on my head and told the waiting crowds that we had found their treasured Relic. They started jumping with pleasure and cried "*Mubarak*" to me. We then carried the Moe-e-Muqaddas to the Assistant Director's office and laid it on a table with flowers and incense.

I asked Viswanathan to come immediately and also informed the Sadar-e-Riyasat. I tried to put through a crash call to Delhi to the Prime Minister. But the line was dead since the morning. I told the operator that he must revive the line and he was at

liberty to hear and broadcast what I was going to say to the Prime Minister. The telephone line, as if by magic, revived, and the Prime Minister came on the line. This was at about 6 p. m. I told him in great excitement that I had recovered the thing. The Prime Minister asked what? I said I had recovered it. He said: "Recovered it, the Moe-e-Muqaddas?" I said, "Yes, the Moe-e-Muqaddas". He asked, "You have recovered the Moe-e-Muqaddas"? I replied, "Yes, I have recovered the Moe-e-Muqaddas." He said, "God bless you, Mullik, you have saved Kashmir for us". Then I contacted Balbir and asked him to pass on this news to the Home Minister, other Ministries concerned and to the press.

I was later told by the President that during this entire period the Prime Minister used to be in an extremely distracted and disturbed state of mind and used to come to him more than once a day and express his great anxiety over the turn events had taken in Kashmir with the disappearance of the Holy Relic. Soon after receiving this telephone call from me, the Prime Minister had hastened to the Rashtrapati Bhawan and informed the President about this recovery and was greatly relieved.

Viswanathan came soon after our return to the AD's office and had a very close view of the Moe-e-Muqaddas. He immediately took steps to send the news to the Radio Station, and the whole Muslim world, which was anxiously waiting for the news about the Moe-e-Muqaddas, knew from the All India Radio broadcast at 9 o'clock that night that the missing Moe-e-Muqaddas had been found. How crest-fallen my Pakistani friends must have been on hearing this news!

We had tough time that night. We sat in the cold room the whole night and called in the Nishan Dez one by one to identify the Moe-e-Muqaddas, which, with due religious ceremonies, they did. It was a very prolonged affair. I called Shamsuddin, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, from his bed after midnight and discussed with him about further steps to be taken, the place where the Moe-e-Muqaddas was to be kept and how other formalities were to be observed. There were scores of loose ends to be tied up and we spent the whole night in that work. I called up the

members of the Action Committee and gave them also the information about the recovery. I returned to the Guest House at 6 o'clock next morning (December 5)—it was still pitch dark. The Muslim *Khansama*, who had waited for me the whole night, gave me "*Mubarak*"—a genuine greeting which came from his heart and said I had saved Kashmir.

When I tried to get up later in the morning, I found I had pain all over my body and I had caught a cold in my chest. My voice was completely gone. So, the Civil Surgeon confined me to my room the whole of this day. I could as well rest. There were no more protest meetings, no more gatherings, no more *hartals* and no mourning processions. On the other hand, joyful processions came along the road of the Guest House shouting "*Mullik Saheb Ki Jai*". This was unprecedented. It hardly ever happens in a public servant's life. In any case, it had never happened to me before. I realised that this could happen only because of the support Pandit Nehru had given me. Congratulations poured in not only from people of all shades of Kashmir and all political parties and the Action Committee but from all over India. The law and order problem was over, the *hartal* was lifted from the town and offices opened after the forced holidays. Cars started moving about and public buses started plying. Black flags disappeared and the Razakars went in hiding.

This was a moment of great pleasure and satisfaction for me. The Prime Minister had reposed great trust in me and he had promised the people of Kashmir that the Holy Relic would be recovered. I had been able to redeem that trust and the pledge. The people of Kashmir were anxiously waiting for the restoration and I had not failed them. A serious calamity had no doubt been averted, because from January 4, Pakistan had already started her anti-Hindu drive and that day serious atrocities had been committed on the minorities in the Khulna district of East Pakistan and soon this had developed into a mass drive against all non-Muslims in East Pakistan with consequent repercussions in India. So, we had every reason to be happy because we had cut the very ground on which this propaganda rested. The two Kashmiri officers who were of the greatest help to me all these days were

Thakur, the Inspector General and Ghulam Qadir the CID Chief.

But our joy was short lived. Everything looked lost again when on the 6th afternoon we heard on the radio that Prime Minister Nehru had had a stroke during the Congress Session at Bhubaneshwar earlier that morning. All the light from our life went out, all our joy turned into gloom. There was no doubt that this Holy Relic episode had taken a heavy toll on his failing health. He had never really recovered fully from his illness of April, 1962, and the Chinese invasion of October/November, 1962 had given him a severe shock, both physical and mental. He himself had expressed in Parliament that many of his much cherished ideas had been shattered by this treacherous blow. Much undeserved public criticism against him had also worked on his mind and the Kamaraj Plan had thrown further responsibilities on his shoulders, since it had deprived him of the services of some of his ablest and most trusted colleagues. However, though all zest had gone from it, we kept on doing our work with a heavy heart—coming back to the radio every time to hear the bulletin about the Prime Minister's health and were relieved to some extent that night when we heard that he was making progress.

12 Demand for Special Deedar

THE WEEK FOLLOWING the recovery of the Holy Relic was very busy for me. We had to complete the investigation, consult legal experts and arrange for the formal identification of the Relic before the District Magistrate, and its final restoration to its original place in the Hazratbal shrine. On the 5th, we removed the Moe-e-Muqaddas to a big hall in the first floor of Shergarhi Police Station and kept it under proper guard. As advised by Shamsuddin, we arranged for the offering of regular prayers in this hall in front of the safe containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas. At the same time we had to take elaborate precautions for its security. Its custody placed on the police an onerous responsibility calling for utmost care and vigilance. The identification of the Moe-e-Muqaddas by members of the Aukaf Committee, some of whom had seen it from close quarters by paying special fees and were, therefore, in a position to identify it, was completed in about four to five days; besides the Nishan Dez, nearly twelve others identified it. Besides the Aukaf Committee members only a few Pirs could have done it. No one else, not even Sheikh Abdullah, was in a position to identify it by sight. We examined large numbers of persons and interrogated others at length. Accompanied by me, Viswanathan carried on political consultations with the Sadar-e-Riyasat, Sadiq, Mir Qasim, Dhar, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd (who had returned to Srinagar), Shamsuddin and other leaders. We also had to keep members of the Action Committee satisfied and had to meet them two or three times.

Though the recovery of the Moe-e-Muqaddas had baulked Pakistan of her prize when it was almost within her grasp and had made the East Pakistan drive against the Hindus look ridiculous, she was not going to throw up her hands so easily. So,

the Pakistan Radio started a propaganda to say that the Moe-e-Muqaddas, which had been recovered, was not genuine, that a fraud had been perpetrated on the people of Kashmir and urged the Action Committee and the people of Kashmir to renew the agitation. The Action Committee, which had assumed almost dictatorial powers for eight days before the recovery, found that suddenly the entire ground had slipped from under its feet and, with peace having returned to the valley, it had no leg to stand on. None of its own objectives had been fulfilled. Sheikh Abdullah had not been released, the Government had not been changed, Bakshi had not been arrested, there was no bloodshed and Kashmir was back again under India's firm control. The members saw in the Pakistani propaganda the new line by adopting which they might stage a come-back and hence slowly started circulating rumours that the public were not satisfied with the process of identification and demanded that the Action Committee should have a hand in it. But Viswanathan quite firmly told them that the identification was a legal process under magisterial supervision and the Action Committee had no *locus standi* in the matter. The members of the Committee had only a few days earlier, both collectively and individually, given me "*Mubarak*" for the recovery, and though in their talks with me and Viswanathan professed that they were satisfied about the authenticity of the find, yet behind our backs they lent support to the Pakistani propaganda by expressing doubts. At that time we thought that this propaganda would be of little consequence and that the people of the valley would treat it as merely the fulminations of the frustrated. When the Action Committee tried to hold some meetings the District Magistrate issued prohibitory orders under section 144 Cr. P.C. With the Moe-e-Muqaddas safe in our hands, there was no longer any need to give too long a rope to the Committee.

Viswanathan and I maintained a continual round of political consultations with a view to bring about unity between the Sadiq and Bakshi groups in the National Conference, so that a strong government headed by G. M. Sadiq could be ushered in to take the initiative and beat back the frustrated groups who were again

trying to raise their heads. The Sadar-e-Riyasat also tried his best, but no agreement could be arrived at on this issue and things continued to drift, with each group throwing blame on the other and in that process immobilising the National Conference at a moment when it should have been most active all over the valley.

We were advised by Sadiq and Mir Qasim that, as the investigation and the trial of the case would take a long time, the Moe-e-Muqaddas should not be kept away from the Hazratbal shrine during all that period. It would hurt the people if no exposition was given on the customary Deedar days and the next Deedar day was the 6th February, 1964, on the occasion of Urs-Char-Yar. It was absolutely necessary that the Moe-e-Muqaddas should be exhibited to the pilgrims who were sure to collect in thousands for the occasion. We realised that if the pilgrims could not have the Deedar on a customary day they might fall a victim to Pakistan's propaganda. So, we had the old enclosure in the Hazratbal Mosque, in which the Moe-e-Muqaddas used to be kept, quickly repaired and reinforced by iron doors and steel bars and we placed the Moe-e-Muqaddas in a Godrej safe in the presence of the District Magistrate with the District Magistrate's seal on it. It was decided that on the date of the exposition the District Magistrate would himself go and break the seal in the presence of the Nishan Dez and other witnesses, and hand over the Moe-e-Muqaddas to the Nishan Dez for exposition and he or his representative would ensure that the Moe-e-Muqaddas was put back in the safe after the exposition and would again lock and seal it up.

The 10th of January was fixed for the restoration and this we did in the evening to avoid undue excitement or crowding on the way. The weather was terrible. It was raining and snowing when in a procession we took the Moe-e-Muqaddas from the police station to the Guest House and thence to the Hazratbal shrine. In spite of this bitter and terrible weather and utter darkness, a large crowd had collected in the open yard of the Mosque and when the safe containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas was placed inside the shrine by the District Magistrate, shouts of "Mullik Saheb Ki Jai" were raised by the crowd outside.

Along with Thakur I came out to meet the people and addressed them, telling them that the promise Pandit Nehru had made to them that their beloved Moe-e-Muqaddas would be recovered and restored to the shrine had been fulfilled; that we were only the agents of Pandit Nehru and that he was the person who was responsible for all the success. The mosque was then rent with cries of "Pandit Nehru Ki Jai", and echoes of these sounds must have reverberated to long distances that night and must have been carried all over the valley by word of mouth. I wished Pandit Nehru was present there on that day. What tremendous enthusiasm he would have evoked among the people! We returned to the Guest House at about midnight after having completed a very delicate task and feeling happy and satisfied.

I stayed at Srinagar for three more days to complete the investigation and hold discussions with the various Kashmir leaders. I inspected the outside police units which had been inducted in the valley and had worked wonderfully well during a period of great stress. Ultimately, I left Srinagar on January 14 and returned to Delhi. One of the reasons why I could not stay any longer at Srinagar was that serious riots had broken out in West Bengal and Calcutta as a repercussion to the killing of non-Muslims in East Pakistan over the issue of the Holy Relic and more serious riots had been engineered by the Pakistani authorities in Dacca and other districts as a result of which thousands of Hindus, Christians and Tribals were pouring into Bengal, Bihar, Assam and Tripura. The whole situation in Eastern India was dangerous and explosive.

The Prime Minister, though out of danger, was still ill and I did not go to see him but had long consultations with Nanda and Shastri. Viswanathan also returned two days later. The other officers who had gone with him also returned one by one. The question which was then being discussed at Delhi was whether the Shamsuddin Government could last and bring the State back to normalcy or whether the National Conference should not be persuaded to elect Sadiq to form a more effective Government. It was a difficult problem to settle and hence it was decided to wait for further developments.

In the meantime, Pakistani propaganda inciting the people of Kashmir and telling them that the Moe-e-Muqaddas, which had been restored, was not the real one, continued unabated and fantastic stories were fabricated by Pakistan and they were continually beamed by the Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radios. Both as a result of this propaganda and the activities of the Pakistani agents in the valley and Srinagar, the Action Committee, in our absence from Srinagar, again came out openly and started repeating the stories broadcast by Pakistan and gradually started building up public opinion against the authorities challenging the very genuineness of the Moe-e-Muqaddas itself. It had to put in very hard work to sow disbelief in the hearts of the otherwise devout people of Kashmir, especially when the most respected Faqir of Kashmir, Syed Mirak Shah of Shalemar, had a dream in which Hazrat Mohammad came and told him that he had returned to the shrine and the people of Kashmir should celebrate the occasion. Unfortunately, as the Government was weak, and the National Conference was torn by dissensions, no counter propaganda could be done, and so the adverse propaganda started gaining momentum and gradually started swaying the people. Even Mirak Shah's dream went unrecognised.

We realised later that our absence from Kashmir had facilitated the perpetration of this mischief, but we had no alternative. We had been away from Delhi for a long time and much pressing work was awaiting us in the wake of the serious communal trouble that was taking place in East India and Pakistan. We also had to divert to Bengal some of the Police reinforcements which had been earmarked for Jammu and Kashmir. Immediately on arrival at Delhi, our attention was completely engrossed in the affairs of East Pakistan and West Bengal and we also had to take precautions against any military adventure by Pakistan. So, for a week or ten days, we were not fully in touch with the developments that were taking place in the valley. Moreover, a certain complacency had crept in our minds and we believed that, with the Moe-e-Muqaddas safely back in the Hazratbal shrine, nothing very serious could happen in Jammu and Kashmir despite the persistent Pakistani propaganda. But there we had under-

estimated Pakistan's capacity for mischief and the strength of her lobby in the valley. So, in spite of the warnings that we had received from our officers in Kashmir, we did not take them very seriously and hoped that in course of time things would settle down.

Pakistan had really planned the removal of the Moe-e-Muqaddas with a view to bring about not only an upheaval in Kashmir valley but also, on that score, to start serious communal riots in Pakistan, knowing fully that repercussions would take place in the bordering Indian States also. The next plan then would have been to send large bodies of tribals and disguised Pakistani servicemen into Jammu and Kashmir on the plea that they were exasperated not only at the suppression of the Kashmiri people but also at the treatment which their co-religionists were receiving in other parts of India. The trouble in Eastern India had taken place as planned, but the recovery of the Moe-e-Muqaddas had removed the main plank from Pakistan's agitation. There was no longer any strong enough motive for the tribals to pour into Jammu and Kashmir and face Indian bullets. So, the agitation had to be re-started in the valley. Pakistan cared little for what might happen to the Muslim population in other parts of India. She had set her heart on capturing the Kashmir valley, and to this end, she played all the nefarious tricks she was capable of. By constantly fanning the propaganda that a fake Moe-e-Muqaddas had been placed in the mosque, which was an act of the greatest sacrilege by the "*Kafir*" officers, and by working cleverly through her agents in Kashmir valley, Pakistan was able to bring about a change in the people's minds. Whilst the people were not willing to suspect that the Moe-e-Muqaddas was not genuine, they easily lent their support to the demand for a special Deedar by the Action Committee to establish its true identity.

By January 20, 1964, the propaganda started taking a very violent form in Srinagar and other parts of the valley, and demands similar to those made before January 4 began to be repeated. This time, however, the Action Committee felt that non-violence would not pay, because the people could not be roused purely on the basis of some suspicion. Therefore, with the help

of its Razakars, the Action Committee started provoking troubles in Srinagar town. Many insults were openly hurled at the Indian Armed Police and many false charges were propagated against them. People passing by deliberately made taunting remarks at Sikh and other Indian policemen and a demand was raised for the withdrawal of the Punjab Armed Police from Srinagar. Apparently, a big show-down had been planned for January 26, and, with this purpose, on the 25th, which was the prayer day, people coming out from the mosques attacked the Punjab Armed Police simultaneously in several parts of the city. The police in fighting back these violent crowds had to open fire in self defence at several places killing about six or seven persons.

We received this information at about noon that day and within an hour Viswanathan and I were flying by an IAF plane to Srinagar not knowing when we would be able to return again. On arrival at Srinagar, we found that the situation had greatly deteriorated, and much of what had been gained by the recovery and the restoration of the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been lost; and now there was an insistent demand that there should be a special Deedar by the members of the Action Committee, after which only the public would be satisfied about the authenticity of the Holy Relic. Viswanathan and I met the members of the Action Committee that very evening and had discussions with them for over two hours, but their attitude and demeanour were very insolent and overbearing and they made all sorts of false and irresponsible accusations against the administration and the police. They demanded an enquiry commission to determine the justification for police firing, but we did not agree. Viswanathan told them plainly and firmly that if their Razakars created any more trouble, there would be more firings. The Committee members then demanded a special Deedar to satisfy them, but Viswanathan firmly rejected the demand and said that the next Deedar would be held on February 6 which was one of the customary days for the Deedar. He was quite satisfied about the magisterial identification and made it clear that there would be no special Deedar for that purpose. The Action Committee went away in a rage which the members did not attempt to hide.

Till 2 o'clock that night I was out with the Station Commander visiting the various police pickets, supervising their patrols, visiting the affected areas and encouraging the men on duty. One must take one's hat off to the Punjab Armed Police because of their exemplary behaviour on this occasion. The cold was benumbing and on the night of the 25th it went down to about 15 degrees below the freezing point and, yet, the Punjab Police, though they were inadequately clad, were out in the streets and on their feet the whole night in mud, rain and snow. Whether it was raining or snowing made no difference to them. It was this excellent force, the Punjab Armed Police, which had maintained order in Srinagar town all these days. In other areas like Baramulla, Khanabal also, the Punjab Armed Police and the Central Reserve Police did equally good work, but the conduct of the VI and the IV Battalions of the PAP under Chhibber and Jeji in Srinagar town was superb. The Station Commander was all praise for them. All the men had realised the importance and the gravity of the situation and unitedly they were determined to meet it, not caring for any discomforts and physical hardships.

As mentioned earlier, the agitation that had been restarted in Srinagar about the special Deedar was entirely artificial and had been inspired by Pakistan. The Action Committee was utilising this propaganda to stage a come-back and re-establish its leadership. There was no justification for the demand for Special Deedar as legally the identity of the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been fully established before the District Magistrate. We were quite willing to have any member of the Action Committee come and see the Moe-e-Muqaddas, but this they would not do. Instead, they insisted on a special Deedar in which they would determine politically and not on the merits whether this was the true Moe-e-Muqaddas or not. Viswanathan's and my fears were that these people were so much in the hands of Pakistan that, at any special Deedar, they might declare the Moe-e-Muqaddas to be spurious and thereafter the entire Muslim population of the valley would rise in revolt, because at first they had been hurt due to its loss, for which after all the Government of India could not be directly blamed, but worse

still the officers of the Government of India had deliberately replaced in the holy shrine a fake, and thus committed a sacrilege of the most heinous type, hurting Muslim sentiments to the very core and humiliating them utterly. This would be taken up by the entire Muslim world and no amount of legal identification or justification would then serve any purpose. Hence the issue before us was extremely complicated and both Viswanathan and I were of the view that there could be no special Deedar for identification because, according to the District Magistrate, that formality had already been completed. The Sadar-e-Riyasat was also of the same view; but some of the Kashmiri leaders, at whose instance we had restored the Moe-e-Muqaddas to Hazratbal, now changed their view and supported the Committee's demand for a special Deedar. When we argued with them that they had expressed completely different views a fortnight earlier, they replied that though they were themselves quite satisfied, since the people were not, steps should be taken to satisfy them. A statement was also issued by this group supporting the Action Committee's demand for a judicial enquiry into the police firing on January 25. We also heard that the Action Committee was trying to introduce into Hazratbal on the day of the customary Deedar large bodies of their Razakars, who by this time had started openly putting on green arm bands and caps to identify their cause with Pakistan. At the time of the Deedar, they would raise shouts suspecting the genuineness of the Relic and thus create disorder and would not allow the Deedar to be held on February 6.

To meet the disturbances, which the Action Committee was planning to create on the day of the Deedar on February 6, 1964, we also laid careful plans. On January 28 and 29, arrests were made of those members of the Committee who were known to be staunch Pakistanis and also of the Razakar leaders. We also arrested a large number of local *goondas* who, though they did not belong to any political party, would always be out in the streets to take advantage of any disturbances that might occur. Our second plan was to pack the yard of the Hazratbal Mosque by bringing in about one hundred bus and truck loads

of pilgrims sponsored by the National Conference and other non-politicals from the villages all over the valley. The National Conference was to select the people who would come from each village and a National Conference worker would accompany them and would remain in their charge. In this way we would be able to exclude from the crowd in the yard of the mosque groups of politically motivated people whom the Action Committee might try to introduce for ulterior motives. We were sure that, with the Deedar peacefully done in the presence of representatives from practically every village of the valley far and near, we would be able finally to remove any doubts which had been created in the minds of the people by the Pakistan Radio and the propaganda by the Action Committee. Then we planned to keep a very careful watch all over the town by posting plain-clothes men and Intelligence staff and locating reserves of the Punjab Armed Police at suitable places from which they could be moved out rapidly to the affected areas. As it was quite clear to us that the people, who were trying to raise their heads again as leaders, were out and out Pakistani agents and were determined to create every form of trouble at the behest of Pakistan and, therefore, would be indulging in acts which would amount to waging a war against India, we were determined to crush the activities of these Razakars and other evil-minded pro-Pakistani agents once for all and the Punjab Armed Police was fully keyed to this job. We were prepared for the eventuality that, in spite of the precautions that we were taking, some of the mischief makers would slip into the Hazratbal yard and create trouble, but we were also confident that we would be able to adequately deal with such trouble makers. The Sadar-e-Riyasat fully agreed with our plans and the Kashmir Prime Minister, Shamsuddin, though he could not show any initiative of his own, helped us in every way possible. Bakshi also rose to the occasion and started mobilising the National Conference for this purpose. We must also give credit to the Kashmiri officers, both magistrates and police, Muslims and non-Muslims, who completely cooperated with us and we all worked as one united team with one single aim, which was to hold the customary Deedar on February 6 in a peaceful

way and to crush once for all the Pakistani trouble-makers, if they would dare raise their heads. Though by January 29, the arrests had been effected smoothly, the rest of our plans remained un-implemented because of an unexpected development which took place the next day.

13 The Special Deedar

IN MY DESIRE to spare the Prime Minister of any mental excitement, during his illness, I had not reported to him personally on my return to Delhi on January 14. In this I had blundered. Without any personal reporting by me, and because very few papers were being sent to him those days, he did not have complete knowledge of all that had happened after the recovery of the Holy Relic and the steps we had taken for its legal identification. It had also not been explained to him what the repercussions of the special Deedar demanded by the Action Committee might be, if deliberately the Committee gave a negative verdict. The Prime Minister probably suspected that Viswanathan and I were unnecessarily making it a prestige issue by insisting on an ordinary Deedar on February 6 and not accepting the demand for a special Deedar. If I had met him, I could have explained to him the possible consequences of this dangerous and legally indefensible step and the ulterior motive of the Action Committee in making this demand for which there was no justification. But, in the absence of any such explanation, the Prime Minister was naturally upset at the new turn the events had taken and he decided to send Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had been recalled from retirement under the Kamaraj Plan and was then the Minister without Portfolio, to Kashmir with two missions—the first to have the special Deedar held and the second to replace Shamsuddin by Sadiq as the Chief Minister. The Home Minister, Gulzari Lal Nanda, was strongly opposed to this move and had protested to the Prime Minister for interfering with the judgment of the officers at the spot when they were working closely with the Sadar-e-Riyasat and the Kashmir Government. But this protest was of no avail.

Shastriji arrived on the afternoon of January 30. He held consultations with us individually and collectively till midnight.

He saw our point of view only too clearly and understood very well the serious repercussions which might take place if the Action Committee gave a negative opinion at the special Deedar, but he said that he had been entrusted by the Prime Minister to get the special Deedar done and he felt that he would have no face if he went back without accomplishing this task. It was not possible for us to guarantee that no trouble would take place at Hazratbal on the day of the normal Deedar. But we were confident of containing it though we could not say that there would be no firing. Shastriji was very concerned about this and at the possibility of this trouble spreading out into the town as well as to the rest of the valley. Such riots in the valley might give rise to a chain reaction and lead to riots in several parts of India where people were excited due to the oppression of the minorities in East Pakistan. So, he preferred a political settlement of the issue to a settlement by administrative measures. This compromise would be on the one hand a promise, vague though it would be at that time, of a change in the government, for which, of course, Shastriji had already received a mandate from the Prime Minister and the possible release of Sheikh Abdullah. Viswanathan and I were not competent to talk about such a political settlement which only a leader of Shastriji's stature could do. I was opposed to Sheikh Abdullah's release. Moreover, we were not in favour of reopening the issue of identification which to our minds had been very satisfactorily settled but which was being revived only at the instance of Pakistan, and of talking terms of compromise with the Action Committee which was functioning as a Pakistani instrument. We, however, promised Shastriji all our support to enable him to fulfil his mission successfully. But we insisted that if a special Deedar was to be held, the identification must be confined only to men of religion and and no member of the Action Committee should be included in the team of identifiers. In any case they were not in a position to identify it as they had never seen the Moe-e-Muqaddas from close quarters. In other words, we insisted that the identification should be conducted on a religious basis and not on the basis of politics. This position Shastriji accepted.

For the next three days, Shastriji remained extremely busy and I was most of the time with him. From morning till late at night he interviewed all types of people and heard their views and demands. He went from place to place and met and had discussions with the leaders of various groups, and I also went out on different missions given by him to contact people whom he could not directly meet. He showed infinite patience and tact and seemed to be able to please everyone who came in contact with him. The only recreation which he took during these three days was a walk on the embankment for half-an-hour when it was not raining. Ultimately, he was able to come to a settlement and made the Action Committee agree that only religious and not political leaders would be chosen to do the identification at the special Deedar. However, the selection of the holy men was left to the Action Committee and the Kashmir Government had no say in the matter; but Shastriji insisted that the Action Committee should hand over to him the previous evening a list of the holy men whom it would select, so that any person unsuitable in our opinion could be excluded. But the Action Committee did not keep its promise and no list came the previous night and no list came at all even up to the time fixed for the identification, which was 2 p.m. on February 3. We were once told that there would be six identifiers and then eight and again ten and ultimately the number came to 14, but we were left quite in the dark as to who they would be. However, there could be no withdrawal at this stage and we prepared ourselves for the worst that might happen.

From the time we heard that there was a possibility of the demand for the special Deedar being conceded, both Viswanathan and I were very upset. The tempo of the agitation had again been brought up to a high pitch and it was difficult to foresee the final outcome. If we got a negative verdict, for which the Action Committee was making all preparations, it could be extremely serious not only for the Kashmir valley but for the whole of the country. To what levels politics could descend was apparent in this case when to gain a political objective the Action Committee was deliberately and assiduously

cultivating doubts even against the Moe-e-Muqaddas, the holiest of the holies amongst the Muslims, and was even prepared to denounce it as a fake. The Committee had no other alternative because affirmation of the genuineness of the Moe-e-Muqaddas would leave it with no leg to stand on and all its efforts during the previous month would have been in vain. But, if we conceded the special Deedar, we would have to accept the negative verdict, if it came. My personal reputation would be gone for ever. The whole world would call me a cheat whose bluff had been called. Even in my own country and amongst my own comrades, I would be ridiculed, laughed at and humiliated. And worst of all, I would lose face for ever with Pandit Nehru. But all this personal calamity would be nothing compared to the serious developments that might take place all over the Muslim world. The prospects were really grim. We, however, made all the preparations that were necessary in case of any violent upheaval following a negative verdict. From the morning the police was posted all over the city. Armed police was moved in the vicinity of the Hazratbal Mosque also and in boats in the lake. All frontier posts and the police and magistrates all over the valley were alerted. Plans were prepared for meeting different contingencies that might arise. The situation in the town was tense from the morning. Large crowds started collecting at all the crossings, waiting anxiously for the news of the Deedar. Razakars were freely moving about. It was apparent that the time for a show-down was approaching.

When even by midday of February 3 the list of identifiers did not arrive, Shastriji got alarmed. He asked me to contact Syed Masoodi, who had been negotiating on behalf of the Action Committee, and to find out why the Committee had failed to keep its promise. We got the report that, except Syed Mirak Shah, the Committee had collected most of the other identifiers in its office and would produce them at the Mosque just before the hour fixed for the identification. The Committee refused to disclose their names. This would give us no chance to verify their antecedents. Shastriji was disappointed. The initiative had passed on to the Action Committee and we were now at their

mercy. This was the position which Viswanathan and I had tried to avoid. But I had not lost all hopes. I could not believe that the holy men, who would be the identifiers, would denounce the Holy Relic as fake, whatever pressure might be brought against them. All through its history the Moe-e-Muqaddas had given commands in dreams and these Pirs all knew that it had revealed itself as genuine, again by dream, to Mirak Shah the highest Pir in Kashmir. So, it was unlikely that they would succumb to political propaganda.

Led by Shastriji, we arrived at the Hazratbal Mosque at 1 p.m. Though the main crowd had been kept away from the mosque, a large number of people had filtered through, and the yard was full. Large numbers also came with the Action Committee members when they arrived half-an-hour after us and they all flocked into the prayer hall. Till then we were ignorant about who the identifiers would be. The formal proceedings commenced at 1-30 p.m. To my dismay, Syed Masoodi, one of the important members of the Action Committee, took charge of the proceedings. He first delivered a fairly long brought speech and then asked the holy men, who had been brought there by the Committee, to be careful in judging the authenticity of the Holy Relic, to use their discrimination properly and then to give their verdict. Shastriji sat at one corner near the entrance of the hall deeply engrossed in his thoughts. I sat against a wall facing the place where the Deedar was to be held. Shamsuddin sat in another corner quietly repeating his prayers. Though the gathering inside the mosque was large, there was pin drop silence. The atmosphere was tense and electric. It seemed that all the chords had been stretched to their farthest limits and any moment they might break. Only the voice of Syed Masoodi could be heard. He was delivering a religious-cum-political lecture to the holy men. Then he gave each of the fourteen persons a copy of the Holy Quran and asked them to swear by it that they would give only the correct verdict. The fourteen took their oaths. The acting Chief Nishan Dez, Noor Din Bandey, then narrated the holiness of the Moe-e-Muqaddas and its history and gave its description from the books for the purpose

of identification. Then amidst pin drop silence the District Magistrate broke the seal of the Godrej safe and the Nishan Dez brought out the Holy Relic with its trappings. Again he spoke about its holiness and repeated the points of its identification. Then he took the tube containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas to each of the fourteen men by turn and held it near his eyes so that each person could have a good view.

From the places where I was seated or where Shastriji and Shamsuddin were seated we could not hear what talk was going on between the Nishan Dez and the holy men. All eyes were fixed on this spot. The silence was almost overpowering and unbearable and the tension was at its extreme. A tempest was raging inside me. I sat more or less in a trance—not caring any longer for what happened. Then suddenly I saw a slight stir amongst the people who were standing just behind the holy men. A few Kashmiri officers and private gentlemen broke away from this group and ran towards me shouting something. I apprehended that the holy men had said “no” and these people were coming to surround and protect me. Then I heard them saying “*Mubarak, Mubarak*” and in a few seconds they had hoisted me on their shoulders, shouting and dancing in joy. Only then I realised that the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been identified as the genuine one. The first to give the verdict was Faqir Mirak Shah, the holiest of the holy men in Kashmir, and the stir was caused when he uttered the single word “*Haq*” meaning right. All the tenseness was broken. Everybody excepting the members of the Action Committee was jubilant. I ran towards Shastriji. He held my hand in great affection and almost in gratitude, and I also reciprocated by saying that he had saved my honour. I ran towards Shamsuddin and we embraced each other. He broke out in tears. He had silently suffered all these days. There were tears of joy all round and everyone was saying *Mubarak* to everyone else, embracing each other, some congratulating, some receiving congratulations, some praising Allah Himself for the happy ending of this 37 day old deadly drama in the Kashmir valley. Only the members of the Action Committee were crestfallen

and they slunk away without even the courtesy of taking leave of Shastriji. We both came out to the yard and received a great many “*Jais*”. Shastriji then left for the Guest House on his way to the airport as he intended to leave that very day for Delhi.

I was invited by Faqir Mirak Shah and the acting Chief Nishan Dez, Noor Din Bandey, into the shrine. There the Nishan Dez put a *Saropa* on my head. The Faqir blessed me and told me to be always on the path of “*Haq*” (Truth). The Nishan Dez gave a special Deedar to me, though a non-Muslim, in recognition of my contribution to the restoration of the Moe-e-Muqaddas and touched my forehead with it. Mirak Shah said I was the greatest friend of Kashmir. Noor Din Bandey said that the shrine would be open for me whenever I would like to have a Deedar. I nearly broke down. Controlling my emotion, I came out of the shrine and the Mosque. After getting many “*Jais*” and “*Mubaraks*” from the crowd outside the mosque, I, along with Thakur, drove back through the town to the AD’s office. The news had already spread throughout the town and we met happy crowds shouting “*Mubarak*” at us. I sent the news of the successful completion of the Deedar to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister “enclaire” by wireless as the telephone line was down, and asked the Srinagar Radio Station to broadcast the news so that the AIR Delhi in its turn could broadcast it to the world immediately. I then rushed to the airport to see off Shastriji and received more congratulations, particularly his own reactions, which was most touching. When I returned to the Guest House, the *Khansama* broke out in smiles and congratulated me saying that I was the saviour of Kashmir.

That evening we really celebrated the occasion with a grand feast which Bakshi Saheb gave. Throughout this period Bakshi Saheb had been of the greatest help to us and had done whatever we had asked him to do. For the first night after a week I slept peacefully and I slept till fairly late next morning.

All that remained for us to do was to make arrangements for the normal Deedar, which was to be observed on February 6.

But this no longer held any terrors, as the main job had already been done by Shastriji. A very large crowd, numbering probably about 60,000, collected on this day. The weather had also miraculously improved after February 3 and the snow and ice were rapidly receding. From *Bara Kalan* (great winter) we had imperceptibly passed on to *Bacha Kalan* (small winter). The Deedar was gone through very successfully four times that day, and the assembled pilgrims were all happy. With my work completed, I left Srinagar that afternoon by a special plane and reached Delhi in the evening.

Early in the morning of the 7th I had to go away to Jaipur and I returned the next evening, i.e. on the 8th. On the 9th morning I informed the Prime Minister's residence that I was back. He was still unwell and I did not want an interview with him to avoid any strain; but within a few minutes the call came that he wanted to see me immediately. So, I went to his Tin Murti residence.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was seated in a chair under a tree in the garden at the back of the house. As I walked towards him he appeared to me like a great *Rishi* with white hair on his temples, wearing a white *achkan* and white *shawl* wrapped round his legs and his serene face smilingly welcoming me. Involuntarily I bowed down at his feet, which I had never done before during the 15 years' of my close association with him. He held my hand in great love and told me that I had done miracles. He made me sit close to himself holding my hand all the time and asked me to narrate all that had happened from the beginning to the end. I talked to him for nearly an hour and a half and he heard through all this narrative with great interest interjecting with questions to clarify points. Though on several occasions I suggested that I might go and come back a day later, because I did not want to tire him, he held me back to hear the entire story. The Defence Minister was waiting to meet the Prime Minister, but he was more interested in this talk on Kashmir. Ultimately, when I ended my narrative, he asked me what I felt about the whole affair. I told him that from the spectacle that I had seen from December 31 till the Moe-e-Muqaddas was recovered, it had seemed to me that Kashmir was not a part of India. No doubt, the cause

of the agitation was strong, but there was no reason to blame the state or the Central Government for it. So, the simple issue had taken such terrific proportions due to political motivations. It was also an irony that even after the Moe-e-Muqaddas had been recovered and restored, Pakistan, by false propaganda, could so poison the people's minds that they built up a second agitation for the special Deedar, whilst admitting privately that the Moe-e-Muqaddas was genuine. Here again pro-Pakistani leaders seemed to capitalise on a false issue and they tried to rouse the people against India whilst the pro-Indian leaders either sat on the fence and did nothing. Probably they could do nothing. So, a new look had to be taken at Kashmir and our Kashmir policy required a new orientation. Pandit Nehru said he was also thinking on those lines and my despatches from Kashmir in the first week of January had convinced him that a rethinking was essential.

After this, I did not wait any longer, and, without asking for any permission from him, I stood up, and said that I would go now and come back the next day or the day after to talk to him further about it, if necessary. Though it was very unusual with him, he held my hand and in his very sweet and charming voice told me that I had saved the country from a great disaster; but that when I had met him (on December 30) prior to my departure on this mission he was quite confident that I would succeed. There could be no more reward for me than this expression of complete trust.

Two days later when I went to meet the President, he got out of his bed and embraced me and congratulated me for my work. Usually Dr. Radhakrishnan used to receive officials and other visitors sitting on his bed. So, on this occasion he must have got up from the bed to show special consideration to me on this occasion. It was then that I heard from him that during the period from December 27, 1963 to January 4, 1964 the Prime Minister used to be depressed and in much mental agony, and used to come to him more than once every day to talk about the implications of the loss of the Holy Relic. He used to brood over the possible consequences not only in Kashmir but in India's relations with Pakistan and with the Muslim world in general. It was also from

the President that I heard that on the 4th evening as soon as the Prime Minister had received information from me that the Holy Relic had been recovered, he had rushed to the President to give him this information and had expressed great happiness at this success.

This was the end of the Holy Relic episode. About three weeks later when I revisited Srinagar on some other mission, the valley was peaceful and life was normal. Flowers had started blooming and the cherry blossoms were in their early glory. A strange thing happened. One evening, while I was at the Guest House, a Muslim divine came to see me. I had never met him before. He did not even introduce himself to me. He came up to me and said that he had come to congratulate me on the recovery and the restoration of the Moe-e-Muqaddas. He further said that the Moe-e-Muqaddas could only ride on the shoulders of an honest man and it was remarkable that it did not find any suitable person in Kashmir valley and chose me—a person of another faith and coming from another part of the country—as its vehicle. He left immediately, after invoking Allah's blessings on me. The Guest House *Khansamas*, from whom I enquired, said that they had not noticed this Faqir.

The Moe-e-Muqaddas had travelled all the way from Medina to Kashmir valley via Bijapur, Delhi and Lahore to rest at this particular place which had come to be known as Hazratbal. Even Aurangzeb had failed to interrupt its passage to this place and all previous attempts to displace it from there had failed and it had come back to its place of rest. So did the Moe-e-Muqaddas on this occasion also; we who worked in the cause were only the puppets in the game. Glory to the Moe-e-Muqaddas !

14 Sheikh Abdullah is Released

SHASTRIJI HAD YET to complete his second mission, which was to obtain a consensus for a change in the government with G.M. Sadiq as the Prime Minister (Chief Minister). In the course of his discussions with me in the third week of February, the Prime Minister mentioned that the Centre was always most reluctant to interfere in the constitution of any state government but in Kashmir it was obvious that the Shamsuddin Government could not function any more and rightly or wrongly—and more wrongly than rightly—Bakshi Saheb had been so discredited over the developments of the last two months that it was apparent that only a person of proven integrity, and who would be acceptable to all the groups, could function as the Chief Minister, and there was no person other than G.M. Sadiq who could do so. He was aware that the State Assembly had a majority of Bakshi's supporters, but he hoped that Sadiq, who was also one of the founder members of the National Conference and who was respected as a person of integrity by all classes, would be able to mobilise adequate support. He apprehended that unless this was done, some other catastrophe, like the disappearance of the Moe-e-Muqaddas, might again befall the valley and the entire people of Kashmir would again be up in arms against the Government. If such events went on occurring, the anger of the people would ultimately turn against the Government of India, and that was what the pro-Pakistani elements wanted.

As desired by Shastriji, I accompanied him during his two quick visits to Jammu, the first from February 20 to 24, 1964 and the second from February 28 to 29, 1964. During the first visit, Shastriji conducted prolonged talks with the various groups in Jammu and Kashmir and all but succeeded in bringing about a change in the government without any controversy. His aim

was that Sadiq should be elected the Chief Minister by the common consent of all groups of the National Conference so that he could enjoy the support of the majority and in that case group factions would cease to plague Kashmir politics as it had done since 1956 when a part of the National Conference under Sadiq had broken away and formed the Democratic National Conference.

Whilst at Jammu on this occasion, accompanied by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jammu, I visited the temple on the bank of the Tawi River from which a theft of two idols had taken place a few days after the loss of the Moe-e-Muqaddas. I found that the temple was practically a deserted one without any protective measures. The doors always remained open. The *Pujari* (Priest) never did any regular *Puja* and hardly ever offered flowers at the shrine and the temple precincts had become the rendezvous of bad characters. A few devout widows used to pour water and offer flowers on their way back from their bath in the Tawi. Two brass idols had been removed and it was difficult to say when they had disappeared, because nobody had ever bothered about them. The *Pujari* could not even say what idols there were in the temple or give their descriptions or even state with what clothes they had been draped. It was quite clear that some professional idol thieves had removed the idols. But this was being used as a propaganda against the Shamsuddin Government and an attempt was being made to prove that some high person (meaning Bakshi Ghulam Mohd) was responsible for this. On this basis the Hindus were carrying on an inspired and artificial agitation. They even alleged that this was an attempt to bring about communal trouble in Jammu as a counterblast to the agitation in Srinagar. A demand had also been raised for investigation by officers deputed from the Centre as the State Officers, it was alleged, could not be expected to do justice due to pressure from the State Government.

As anticipated by me, during our stay in Jammu, the Sadar-e-Riyasat pressed Shastriji that the investigation of this case also should be entrusted to the Director, Intelligence Bureau (i.e. myself) to satisfy the Jammu Hindus, who had a legitimate grievance

that whilst the investigation of the Holy Relic Case had been given to the highest Intelligence Officer in the country, that of the theft of the Hindu idols was being conducted by the Jammu Police, from whom they did not expect any justice. I, however, declined to take up the investigation on the ground that this was no part of the DIB's job. I had handled the Holy Relic Case because it was a purely political matter and involved not only Kashmir's position in India but also Pakistan and the entire Muslim world. I further said that from my inspection of the temple on the Tawi river bank, I was satisfied that this was the work of professional idol thieves and had no connection with politics. I also mentioned that the temple was being managed in a poor way without any regular worship and it was quite unnecessary to involve the DIB in such an investigation when he had so much else to do in the rest of India, particularly when a serious communal situation was brewing in the eastern region and was likely to boil over any day. Shastriji agreed with me and did not insist on my taking over the investigation; but the Sadar-e-Riyasat remained dissatisfied.

We returned from Jammu on the 24th after the first visit. Shastriji had nearly completed his mission, but a small hitch remained and he promised to come back after a few days hoping that this hitch would be resolved by the groups themselves. So, on February 28 in the afternoon I again accompanied Shastriji to Jammu to attend the swearing in ceremony of the new Cabinet and also the subsequent meeting of the National Conference, in which the Bakshi and Sadiq groups pledged to remain united and to support each other. Shastriji returned to Delhi on the 29th in the afternoon but I stayed on for several days more to visit the frontier areas of Jammu and also the Kashmir valley and then finally Ladakh before returning to Delhi.

Though the change-over took place peacefully, there was no real reconciliation between the two groups in the National Conference and the next attack came on the Kashmir Conspiracy Case. It was also clear that as a part of the bargain, Sheikh Abdullah's release had to be seriously considered. The new Kashmir Government lost no time in making a statement that

it was reviewing the Kashmir Conspiracy Case and would soon take a decision about its withdrawal. Bakshi Saheb, not to be left behind, also issued a statement to the effect that the case against Sheikh Abdullah should be withdrawn. When the Prime Minister had, in September, 1963, suggested the withdrawal of this case, all these leaders had vehemently opposed that move, but, probably sensing that Sheikh Abdullah was in any case going to be released, they all made a *volte-face* and now competed with each other in suggesting and demanding the withdrawal of the conspiracy case. The Sessions trial was going on; but in this political atmosphere it was impossible to keep the witnesses steady. For the first time in five years since the case had gone for trial in 1958, some witnesses showed signs of wavering in court. G.S. Pathak, Senior Counsel, and I discussed this on two or three occasions and, ultimately, I sent a note to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and the Minister without portfolio (Shastriji) stressing that a decision should be taken immediately whether the case should proceed and, if so, a clear statement to that effect should be issued by both the Government of India and the Kashmir Government to set at rest all speculations about the withdrawal of the case. On the other hand, if this was not possible, then we should be allowed to withdraw the case, as there was no point in getting the witnesses humiliated in court and embarrassing the prosecution. The evidence in the case was very strong and there could be no escape for the accused if the trial could be completed. If a clear statement about the Government's intention to continue the prosecution was made, all the witnesses could be expected to depose truthfully. But they could not remain steady when they apprehended that the Sheikh's release was imminent and he might even form the government. Already many of the witnesses were being victimised by the so-called Action Committee and there had been cases of intimidation and assault on them.

But, no decision was taken on my letter. It was no doubt a difficult decision. Nandaji was quite firm in his view that the case should not be withdrawn. Shastriji did not commit himself. I did not have any personal discussion with the Prime Minister,

but his view was well known. The case proceeded in the court in desultory fashion, and on April 4, 1964, an urgent message came from the Prosecution Counsel at Jammu stressing that, if the Government were not prepared to make a statement that the case would proceed at any cost and that they had no intention of releasing Sheikh Abdullah, it should be withdrawn, because it was impossible to hold the witnesses together in this uncertain atmosphere. I met G.S. Pathak that night and together we went to Shastriji and we were with him till about midnight. Sri Pathak told Shastriji that in his long experience in the bar he had never handled a case which was so good and yet had received such cavalier treatment at the hands of the Government. He said, "*isko to tithar tithar kar mara gaya*". He further complained that there had been obstruction at every stage in the smooth prosecution of the case. He was the Senior Counsel and yet decisions were being taken without consulting him. He felt embarrassed. In the existing political atmosphere, when everybody was talking of and expecting the Sheikh's release any day, it would be farcical to proceed with the case, particularly when the Government was not prepared to issue a firm statement that the case would not be withdrawn. He himself was unwilling to remain in charge of this case any longer and he urged upon Shastriji that a decision should be taken immediately to withdraw it, so that the Prosecution Counsel at Jammu could be informed by telephone to ask for an adjournment for considering withdrawal. But Shastriji did not give a decision. Apparently, he was not prepared to take the responsibility. Sri Pathak and I came back disappointed and I rang up the Prosecution Counsel in Jammu and advised him, much to his annoyance, that the case should be proceeded with and if he could tactfully manage to get a simple adjournment, he might try for it.

Next morning, that is April 5, 1964, the Assistant Director from Jammu telephoned, saying that the Chief Minister, G.M. Sadiq, had issued a press statement to the effect that the case against Sheikh Abdullah would be withdrawn immediately. This was strange, because Sri Pathak and I were with Shastriji till midnight the previous day and no decision had been taken. Nandaji

was opposed to the withdrawal and could not have given his consent. I communicated this information immediately to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and Shastriji. In the afternoon there was a meeting at the Prime Minister's residence where this matter was discussed. Members of the Emergency Cabinet Committee consisting of Nanda, T. T. Krishnamachari, Shastri and A. K. Sen were present besides several Secretaries and myself. The Prime Minister started by saying that, even after fifteen years of association, if Kashmir still remained in such an unstable state that even on a simple issue like the Moe-e-Muqaddas the people could be so provoked as to rise in defiance of the government, then, in his opinion a new approach had to be made and a radical change in our thinking about Kashmir was called for. He said that he felt disappointed that after all that had been done for the people of Kashmir they were apparently still dissatisfied and though much of this dissatisfaction was due to a certain amount of mis-government, all of it could not be ascribed to that cause. He also felt that Sheikh Abdullah still had a strong hold on the people of Kashmir and in the changed circumstances, no political settlement in the valley could be thought of without bringing him in. It was, therefore, desirable that he should be released and to that extent he supported Sadiq, though he felt unhappy that this decision had been taken by him unilaterally and an announcement had been made without consulting the Government of India.

The Prime Minister asked for everybody's opinion. G.L. Nanda made a mild protest but could not go very far. Other Ministers did not speak. (I later learnt that A.K. Sen had, in protest, tendered his resignation but had been persuaded by Shastriji to withdraw it on the ground that such action would hurt the Prime Minister.) The Prime Minister then looked round the table at the Secretaries who did not speak anything. Ultimately, his eyes rested on me. I had opposed all his previous moves to release Sheikh Abdullah, and so he naturally expected that I would like to say something. I said that the Prime Minister had correctly analysed the Kashmir situation and from the grim spectacle that I had witnessed during the Moe-e-Muqaddas agitation, I was

convinced that our Kashmir policy had to be reshaped. I also agreed that a new approach to the Kashmir problem was necessary and if that required the release of Sheikh Abdullah that position had to be accepted and the consequences had to be faced whatever they might be. From the practical point of view also it was no longer possible for us to pursue this case as the minds of the people in Kashmir were extremely disturbed and they were expecting the Sheikh's release any moment, and this had very adverse reactions on the witnesses. But I reminded the Prime Minister that Sheikh Abdullah had not changed his attitude one bit and even the letter, which he had written to the Prime Minister after the Chinese invasion, showed not the slightest trace of sorrow at India's humiliation. On the contrary, it showed his pleasure at India's discomfiture. Similarly, the letter he had written to the Prime Minister during the Holy Relic agitation also sounded more as a warning and demand than as an expression of friendship and solidarity with India. We had proceeded on the basis that Kashmir was an integral part of India and anyone who talked of secession was guilty of treason. We had a cast-iron case against Sheikh Abdullah and the Law Minister who had been associated with it from the very beginning, would testify to it, and many renowned counsels, including G.S. Pathak, who had been associated with this case at one stage or the other, had unanimously given the view that there could be no acquittal in this. On the other hand, the accused had been propagating all these years that it was a concocted case and that was why the prosecution had adopted dilatory tactics to delay the trial. Mridula Sarabhai was carrying on similar propaganda in Delhi and the anti-Indian foreign press was also writing in the same strain. It was the defence which had obstructed and delayed the court proceedings in every way possible from the very beginning. If the case was withdrawn at this stage, we could lay ourselves open to all the charges which the accused had been levelling deliberately and falsely against the Government of India. Once this case was withdrawn, the accused could not be booked again on the same charges and they would be more careful with their contacts in future in hatching any conspiracy

against India. I also mentioned that in unveiling this conspiracy some of our most sensitive agents had been exposed and it was difficult even to keep them safe in the valley. I said that I was mentioning these points because there was still time to save the case by firmly pursuing it and issuing a firm statement to the effect that the case would not be withdrawn and the Sheikh would not be released. If this could not be done, then there was no point in pursuing the case, because it would not be possible for us to keep the witnesses steady any longer.

So, the decision was taken that the case should be withdrawn and the Prime Minister suggested that Shankar Prasad and I should go to Jammu next morning to get the withdrawal petition prepared in a proper way and filed in the court. I requested the Prime Minister to excuse me from going on this mission. I said that the Prime Minister knew with what pains we had built up a citadel round Sheikh Abdullah, from which he had no possible escape; but now that it had been decided to blow up that citadel and let Sheikh Abdullah out, I might be spared the humiliation of having to light the fuse. The Prime Minister respected my sentiments. So, Shankar Prasad went and did the obsequies.

I am not in any way criticising the decision. I had myself moved for it. In the changed circumstances there was no other alternative. The Prime Minister's analysis of the situation in Kashmir was no doubt correct, and having seen the situation in the valley that winter I had independently come to the conclusion that something radically new and revolutionary had to be done in Kashmir to win over the people to India's side. A mere change in the Government, in my opinion, was not the solution. President's Rule was no solution either. It would exasperate the people further and widen the breach between the Government of India and the people of Kashmir. One had to come to the inevitable though extremely unpleasant conclusion that a new ground had to be prepared and Sheikh Abdullah brought back to the picture to see once again whether a lasting solution of the Kashmir problem could be found with his assistance.

So, Sheikh Abdullah was released a few days later. All his erstwhile opponents fell head over heels in welcoming him back, called him the Lion of Kashmir, and even the Praja Parishad, his avowed enemy, welcomed him. After a few days' stay in Jammu he went to Srinagar and revived the Plebiscite Front immediately and started delivering anti-Indian speeches. Later at Pandit Nehru's invitation he agreed to come to Delhi. A day before Sheikh Abdullah was due to arrive, the Prime Minister told me that a complaint had been made that we had made preparations for watching the Sheikh's activities in Delhi. Apparently, Mridula Sarabhai had made this complaint. It was at her instance that security arrangements had been made as she apprehended danger to the Sheikh's person. I explained to the Prime Minister that these security measures, which had been taken under the orders of the Government, had probably been misunderstood as arrangements to watch the Sheikh's activities. Sheikh Abdullah was coming to Delhi at Pandit Nehru's invitation and we did not think it necessary to keep a political surveillance on him. We would gladly withdraw all security men, if it was so desired, because we ourselves did not see any threat. Pandit Nehru said that we should maintain security but should take care to see that no offence was caused to the Sheikh. He said it was his intention to ask the Sheikh to forget the past, look to the future and suggest a lasting solution to the problem of Kashmir's relations with India. He would even advise the Sheikh to visit Pakistan and have a good look round before coming to any decision. So, it was likely that he would contact members of the Pakistan High Commission and we should not be perturbed at that.

Sheikh Abdullah came to New Delhi and was cordially received by the Prime Minister. The two had long talks. He then went to Pakistan with the consent of the Government of India to talk with the Pakistani leaders. He was apparently disillusioned with what he saw in Pakistan and was distressed at the pitiable conditions in which the Kashmiri refugees were living there. He met the Azad Kashmir leaders and learnt that Pakistan had given no scope for the establishment of a proper representative Government in Occupied Kashmir. He was also disillusioned

about the intentions of Pakistan about Jammu and Kashmir and apparently he did not get any encouragement to his pet idea of an independent Kashmir. This was needed to bring him back to a proper frame of mind so that he could finally decide whether association with India or with Pakistan would be more beneficial to the people of Kashmir and whether his dream of an independent Kashmir could ever be realised.

However, this exercise could not be completed and the imponderable remained imponderable due to the sudden demise of Pandit Nehru on May 27. Sheikh Abdullah hastened back to India and was at the funeral and looked greatly moved. But it was apparent that with the passing away of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Sheikh's last emotional link with India had broken. He would accept no other leader in the Indian Government as even his equal and would not agree to Kashmir's subordination to India which would mean his own subordination to the Indian leaders whom he considered inferior in status to him. The dialogue which had been started and from which so much had been expected was cut short abruptly. Sheikh Abdullah went back to Kashmir and soon afterwards resumed his anti-Indian propaganda.

15 The Kashmir Problem

KASHMIR STILL REMAINS a problem which bedevils the relations between India and Pakistan, keeps some sections of the people restive and vitiates the communal atmosphere in the country. The way Pakistan utilised the Holy Relic episode to start an orgy of violence, murder, arson and rape against the non-Muslims in East Pakistan, where people were completely ignorant of even the existence of the Holy Relic, and the repercussions which took place in Eastern India in 1964 as a consequence, show in what manner the issue of Kashmir can be utilised to poison the communal atmosphere in both the countries leading to untold sufferings to the minorities.

The prime responsibility for the continued existence of this serious problem is that of the Security Council. India had gone to the Security Council with a simple complaint of Pakistani aggression on Indian territory. Nobody could challenge the legality of the accession which made Jammu and Kashmir a part of India and nobody could deny the fact that serious aggression had, in fact, taken place and large numbers of tribals, aided, assisted, armed and led by members of the Pakistani Army, were on a rampage in the valley of Kashmir and also in parts of the Jammu area. The issue before the Security Council was simple, viz. to ask the aggressor to vacate the aggression immediately and, if the latter failed to do so, to invoke such sanctions against it as were within the powers of the Council. The problem would have been solved once and for all. But instead of solving this problem in a straightforward manner, the Security Council tried to equate Pakistan with India as regards Kashmir and the arguments used by some of the permanent members of the Council and the resolutions proposed or passed seemed to favour the aggressor more than the aggrieved. This only gave more

encouragement to Pakistan and she then brought her regular army into operation and this was admitted by her own representative before the UNCIP. But, again the Security Council failed to take the only justifiable decision, which was to ask Pakistan to withdraw her troops at once. Hence, far from dealing with India's complaint in a straightforward manner, the Security Council complicated the entire issue and left a festering sore which has been the source of continued trouble over the past two decades between India and Pakistan.

Even the Security Council's resolution and the UNCIP's recommendations clearly laid down that Pakistani troops were to be withdrawn first, the quantum of Indian troops would then be reduced and then a plebiscite under a neutral administrator would be held. But Pakistan never carried out her first task and yet the Security Council went on indirectly blaming India for obstructing the plebiscite. Even when UN representatives, Owen Dixon and Frank Graham, found that the possibility of an overall plebiscite did not exist, the Security Council, ignoring their recommendations, went on passing resolutions completely devoid of any reality.

In 1953 the Prime Minister of India came to an understanding with the Prime Minister of Pakistan that a regional plebiscite would be held in Jammu and Kashmir under a neutral administrator from one of the smaller countries. But, when the Pakistani Prime Minister, on returning to his own country, backed out of this agreement, it caused no ripples in the placid atmosphere of the Security Council, which again failed to hold Pakistan responsible for the stalemate. This agreement, had it not been unilaterally repudiated by Pakistan, would have brought the two countries nearer to the solution of the Kashmir problem. Later, however, the United States-Pakistan Mutual Aid Pact and Pakistan's joining the CENTO and the SEATO with the avowed and declared object of utilising the aid against India changed the entire atmosphere and ruled out any further talk of a plebiscite or an agreed formula on Kashmir.

And all this time Pakistan had gone on strengthening her position in the area illegally occupied by her not only in the

Kashmir valley and the Mirpur-Poonch area but also in the northern areas which till the time the Security Council resolution was passed was not in Pakistani occupation. The Security Council did nothing to prevent Pakistan from pursuing a course which was quite contrary to its own resolution. When Jarring arrived in 1957 and reported that, in view of the fact that the position of the two countries had so much crystallised on the two sides of the cease-fire line, any talk of the plebiscite mooted in 1947 or of the reversal of the process would be unrealistic, the Security Council ignored Jarring's recommendation and proceeded to sponsor a resolution devoid of any reality. It was deterred only by the strong objections raised by Krishna Menon and the final veto of Soviet Russia.

It is not on this question alone that the Security Council had faltered. When Pakistani guerrillas invaded Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965, and the Chief UN observer had reported that in fact trespass by large numbers had taken place and India wanted the Security Council to take action, the latter could not make up its mind to ask Pakistan to withdraw the raiders by a specified date and dithered again. This indecision resulted in actual war breaking out between India and Pakistan in September that year, and then the Security Council was prompt enough to issue a notice to cease-fire. There is no doubt that this war was the direct outcome of the failure of the Security Council to take action against the aggressor even when it had been clearly proved that Pakistan had infiltrated large numbers of trained and armed guerrillas into Jammu and Kashmir to wage war against India.

The influences which worked inside the Security Council and led to delayed and distorted decisions have been ably described by B. L. Sharma in his book, *The Kashmir Story*, and it will be worthwhile for readers to go through that highly documented book to see how every time imperialist intrigues thwarted a solution of the Kashmir problem, though the solution was simple enough from the very beginning.

Pakistan's responsibility for creating this problem hardly needs an explanation. She is interested in seizing the whole of Kashmir valley and the whole of Jammu north and west of the Chenab

river. She is already in possession of more than one-third of the territory with about one-fourth of the original population under her control. It is to her interest to keep the pot boiling all the time and to find excuses to drag the Kashmir issue out of cold storage with the help of her old friends and to revive her diplomatic offensive against India in the Security Council. Though the aggressor on both the occasions, she has been helped by the imperialists to pose successfully as the aggrieved and thus deserving the World Body's support.

As the earlier chapters would show, Pakistan had tried, throughout the years from 1948, all forms of infiltration, propaganda, subversion, sabotage, outrages and murders, but had signally failed to make the population of Kashmir rise against the Government of India. Even her master-stroke of causing the temporary disappearance of the Holy Relic was foiled by its quick recovery. She then tried to create a Viet Nam situation by sending large numbers of trained guerrillas, but even that did not find response amongst the people. It suits her purpose to keep up this offensive. By raising the false bogey of India's alleged oppression of the Muslims of Kashmir she continues to denigrate India before the Muslim world and foster a spirit of hatred against India among her own people. This anti-Indian attitude helps to hold together the loosely-knit joints that comprise Pakistan. And whilst she demands the right of plebiscite for the people of Kashmir she denies the same right to the Pakhtoons and suppresses with a strong hand even the demand of autonomy in East Pakistan and Baluchistan. Now, of course, she has been joined by China, who also supports the right of self-determination for Kashmir, whilst using the most barbaric methods to suppress the demands of the people of Tibet and Sinkiang of even the right of national expression.

There was a lot of arm-twisting by the British and the American representatives immediately after the Chinese aggression in 1962 and the bargain that was then attempted was in the form that America and Great Britain would give arms aid to India only if the latter could come to a settlement with Pakistan about Kashmir, as if the responsibility for non-settlement was India's. But, both Prime Minister Nehru and Finance Minister Morarji Desai had

stood firm and so this attempt misfired. But encouraged by these friends of hers, Pakistan raised her demands so high during the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks that, though India had agreed to the discussion with an open mind and was willing to make fairly large concessions, it was impossible to concede all of Pakistan's demands. Pakistan's demand was that she would take the Kashmir valley and the bulk of Jammu and only the three south-eastern districts of Jammu might go to India. She did not care what happened to Ladakh and would ingratiate herself further with China by handing it over to her on a silver platter.

After 1965, the situation has changed vastly. Even such a sympathetic leader like Jayaprakash Narayan, who had always advocated Indo-Pakistan joint efforts to settle the Kashmir problem, has said that, after the aggression of 1965, Pakistan could no longer have any say on the solution of this issue, and she should no longer be recognised as a party to the dispute. Jayaprakash Narayan is right. Pakistan had fought not one war but two, and she has lost them both. If she likes to fight another, she may try it; but in the circumstances any further negotiations with her seem to be impossible and this is quite clear even from the attitude recently displayed by both Ayub and Yahya. Pakistan refuses even to open trade with India on the score of Kashmir in spite of the Tashkent agreement.

Jayaprakash Narayan has rightly observed that, after Pakistan has put herself out of court, the issue of Kashmir should be settled only between India and the people of Kashmir. This is the correct position. Recently Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan pertinently said that India should examine if she had kept all the promises she had made to the people of Kashmir and the latter also on their side should examine whether they had carried out the undertakings they had given to India. Though this frank attitude was not liked by a few persons, this is an unexceptionable statement and should provide the basis for judging the relationship between Kashmir and India.

The first question is: "Has India kept all the promises she made to Kashmir?" To decide this, we should find out what promises India had made.

On a request from the then Kashmir ruler, India had sent troops to drive the raiders out from Jammu and Kashmir territory and had partially succeeded in doing so. Pandit Nehru had made a historic declaration at Lal Chowk in Srinagar in October, 1947 to the effect that after the raiders had been thrown out and peace had been re-established, the people of Jammu and Kashmir would be given an opportunity to decide their future.

Has the Government of India gone back on this promise made by its Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, when Mahatma Gandhi was still living? Indians, no doubt, will say that the promise has been kept and Kashmir has decided its future through the Constituent Assembly and through three general elections in 1957, 1962 and 1967. But, let us look at it from the point of view of the people of Kashmir themselves. Do they consider that India has fulfilled her promise and have they voluntarily opted for the final accession of the State to India?

Sheikh Abdullah had gone to the Security Council with India's delegation and, addressing the Council in support of India's complaint, he had roundly accused Pakistan of blatant aggression and had expressed his grave disappointment at the fact that instead of directly asking Pakistan to vacate aggression, the Council was by-passing India's complaint by introducing various other extraneous matters.

The Security Council having failed to move in the matter, the people of the State had, time and again, reiterated their faith in the final accession of the State with India. A Special Convention of the National Conference held in October, 1948 (i.e. one full year after the aggression had taken place) passed a resolution which stated: "In these circumstances this Convention, therefore, confirms the provisional accession of the State with India. It further pledges its fullest support to a final accession to India on the basis of new Kashmir, the realisation and implementation of which will be our first and foremost task. The Convention strongly hopes that the Indian Government and the people of India will lend the people of Kashmir all material, moral and political support in completing this task and in achieving our goal of economic and political freedom". On this occasion

Sheikh Mohd Abdullah, who was the President of the National Conference and at that time the undisputed leader of the Kashmiri Muslims, whilst moving this resolution, said: "So far as I am concerned, I feel certain that the political, economic, social and cultural interests of Kashmir demand an immediate and final accession to India, India and India alone." Later he amplified his stand while addressing an *Id* gathering at Srinagar when he said: "The decision taken by the Special Convention of our National Conference was the logical outcome of a year of hardships and sufferings perpetrated on an innocent and peace-loving people by Pakistani troops. The pledge I gave to Pandit Nehru last year that Kashmir will be a part of India has now become an eternal bond. We can never forget the help rendered by the Indian Army and the people of India at a time of grave crisis in the history of our State. Indian troops have even provided the local people with their own rations to save them from starvation. It was after fully knowing India's attitude for over a year that the decision for permanent accession was taken, a decision which would affect the destiny of the entire population of the State for generations to come. Our decision to accede to India is based on the fact that our programme and policy are akin to those followed in India.... The Special Convention called by Jammu and Kashmir National Conference has given a definite lead to the country. After one year's hard sufferings, bitter experience and deep deliberation, we took a decision which affects the people of the State for generations to come. We are happy over it, for it is also in accordance with the principles of Islam".

A whole year had gone by since the aggression had taken place and the raiders had been pushed back, and the people of the State had had ample time to study India's policies and attitudes and see the implementation of her policies and also the behaviour of Indian officials and troops and take a final decision whether Kashmir's accession to India would be beneficial to them. It was only after mature deliberation, that the people, through the forum of the Special Convention of the National Conference, decided that the provisional accession should be made permanent. Another weighty reason given for this decision was that both India

and Kashmir were guided by similar programmes and policies and so there was an identity of purpose binding the two people together. Not only that, Sheikh Abdullah also held that this decision was fully in accordance with the principles of Islam. Was any further expression of opinion of the people to settle their future necessary? The whole world would acknowledge that in 1948 the National Conference with its united leadership under Sheikh Abdullah represented 95 per cent of the Muslim population of the Kashmir valley. Through this Special Convention, the vast majority of the people of the valley had unreservedly decided in favour of permanent accession of Kashmir to India. So far as India was concerned this unanimous decision of the Convention of the National Conference, which represented practically the entire people of Kashmir, was enough and could be considered as the fulfilment of the pledge that Pandit Nehru had given earlier that, after the raiders had been thrown out, the people of the State would be given an opportunity to decide their future. They had in unmistakable terms decided their future by agreeing to remain permanently with India.

Has India defaulted on the question of the plebiscite itself? After all, it was for the people to decide whether they wanted to have a formal plebiscite to decide their future or they considered that they had already properly exercised their option and no further ascertaining of opinion was necessary. So, let us see how the people of Kashmir looked at the question of a formal plebiscite when the issue was still alive. The National Conference continued to take a grave view of the delaying tactics of the Security Council in finding an equitable solution of the Kashmir problem in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. Sheikh Abdullah gave vent to this feeling of extreme disappointment whilst addressing the 19th session of the National Conference. He said: "Soon after the United Nations Charter had proclaimed the fundamental freedom of nations, our country was suddenly made the victim of an unprovoked and wanton aggression. In vain we sought the assistance of the United Nations Organisation to undo this aggression which had resulted in untold sufferings for thousands of innocent people of the State. To our utter

amazement, instead of giving a clear verdict on the war-guilt of the aggressor, our rights and the bona fides of India were questioned. As a consequence of this refusal to enforce the fundamental principles of the Charter, the United Nations Organisation repeatedly failed in its attempts to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem. Under the pretext of referring the question of the State's future disposition to the will of the people, the Security Council tried novel and astounding methods which were not connected even remotely with the basic issue of accession. In all sincerity and good faith we suggested time and again that, as the question of their future was the primary concern of the State's people themselves, it should be made possible for them to express their will on this all-important issue and for this we suggested that it was necessary to restore such conditions as obtained in the State before the invasion with an effective guarantee against further aggression. This was the crux of the problem and if the Security Council had brought about a peaceful settlement of the dispute, the matter would have been solved long ago. But the Security Council proceeded to recognise the claims of the aggressor and permitted him to enjoy the fruits of his aggression. Under these circumstances, a free and impartial plebiscite would have become not only a mockery but would have further imperilled the security of the State". So, the undisputed leader of the Kashmiri people at that time categorically repudiated the plan of a plebiscite as envisaged by the Security Council.

The National Conference, as the representative political organisation of the people of the State, took timely notice of these dangerous tendencies and rejected the proposal that had been mooted in the Security Council by some interested members. In a statement to the Press, Sheikh Mohd Abdullah said: "No plebiscite is possible without the sovereignty of the legally constituted Government of Jammu and Kashmir being effectively extended over the entire territory of the State, disbanding of the so-called Azad Kashmir Government and its forces and the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and nationals". In another statement Sheikh Abdullah declared: "But there can be no plebiscite in Kashmir

unless and until the Pakistan and so-called Azad Kashmir forces are withdrawn from the State territory, refugees are rehabilitated and the sovereignty of the legal head of the State over the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir is recognised". In a Press statement in Srinagar he declared: "I have often said in the past and I repeat that the irreducible minimum conditions for the settlement of the dispute are, firstly, restoration of the State to the lawful Government and the consequent liquidation of the so-called Azad Kashmir Government and disbandment of its forces and secondly, the rehabilitation of those who have left their places of residence after the raids and consequent disturbances. These two factors are the key-note of the whole problem and any denial of their fulfilment would mean drastic deviation from the fundamental principles on which the people of the State had taken their stand."

The people of the State were naturally getting impatient and resented the fact that forces in the Security Council, which did not have the interest of the people of the State at heart but were guided only by their own imperialistic interests, were thwarting the attempts of the people to find their own salvation and thus defying their wishes. Therefore, the National Conference in 1950 held the view that "these conditions of drift and uncertainty should end and that a proper, constitutional and democratic forum be established which should ascertain the wishes of the people in relation to their future". The National Conference reiterated that "the accession to India was perfectly valid—legally, morally and politically—and the people of the State could no longer be denied the opportunities of social progress that was afforded to them by virtue of their being a part and parcel of the Indian Union". Accordingly, the General Council of the National Conference, presided over by Sheikh Mohd Abdullah in October, 1950 (full two years after the aggression and when peace had been restored), issued a mandate to the party for the convening of a Constituent Assembly which would take decisions on all vital issues concerning the future and the affiliations of the State. The resolution stated: "The indecision and unrealistic procedure adopted (by the Security Council) so far has condemned the

people of the State to a life of agonising uncertainty. The All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference is gravely concerned and cannot any longer afford to ignore the perpetuation of these conditions of doubt and frustration. In the opinion of the General Council, therefore, the time has come when the initiative must be regained by the people to put an end to this indeterminate state of drift and indecision." The General Council, therefore, directed as follows: "The General Council, recommends to the Supreme Executive of the people to take immediate steps for convening a Constituent Assembly based upon adult suffrage and embracing all sections of the people and all the constituent units of the State for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In this Sovereign Assembly, embodying the supreme will of the people of the State, we shall give to ourselves and our children a constitution worthy of the traditions of our freedom struggle and in accordance with the principles of a new Kashmir."

So, in response to this requisition by the main political organisation of the State, the Supreme Head of the State issued a proclamation convoking a Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives of the people elected on the basis of adult franchise for framing a constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah welcomed this decision and addressing the annual session of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on June 1, 1951, said: "In view of this prolonged stalemate, the General Council of the National Conference once again met in October last year to examine the position. It came to the conclusion that in order to put an end to the agonising uncertainty and suspense, the people could no longer afford the perpetuation of these conditions of doubt and frustration. It felt that the initiative must be regained by the people to put an end to this indeterminate state of drift. It may be observed here that this was no new decision, because as early as 1948 the General Council had urged the Government to convene a Constituent Assembly intended to shape the future destiny of the country and to implement the cherished objectives of New Kashmir."

The tirade about uncertainty and suspense was not against

India but against the Security Council for persisting with its unrealistic paper plan about a plebiscite, holding this threat as a sword of Democles over the heads of the people, who had quite clearly and unmistakably, through their national forum, exercised their option to remain with India. But the Security Council's fanciful approach to the problem, which favoured the aggressor and not the aggrieved, perpetuated the uncertainty about the future and thus blocked all avenues of progress. How long could the people suffer this gross injustice? So, the people decided to take the issue out of the Court of the Security Council and decide their own future.

When the Security Council heard of this proposal to call a Constituent Assembly, it feared that it was going to be bypassed. By whom? By the people themselves who were disgusted with the manoeuvrings of the imperialists who paid little consideration to their interests. The imperialists found that their game was up and they hastily introduced a draft resolution in the Council disapproving of the idea of a Constituent Assembly. On hearing this, Sheikh Abdullah again issued a long statement asserting the right of the people of the State to decide their future through the instrument of the Constituent Assembly. He said: "The attitude which the draft resolution reveals towards the Constituent Assembly comes as a painful reminder of all the dilatory means which have so far delayed the subjection of Pakistan to the penalties of an aggressor who had invaded our country. On the other hand, the attitude of the promoters of this resolution towards the Constituent Assembly appears as an attempt to stay the democratic development of the people who wish to build the framework of their government in a democratic manner. Our development as a democratic people demands convening of the Constituent Assembly. It is the highest organ reflecting the people's will. We cannot wait indefinitely and hold up our march forward.... We want to go to our people. We want to get their mandate. We want to draw sanction from their will. Surely, any individual or institution that denounces such a move cannot be sympathetic to the vital spirit of democracy. The objection that our being in the government while elections

are held will be prejudicial to the correct expression of the popular will is not valid. Can any democratic government, say England, USA, France or even Pakistan, show any example when the government in power came out of office while elections were on. If not, then why in the case of Kashmir is such great exception being taken to the Constituent Assembly being convened with the present government in office. Not only that, but objection is being raised to the Constituent Assembly being convened at all. Those who raise these objections surely are sufficiently aware as constitutionalists that such objection is an attack on the prerogative of the government to seek the confidence of its people. Further, it is an anti-popular move which seeks to deny a people its sovereign right to self-determination, a right which is as inalienable as the soul of democracy".

So, the people of Kashmir had unequivocally renounced the idea of a plebiscite and had decided to settle their future through a democratically elected Constituent Assembly. The decision was taken unilaterally by the people of Kashmir themselves acting in complete freedom and exercising their choice as free people. No one can blame India for having failed the people of Kashmir in respect of the plebiscite. Actually, India was embarrassed, but the people of Kashmir were determined to end their state of continued uncertainty and to find their own salvation. How could any democratic country oppose this legitimate and laudable move?

The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly was held on October 31, 1951, when Sheikh Abdullah, as the Leader of the House, made the following statement on the sovereignty of the Assembly and the objectives:

"You are the sovereign authority in this state of Jammu and Kashmir. What you decide has the irrevocable force of law.

"What are the main functions that the Assembly will be called upon to perform?

"One great task before this Assembly will be to devise a constitution for the future governance of the country.

"Another issue of vital importance to the nation involves

the future of the Royal Dynasty.

"The third major issue awaiting your deliberations arises out of the Land Reforms which the Government carried out with vigour and determination.

"And, finally, this Assembly will, after full consideration of the three alternatives that I shall state later, declare its reasoned conclusion regarding accession.

"This will help us to canalise our energies resolutely and with greater zeal in directions in which we have already started moving for the social and economic advancement of our country."

On the crucial political issue, namely, the State's accession to India, Sheikh Abdullah discussed the various alternatives and, rejecting the possibility of the State's accession to Pakistan or its independent status, observed: "The Indian National Congress has consistently supported the cause of the States' peoples' freedom. The autocratic rule of the princes has been done away with and representative governments have been entrusted with the administration. Steps towards democratisation have been taken and these have raised the people's standard of living, brought about much needed social reconstruction, and, above all, built up their very independence of spirit. Naturally, if we accede to India, there is no danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy. Moreover, during the last four years, the Government of India has never tried to interfere in our internal autonomy. This experience has strengthened our confidence in them as a democratic set-up. The real character of a State is revealed in its constitution. The Indian constitution has set before the country the goal of secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction. This is the bed-rock of modern democracy. This should meet the argument that the Muslims of Kashmir cannot have security in India where the large majority of the population are Hindus. Any unnatural cleavage between religious groups is the legacy of imperialism and no modern State can afford to encourage artificial divisions if it is to achieve progress and prosperity. The Indian constitution

has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious State, which is a throw-back to medievalism, by guaranteeing the equality of rights of all citizens, irrespective of religion, colour, caste and class."

So, even up to October, 1951, Sheikh Abdullah as the leader of the Kashmiri people had categorically held that Kashmir's interest lay with India and it was only as a part of India that Kashmir could develop as a democratic State. He had lauded those provisions of the Indian constitution which had given India a secular democracy with freedom for all religions and based on social justice; and he very definitely identified the aspirations of the Kashmiri people with those of the people of India, and he also categorically declared that in the Indian constitution itself the Kashmiris would find a guarantee of all that they had been struggling for since the beginning of their freedom movement. So, even up to this point of time, that means even for four years after the historic declaration had been made by Pandit Nehru, never had any doubt been raised by the Kashmiri people that India had not kept her promise by them. In fact, every resolution which had been passed by the National Conference or its Special Convention beginning from October, 1948, had supported the accession of the State to India and recommended its final accession. This was the feeling which was powerfully voiced by Sheikh Abdullah in his historic address on the opening of the Constituent Assembly in October, 1951.

Did India default in any way after this calling for a re-appraisal of Kashmir's position in India? Let us examine this further. When the Constituent Assembly had to decide on the basic principles on which the constitution was to be framed, naturally the details of the State's relationship with India and the obligations on both the sides had to be worked out jointly by the Governments of India and Kashmir. The Indian Constitution had in Article 370 already provided for special provisions for Jammu and Kashmir, but it was necessary to spell out these special provisions in more detail to avoid subsequent difficulties. After negotiations between the two sides, a full agreement was arrived at in July, 1952, which was called the Delhi Agreement. For

Kashmir, it was signed by Sheikh Abdullah as the leader of the Kashmiri delegation. And commending this Agreement to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah said: "A satisfactory position has emerged and we are now able to assess the basic issues of our constitutional relationship with India in clearer terms. There has been a good deal of accommodation of our respective points of view. Both the representatives of Government of India and the Kashmir delegation have been impelled by the desire to strengthen further the existing relationship to remove all obscurity and vagueness. We are convinced as ever before that we have the full support of the Government and the people of India in the fulfilment of our democratic ideals and the realisation of our objectives." Thus, the Delhi Agreement was considered completely satisfactory by Sheikh Abdullah who held that India had fulfilled all her promises till then. By a Presidential order in November, 1952, according to the terms of this Agreement, a change was made in the definition of the Government of the State. The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 also made provisions incorporating the basic points of the Agreement.

So, no one can question India's bona fides in the matter. India considered Jammu and Kashmir to be an inseparable part of India, recognised Kashmiri as one of the national languages of India and gave the population of Jammu and Kashmir all the rights and privileges which the people of other States of India possessed under the Constitution, and yet made important exceptions in favour of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian citizens (other than the permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir) had no right to acquire property in that State though the people of that State had unfettered right to acquire property in any part of India. Laws passed by the Indian Parliament could be introduced in the State only with the consent of the State Assembly. There were many other provisions giving a special status to the people of this State. So, no one can accuse India of having defaulted in any way in the matter of implementing the promises she had made to the people of the State.

It was only from the latter part of 1952, that Sheikh Abdullah

started having second thoughts. The Praja Parishad and Jana Sangh agitations in January, 1953 in Jammu and India respectively gave him the excuse that he required for making a somersault and thereafter he started equating Pakistan with India though he had so far unequivocally condemned Pakistan as the aggressor. But, his new posture of independence did not find much support amongst the people of the State and by August, 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah was removed from the Premiership of the State, he had already lost his majority in the three main bodies that counted, that is in the Cabinet, in the National Conference and in the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly members, elected on National Conference tickets, had been hand-picked by Sheikh Abdullah himself and yet, barring a few who went his way, the vast majority remained favourably disposed to India and by overwhelming majority voted Kashmir's permanent accession to India. When the Constituent Assembly ended its functions and elections to the State Legislative Assembly were held, the National Conference won by overwhelming majorities in 1957, in 1962 and again in 1967, and there is no reason to doubt that these assemblies, which never questioned Kashmir's position in India, fully reflected the wishes of the people. If the Assemblies made any changes in the Constitution, they were for ending some or other of the special provisions and for bringing this State more closely in line with the rest of India. The main political organisation of the State, i.e. the National Conference, which later transformed itself into the National Congress in 1965, had, in none of its general body meetings or conventions, questioned Kashmir's constitutional status as an integral part of India, nor had it ever alleged that India had in any way defaulted in the implementation of the promises she had made to the people of the State.

Therefore, so far as the promise made by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to the people of Kashmir, that they would have an opportunity to settle their future, is concerned, it has been more than redeemed and this was implicitly acknowledged by the successive resolutions of the National Conference from 1948 onwards, by the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly and the State

Assemblies elected on the basis of adult franchise and by the exercise of the free will of the people. It is the people of the State who, of their own volition, and after fully considering where their interests could be best served, have decided to remain a part of India with whose ideology the Kashmiri people have found close identity.

Have then, as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan asked, the people of Jammu and Kashmir, gone back on the promises they had made to India? The answer is an emphatic "no". The people of the State have suffered many vicissitudes, witnessed several upheavals and patiently borne an orgy of violence let loose by Pakistan in 1957 and invasion by the Pakistani guerrillas in 1965 but have always kept their heads cool and have never wavered in their faith in their eternal ties with the Indian people, which no amount of exhortation, intimidation, outrages and even war has been able to erode.

Then why admittedly does a certain amount of dissatisfaction prevail amongst some people? The cause is Sheikh Abdullah. Once having tasted power, Sheikh Abdullah wanted to be a dictator under the facade of democracy and started toying with the idea of an independent Kashmir. His idea of democracy was probably that there would be an elected parliament filled by people selected by him and with no opposition or only a nominal one, which would give sanction to whatever he desired and thus give the stamp of democracy to his dictatorial will. Sheikh Abdullah has proved to be completely unreliable—unreliable to the people of India and of Jammu and Kashmir. When his people were suffering terrific oppressions by Pakistani marauders, he proclaimed the eternal unity of Kashmir with India and thus promised his people all the benefits of sharing in the prosperity of this great country. When India after much sacrifice and shedding of Indian blood saved the major part of the State from Pakistan and restored peace and order enabling the people to call their own Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah went on preaching unity with India, at least outwardly, because the threat of a plebiscite to be conducted by the UN was still hanging over his head and he saw in this a danger to his own position. But as

soon as he found that India had finally blunted all the efforts of the Security Council to interfere in the affairs of the State and when he got the imperialist bait of the possibility of an independent existence, he betrayed India and also his own people because the course he was going to adopt could only bring much sorrow and difficulty to them. But for satisfying his personal ego, he was willing to sacrifice the good of his people. So, from this moment he started giving Pakistan the same position as India as regards Kashmir, and at the same time went on insisting that no parliament outside the State would have any jurisdiction over the people of Kashmir. How Kashmir was going to be a part of India or Pakistan or any other country without the highest elected body of that country having a say in the affairs of the State is, of course, beyond anybody's comprehension. Sheikh Abdullah himself has never found it convenient to clarify how this was to be secured. He goes on poisoning the minds of the State people by propagating that they had been denied their right of self-determination. In what way, he does not explain. By allowing a UN-sponsored plebiscite to be held? But he himself was the greatest opponent of that idea. The trouble is that he identifies the interest of the people of Kashmir with his own interest and so he raises the cry that the people had been denied the right of self-determination when he actually means that Pandit Nehru did not allow him to lead the people astray for satisfying his personal ambition of being a "Sheikh" in the real meaning of the term.

Joseph Corbel, who was a member of the UNCIP Mission, in his book, *Danger in Kashmir*, had summed up Sheikh Abdullah correctly in the following words: "In May, 1949, Sheikh Abdullah assured Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that 'I want you to believe that Kashmir is yours. No power in the world can separate us. Every Kashmiri feels that he is an Indian, and that India is his homeland'. From time to time he clamoured for complete independence of Kashmir and on other occasions he declared that independence was not a practicable idea. In 1952, he stated: 'Neither the Indian Parliament nor any other parliament outside the State has any jurisdiction over our State. No country, neither India nor Pakistan, can put spokes in the wheel of our

progress.' A few days later he envisioned Kashmir 'as a bridge between Pakistan and India which 'can again be reunited and become one country.' But two days later he considered 'relations between India and Kashmir irrevocable and no force on earth can render us asunder'. Back to warn the Indian Government he declared that 'the existence of Kashmir did not depend on Indian money, trade or defence forces and he did not expect any strings to be attached to Indian aid. Threats and taunts would not intimidate him into servile submission'. In actual fact, he led Kashmir step by step further away from India. One of his political rivals has characterised him as a 'Communist in Kashmir, a Communist in Jammu, and a Nationalist in India'...The story of Sheikh Abdullah is a sad and sorry one. It is the story of a patriot, once passionately devoted to his people's welfare, but one whose patriotism was too shallow to reject the temptations of power. Once a fighter, he turned into an opportunist, and, worse, a dictator, who at the end found himself entangled in the web of his own methods and policy".

What were the causes which brought about this change in Sheikh Abdullah? Was there a change at all or was it the reappearance of some basic trait in him which had been kept subdued for the time being due to the exigencies of the situation? Some observers have suggested that the bait offered by some foreign dignitaries of an independent Kashmir worked on him. It is true that the solid support he had so far given to India had foiled the designs of the imperialists to detach Kashmir from India and make it a playground for their power politics. So, unless the Sheikh could be subverted, there was no chance of the imperialist game succeeding. But, the Sheikh was not such a simple person as to be taken in by a vague promise, even if it had been made. The cause was much deeper. The attitude of the members of his family, who were against India, exercised much influence on his mind. We have it from Joseph Corbel that when the United Nations Commission was in Kashmir, Begum Abdullah sent a message to it to the effect that "even if her husband would not make a firm stand for an independent Kashmir, she would". But an even stronger reason was Sheikh Abdullah's basic

communalism. He had subdued the external manifestations as long as he needed India to prop him up. As soon as he found that he could do without India, his strong instinct of communalism and opportunism raised its head and he re-appeared in his true colours.

Sardar Patel had sized up Sheikh Abdullah correctly when he had warned me as early as in 1949 that I would soon be obliged to change my favourable opinion about him. It is not that Pandit Nehru also had not understood him properly. This was quite clear from what he had told me in January, 1953, when sending me on the mission to stop the Praja Parishad agitation and also to induce Sheikh Abdullah to desist from making communal speeches. His outburst in the meeting referred to earlier in which Lal Bahadur Shastri, A.K. Sen and G.S. Pathak and myself were present, dubbing Sheikh Abdullah as basically communal, also showed that he knew what stuff Sheikh Abdullah was in reality made of. But Pandit Nehru was a humanist and an optimist and he had hoped that, seeing the secular and democratic forces at work in India and the progressive trends which even Muslim countries like the UAR and Turkey were following, Sheikh Abdullah would be able to get over his basic trait of communalism and become a national leader, not merely a leader of Kashmir but a leader of the whole of India. But no amount of good example, no amount of persuasion, no amount of friendship and even exhortations by such highly respected Muslim leaders like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai could eliminate the basic communalism in Sheikh Abdullah, and this is what ultimately prevailed.

Sheikh Abdullah calls himself a leader of Jammu and Kashmir which includes also Ladakh; but the people of Jammu and Ladakh will not acknowledge him as their leader. Bakshi and Sadiq have much better claims to that title and are respected and trusted by these people whereas the Sheikh is held with suspicion. He can at best claim to be the leader of the Kashmiri Muslims only, not even of all the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir. The Poonchis and the Muslims of Rajauri, Mendhar, etc. and those of Azad Kashmir area have never acknowledged

the Sheikh's leadership and there is a considerable percentage of Gujars who also have not done so. No doubt, the Sheikh has sizeable influence in the valley, but this is only of a negative character. Leaders who had roused the spirit of resistance of the people of Srinagar and the valley during the dark days of 1947 were Bakshi and Sadiq and not Sheikh Abdullah who was then in jail. Even in 1965, during the attack by Pakistani guerrillas, the State was kept steady by the Sadiq Government. Sheikh Abdullah had done his best to rouse the people of the valley to a state of open rebellion against Bakshi in 1958 but had dismally failed. The only time when the equilibrium in the State was really seriously disturbed was during the disappearance of the Holy Relic, and Sheikh Abdullah's name was used at the instance of Pakistan by certain pro-Pakistani elements, but he had made no other contribution in one way or the other.

Sheikh Abdullah is the undoubted originator of the Plebiscite Front idea and is its acknowledged leader, though, to keep himself out of trouble, he has preferred not to hold any elected position in this body. But, what is the ideology of this Front? The Sheikh and his lieutenants like Afzal Beg say that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should be allowed to settle their own future. But they were at the helm of affairs both in the Government and the National Conference all through the years 1947 to 1953 during which period the National Conference repeatedly declared Kashmir's permanent accession to India and the Constituent Assembly also ratified that position. So, what is the plebiscite for when the people have already made known their choice and the State has already acceded to India? No session of the National Conference, which was the recognised political party and the only political party that counted in the valley, till it transformed itself into the National Congress or the latter body, has ever gone against that decision made by the exercise of the free will of the people. After all, it is for leaders like the Sheikh or Afzal Beg to lay down what they think should be the status of the State and it is only then that people can be asked to express an opinion. Without spelling it out, how can the people be expected to vote one way or the other? The heterogeneous bodies

which he tries to utilise do not at all see eye to eye with him. Maulavi Farooq, who is the Chairman of the Action Committee (it is not spelled out what kind of action and against whom), recently declared that the plebiscite should be between India and Pakistan. There is no need for a plebiscite so far as India is concerned, because Kashmir is a part of India. So, the only plebiscite need be for Pakistan, and he might as well be honest enough to say that he wants to go to Pakistan. He is free to do that and taste the miseries which his uncle, Maulavi Yusuf, the previous Mir Waiz, suffered. But Farooq does not represent the people of Kashmir—not even of Srinagar.

It is unfortunate that these leaders, some old-time leaders like Sheikh Abdullah or Afzal Beg and some mushroom leaders like Farooq, in order to satisfy their own ambitions, try to take advantage of the parochial and separatist tendencies which are inherent in any people in the world and poison their minds. One may find examples of such feeling amongst the Scottish or the Welsh in Great Britain or amongst the French-speaking people in Canada or even amongst the English-speaking people in South Africa. Such a kind of feeling one sees in the separate Telen-gana or Vidharba movements. Such kind of parochialism is fanned by people who want to become leaders of factions.

Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh (the name recommended by the Gajendragadkar Commission) is not a homogeneous State in the sense that Maharashtra or Gujarat or Punjab is. The people of Jammu have their kinsmen in the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh and have more in common with the people of Punjab than with those of Kashmir valley. On the other hand, even the Muslims of Rajauri and Mirpur have more in common with the Jammu Hindus than with the Kashmiri Muslims. The difference between the Ladakhis and the Kashmiris is much wider than that between the Assamese and the Nagas. So, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a heterogeneous State in which various racial groups had been brought together by force of arms by one strong ruler, Gulab Singh. It was possible in the days of kings and emperors to keep such heterogeneous people together as one political entity by a strong ruler, but the tendency has always been for the different

parts to break away as soon as the central authority became weak. In a democracy, however, the question has to be decided by the people by the exercise of their free will and whether Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh can and will remain as one unit will depend on the wishes of the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh taken separately and it cannot be decided only by the majority of one group. It is quite clear that for any demand of plebiscite as between India and Pakistan there will be no support from the people of Jammu or of Ladakh. So, those who are asking for a plebiscite could speak of the Kashmir valley alone. Even if by plebiscite it is sought to make the State more autonomous, the people of Jammu and Ladakh will not agree. The progress over the years has been towards eroding the provisions of Article 370 of the Constitution which gave Jammu and Kashmir a special status, and that process cannot be reversed. If any change is sought to be made it can be only in the direction of more speedy erosion of the special provisions.

Are Sheikh Abdullah and the other leaders of the Plebiscite Front not intelligent enough to see this? This cannot be true; but their communal ambition is to serve their own interests even if these harm the interests of the people, and so they try to create and keep up tension. Sheikh Abdullah poses to be a firm believer in secularism and yet his actions continue to keep the suspicions of the non-Muslims alive because he demands a special status for Kashmir only because the Muslims form the majority in one part of the State. It is this Kashmir pot which Sheikh Abdullah has kept boiling for serving his self-interest, which has been directly or indirectly responsible for much of the communalism which has raised its head in India, and it is this phenomenon which has given Pakistan the opportunity to denigrate India in the eyes of the Muslim world which, in its turn, embitters the relations between the two communities.

If Sheikh Abdullah really wants to serve the interests of the Kashmir valley as well as the interests of the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir, of which he claims to be a leader, and to promote peace and harmony in India, it would be worth his while to retrace his steps and go back to the position which he

had held from 1947 to 1952 when he had declared to Pandit Nehru that "Kashmir is yours. No power in the world can separate us. Every Kashmiri feels that he is an Indian and that India is his homeland". That way lies the path of peace and of real happiness and prosperity of the people of the State and not the way he is trying to mislead them. He can yet play an important constructive role provided he subordinates his love for power to his sense of patriotism.

Exhibits :
Select Facsimiles

EX. P-11

To The Contractor

~~The~~ Khwaja FirmB-9
P. 11

Received your second many thanks, I appreciate your sympathetic thoughts about the contract. Though I had tried my level best to send to get our manager to come over to you and your G.M. but as you may be knowing he is not in good health. Anyway the person who is taking this to you is our own man "Aynal - Yakin" he will talk it to you personally about the contract. Therefore you may take him to your G.M. after discussing with him and then inform by written us to what has been agreed upon by your G.M.

Though I had sent one other person to you some two weeks back for two things, which "Aynal Yakin" will explain to you he is our own man, but he has not been permitted to discuss the contract at such a high level as this person.

I am also eager to get the going on a firm footing.

The firm's duty is also our own man to meet me & explain the things, in a simple manner.

Contractor J & K Firm

J

۱۰۶

مقام بادشاہ ابراہیم

السلام علیکم ورحمة اللہ وبرکاتہ -

آپ کا خط مبلغ پانچ سو روپیہ وصول ہو گیا۔ بہاری بیگم نے مورخہ
۱۴ کو بھیج دی تھی۔ مجھے دھول بھر کر جس کے بلے دل شکستہ
قبول ہوئے۔ باقی ہمارے حالت کے متعلق بہاری بیگم کو مطلع
کر رہا ہوں۔

آپ کا خیر خواہ
رینت اسم

B-5
p. 33

برادر اکرم استغفر

۱- کجک و درویش و سبب عیون چون - ذاتی عیون و درویش و سبب عیون
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 ۸- کجک و درویش و سبب عیون چون - ذاتی عیون و درویش و سبب عیون
 ۹- کجک و درویش و سبب عیون چون - ذاتی عیون و درویش و سبب عیون
 ۱۰- کجک و درویش و سبب عیون چون - ذاتی عیون و درویش و سبب عیون

[illegible]

۱۰۰۰

little intensions but that, because I am not amongst my professors, I
 believe when I see that letter, containing something else, I will be able to
 every letter must reach your quarters in the field - we are not allowed to
 the addressee, I wait till the opportunity for via Bhadravah.

2. I don't complain of the weather, very cold and so, now my
 job & while facing the storm I do ask you to guide me. I have at or late
 no relation is working under any person - whether, he past has been
 But I shall not be wholly hearted only under a person in whom I have the
 fullest confidence. Whether I person Kh. Sahib may prove about me,
 I waited to the almost of my capacity under him been. I had never
 the occasion to doubt his sincerity & honesty. We have in our
 ranks certain gentlemen who are not in favour of severing relations
 with Phal, & the Brahmanic Imperialism finds them the best tools to
 achieve the relation and P. is to your mind we could only guess what
 Bhajanjee is going to do with regard to your person. And at the time the
 Phal was in your house to send you, Bhajanjee asked Kanch Sahib
 about her ~~name~~ ^{name} & then Kanch Sahib told her, you cannot
 be responsible for her. She is not responsible for her. She is not responsible for her.
 Sahib's mind & that you should not hold any protest meeting & protest. The
 same Bhajanjee, it is said, was in telephone conversation with Dargah
 on the day Kh. Sahib was being arrested in Bhadravah, & asked Dargah
 Sahib about Kh. Sahib's welfare. That may be only a guess, but
 it is a hard fact that Bhajanjee had asked a colleague of ours that
 the friends of Delhi were not satisfied with Kh. Sahib's line
 action & that the addressee along with his friends would
 rather to send him & send him. And the

3. Now having been successful in "ending" Kh. & Shab. our colleagues forming a clique, wanted to affect certain paragraphs in our programme. It is obvious that they want to put Kh. & Shab. in an advantageous position, so when the new President over, I could read their minds. Being ignorant about the political & the capabilities of the new President, I adopted the method of wait & watch. At last on the previous Sunday, when I met the President, I was quite up to the mark in whatever I desired. The clique, it came to light, tried to know certain secrets & had failed miserably in the attempt. I pursued their policy & it was suggested that only the release of Mirza Sahib should be demanded in order to win the sympathies of "Muslim India".

4. There is a body of Mullas organizing the Muslim League. Arjunan Tablighul Islam with Mirza Sahib as its patron. I met him in order to see the real purpose of the move. He is sincere & pure. But the body is chiefly manned by Jagers — with Shud Singh as President, Bani hung as the Vice President, Rasheed Mawla as the Secretary. In order to test their bona fides, I sent a copy of the daily "Hindustan" in which the news of the book "Living Biographies of Muslim Leaders" was published & Muslims were asked to raise their opinion. The result was that the body kept quiet & that raised a question with regard to their real aim. I may be able to judge the relative importance of the sponsored body. The aim is to divert the attention of the Muslim community from the Front to some not so important issue, so that its death warrant can be effected without any public display of opinion. Although I plead that the body must be manned by true Muslims.

5. Masade is coming here. They say it is not the real Masade who was playing double game. I was told that Sahib, who

he coming here & what shall be his future position. I am not knowing. Although he cannot be a real Masade, I am not sure of shall be given his due.

6. Some people from Jammu had come over here. I gave them the suggestion of forming a united front for the coming election. I don't want to fight the election, but I want to be in touch & strengthen contacts with them, so that we get some support in publicity. Other things: One Shiekh Humam was here the other day & he made me a suggestion of getting our financial help in order to publish a paper or poster. Seeing the difficulties, we arranged that three of them are being printed. I think Jammu, cannot stand in good stead.

7. I am successful in checking the growth of Political movement in the district. In fact my attack was directed even at the Front. For the last two days, I have been at Kulgam their "stronghold" in the Valley & at last I was able to make capital out of the "Jawahan" movement & held a meeting in Domicil building. I had Choudh. change a lot of my opinion. He, by the nature of their movement, the composition of their body, & it clearly demonstrated their political bankruptcy. They were all arrested & are now in the net of political leaders.

8. I send herewith some copies of the resolutions passed yesterday. I shall stay with you for some day, and I shall be able to put up with the Mayday movement, & reports to the Government. I shall be able to do all.

I shall be able to do all.

EX. P-4

X. P-80

B-1

P. 50

My Dear Brother,

You say be desirous that I should give you an appreciation of the present political situation here. Khalil may have already sent you a letter which may have reached you. If not, the Bearer will produce a copy. The letter appears to me to be a pessimistic picture and its enclosure is too lengthy to be impressed. He gave out the letter as ours. It is not. We had our own. Copy is herewith per Bearer. He may come over here after some time will be welcome but if he isolates the idea of his pet child "Democratic Front" it may, despite our best intentions to the contrary, create inharmonious between two fronts. I talked to Sheri Ganderbal all about it when he was here. He told me that Plebiscite Front was too narrow to admit others into it and a new organization was needed to allow unfettered action in the larger interest of the country. I told him that P.L.F.R. was broader enough to cover all activity contemplated to be taken and could be expanded to cover such activity. His main theme was that the country needed the release of its Leader first to give it a bold lead and to pull it out of the swamp it had sunk into. I think that P.L.F.R. is paying good dividend and I am personally for it.

One important factor has cropped up which requires close, careful and anxious consideration and thought. Need we change our approach in this new context? Constitution will be completed as early as the Ruling Clique wish and elections in Kashmir may be held simultaneously with Indian Elections. What should our attitude be? We cannot fight these elections in vicious circumstances. The Ruling Clique have so far manipulated all elections to their favour. In such circumstances, we cannot be sure of the result if we fight these elections. But if we do not fight the same, the result will be obvious and we shall be obtained to the devil for five years to come.

The situation will altogether be different if Leaders will be released sufficiently in advance of time but if they are released at the eleventh hour they cannot deliver goods and a pernicious effect will follow in as much as the World will be made to believe that we have no following, since we failed to register a victory despite the Leaders release. Thus we are on the horns of a dilemma. Is there any escape? We may align ourselves with other Parties. But we cannot be sure which parties to align with what colour will drop up. Moreover, ours is the biggest following. It appears to me to be out of proportion for such a Party to seek alignment. Some way is to be thought out. May we ask for your guidance in this regard?

Another factor is causing us grave concern. The Congress may meet soon. What should be the attitude of the opposition? If I am correct you had in mind a kind of loose federation with four units linked to a set strong centre. Will opposition follow the same policy or fight their case as per conditions that may arise? But their cry will be in Wilderness. Should they support the Assembly? That is your guidance in this behalf?

As regards Delhi and its attitude, there exist various points of view on the subject. These can easily be imagined and need not be discussed here. Although Khalil's letter is a partial representation of facts prevailing there but his views on your release need be taken into consideration. Let us pass this question afresh what Delhi's attitude will be with regard to your release. It will naturally want that you tow its line which, if you do not do they may keep you where you are to avoid further complications. In some quarters it is believed that Nehru's latest announcement is not an election stunt nor a result of frustration. He made the statement just on return from Delhi. Foreign Diplomats who may have a struck a bargain with him and encouraged him to make the statement which always he wants to sit tight in his saddle. Most of us are with this point of view. I feel for myself that he is a strategist. He wants to strike a favourable bargain for his people during the final election. Election campaign cannot be ruled out. Some fear is all to be taken into account. He has to do with a stiff neck.

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which commands more than half the population of the World. Just as we want Kashmir as a spring board, last may went it for similar purpose and what's support to Nehru may give him a point of advantage. Against this, the other side (West) is strong & but for their own reasons and trailing concern would have thrust a solution on the problem long ago. Add to it, communists is a red rag to them and they will favour a solution against India. What effect these diverse pulls will have on Shaeikh Sahib's release? I think favourable, more so, because he cannot indefinitely be detained. Thus I am of opinion that our present stand pays a good dividend and we must stick to it. Moreover fundamentals are to be fought and sought for first. There are others among our sincere friends who do not look eye to eye with us in respect of P.L.P. Do please give a very careful thought to this subject and favour us with your views and what we should do in such a complicated situation.

MMN and myself have received letters from Mr Parker demanding our assurance on the stand to the problem. These letters are herewith. Please tell him what you want to convey.

They is doing the best to warn us off our present stand. It believes that his stand is final and as thus we strike our head against rock in opposing him. It try come over soon to add to my worries. But my attitude towards it will be as it has been so far.

Harassment of our workers continues unabated and crusade is conducted against our enrollment of membership. At Kulangan, all the agencies of Govt. trapped a handful of our workers including Shihree and Hafiz, roughly beat them, kept them in lock-up & starved them for four days. They have now been released and a case registered against them. I am just consulting legal advice if we can register a case against Police and Judiciary. If advice say favourable we shall do so.

Prices are shooting up from day to day. Life has almost become impossible for us to live. Imported grains are not palatable. Concentration of wealth in some hands and payments of huge money to favoured few are making their effect felt by the average body of citizens.

I am definitely of opinion that time has come when we shall have openly to come out into the field. It should be planned and met of the nature of voluntary effervescence. Some well meaning persons strongly advise against it for obvious reason. They think that we should maintain the flicker as we do at present. However, we are meeting after some time to think over the matter. Personally I am for some bold action but I have to depend on the support of my colleagues whom I shall try to convert to my point of view.

Almost all my friends are back home now. They deem discretion better part of valour. Some do not see eye to eye with us with regard to our policy of the Plebiscite. They may be believing, honestly, first, in the Leader's release and then in action.

My darling kid got 15 illustrated child's tale books but in boy's curiosity the child wants a library. MMN has 50 to 60 books on his home to please the child. He is keeping good health.

Our idea is to raise a volunteer corps and have a Plebiscite site youths as well. But the basic character of people stands in our way. Even then we shall try.

Bandhuji will leave for Delhi as soon as he may get a permit. We are meeting frequently.

My time is overoccupied. I feel very lonely but HE is my consolation and succor. Let us humbly seek His Guidance--Indira the Rabbi--Amen.

General.

1) The pull in diverse directions at Delhi has affected our workers to some extent. They feel uneasy why to come into open. Looked upon objectively they may have some to do so. I talked to them individually and concluded that although their loyalty cannot be questioned but they are a bit confused in thought. It may be due to honest differences. I feel Leaders release should have come first; others prefer Plebiscite first; some are on Parole and thus cautious; some are different situations and so on. Even if they were to appear prepared to do, they will render.

Both to the Government & myself. One to the Government, one to myself. One to the Government, one to myself.

The worker at the base is sound, attached, devoted, honest & ready to do his duty. Of him I am very proud and really happy.

2) Should Maulana return, I shall do my best, within my light and limitations, to keep the clock going on steadily. If workers wish that he should lead us, I shall with humility bow to their decision and work where I may be asked to work. It is immaterial for me whether I am at top or bottom. But my main effort, inshallah will be to see that harmony is maintained.

3) A sympathiser told me that I was not polite or tactful towards my workers, that there was some lack of clarity among them. What he told me is exactly the propaganda that Political Conference carry on against us. On close and detached thinking I came to the conclusion that mostly his appreciation of the situation resulted more from his own politics than from objectivity.

4) Questions are often posed why a reputation waited on Nehru; why TO-SHAYEL returning from outside pull in different directions and did so also in Delhi and Jammu (Assembly); why has I been left alone; why so & so did not sign a document in Jammu when others did it? To me it appears that there may be justifiable differences but such questions are sure to arise in a big Organisation like P.L.P. and those who call it complexity ignore psychology or talk from a safe distance. It appears that there is some undue fright existing in the mind of some and to cover this fright different pleas are put forward to avoid coming forward. Against this the base workers are bold and invariably visit me boldly & openly. How much proud I am of this and this sincerity--goodness alone knows. Darood on Prophet who said Alifqur Sahree Wal Paqru Minee.

I am convening a meeting very shortly to talk frankly to the concerned upper few and to clear atmosphere. Inshallah I will succeed. We depend here more on your prayers than our efforts. Let Heaven grant these and lead us on the right path to steer our course clear of pitfalls--Amen

Yours Sincerely

RESOLUTION

B-65

The Central Committee of the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front met on the 7th of April 1958 and considered the latest report of Dr. Graham and the reasons that have prompted the Government of India to reject all the recommendations contained therein. The Committee while appreciating the efforts of Dr. Graham to resolve this ten year old dispute strongly deprecated the intransigence of the Government of India. Apart from her general objection that Dr. Graham's recommendations bypass the preliminary question of ~~the~~ ^{the} implementing certain Resolutions of the Security Council, India has based her attitude on the belief that accepting the recommendations of the Report would have the effect of placing the aggressor and the aggressed on the same footing; would tend to condone Pakistan's actions and would give the impression that the part of Kashmir across the Cease Fire Line was not an integral part of Indian Union.

The Prime Minister of India in a recent press conference stated that the World must accept two basic points which he called "realities" before considering the Kashmir problem. According to him the first reality is that Pakistan has committed aggression and must vacate it. Secondly that the Jammu and Kashmir State has acceded to India and, therefore, has become an integral and inseparable part of the Union of India.

The Central Committee has given its careful consideration to these arguments and feels constrained to state that they have ~~no~~ ^{no} weight or substance. India's attitude reminds the committee of that famous parable about lion and lamb. Since the beginning of the dispute the Indian Prime Minister has many a times held discussions across the table with various Prime Ministers of Pakistan and it never struck him that such a meeting would place the aggressor and the aggressed on equal footing. Therefore, to refuse a joint meeting of the two Prime Ministers on this ground now, is nothing but clear intransigence. Then again, the very question of aggression is under question. Everyone, more so the Prime Minister of India, fully know that the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession with India under ~~duress~~ ^{duress}. According to no less an authority than Mr. V.P. Menon the then Secretary for States, Government of India, "The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir was accepted, subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State when the law and order situation allowed". This clearly shows that unless a plebiscite on the question of accession of the State is held the State cannot be considered to have finally acceded to India nor can it become, till then, an integral and inseparable part of the Union of India. If Government of India bases her stand on the mere signatures of the Maharaja of Kashmir on the Instrument of Accession one fails to understand as to what justification does she have in ~~claiming~~ ^{claiming} the accession of Junagadh and Kanawader etc. ~~in spite of~~ ^{in spite of} the fact that the rulers of these States had duly signed the Instrument of Accession with the Government of Pakistan without any ~~hesitation~~ ^{hesitation}. Is it not a fact that under the partition scheme the two dominions had entered into an

agreement not to consider the signatures of the ruler on the Instrument of Accession sufficient for the Accession of the State with either of the two dominions where the ruler happened to be of a different religion than the religion of the majority of his subjects unless his action was supported by the ~~people~~ ^{people} majority of the people of that State? ~~Of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir and India~~ ^{Of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir and India} In the opinion of the Committee the Jammu and Kashmir State has not yet acceded with either of the two dominions and, therefore, the question of aggression by Pakistan on Indian territory is not a "reality" but only an excuse for India to maintain her forced occupation on a part of the State.

As far the plea that Pakistan has not implemented the earlier Resolutions of the Security Council the Committee feels that the only way to adjudicate on this charge was the one suggested by Mr. Jaring and now by Dr. Graham, the two representatives ~~of the~~ ^{of the} by the Security Council to this subcontinent for ~~resolving~~ ^{resolving} the dispute. By persistently rejecting every effort, by the Security Council or its representatives, India has proved beyond any doubt that she does not want a peaceful settlement of the dispute in accordance with her previous International commitments and the promises held to the people of Kashmir. ~~The entire attitude appears to be based on fear and the threat of the army against Pakistan and the people of Kashmir.~~ ^{The entire attitude appears to be based on fear and the threat of the army against Pakistan and the people of Kashmir.} The Committee strongly condemns the attitude of India and warns her of the grave consequences that this may lead to. The Committee ~~also~~ ^{also} appeals to the Security Council to take effective measures and make India yield to reason, justice and fairplay towards the poor and helpless people of Kashmir. It also ~~appeals~~ ^{appeals} to the conscience of the World to render all possible moral assistance to the people of Kashmir who are valiantly fighting to liberate themselves from the iron yoke of Indian Government and her quislings within the State.

This can only be achieved only if
~~that India & Pakistan are an occupation~~
~~forces of both India & Pakistan are~~
~~made to be replaced by United Nations~~
~~of the people of Kashmir signing the final settlement~~
~~under the UN auspices.~~
 The Committee also appeals

EXHIBIT P-11

Copy of an English letter from the "Contractor J & K Firm" addressed to "The Contractor Khwaja Firm".

To
The Contractor,
Khwaja Firm.

Received your second many thanks. I appreciate your sympathetic thoughts about the contract. Though I had tried my level best to get our manager to come over to you and your GM but as you may be knowing he is not in good health. Anyway the person who is taking this to you is our own man "Anyal Yakin"; he will talk things to you personally about the contract; therefore you may take him to your GM after discussing with him and let me know by writing as to what has been agreed upon by your GM.

Though I had sent some other person to you about two weeks back for two things which "Anyal Yakin" will explain to you, he is also our own man, but he has not been permitted to discuss the contract on such high level as this person.

I am also eager to get the contract going on a firm footing.

The Jamadar is also our own man and he met me and explained things. Many thanks.

*Contractor J & K Firm
(initials in English)*

EXHIBIT P-15

Translation of an Urdu letter dated 23.9.53 addressed to Mohd Akbar Khan.

I regret that I could not write nor send any message to you since long, the reason being that the decision of the matters at this end was delayed and time elapsed over putting off the matter. I remained under the impression that I would be relieved soon. Anyhow, the matter is now being decided very soon and I would be going very shortly. Affairs seem to be satisfactory. You people must have run short of money. Hence, I am giving Rs. 200/- in Pak. currency and Rs. 100/- in Indian currency to Maqbool. Out of the Pak. currency some of it would be spent by Maqbool towards meeting travelling expenses etc. and with the rest of the money, ration etc. should be purchased. For the present stock of ghee is also to be stored and similarly of sugar etc. Get your sugar candy and rice from across. Mir Abdul Ghani and Sardara have also been called to Hillan. You people should remain at one place. It is hoped that work would be done soon. I often remember all the people of Hillan and I regret why I could not reach you people so far.

I was compelled by the circumstances. I would bring the necessary articles etc. along with me.

Yours
Sd/- in English
A. A. SHAH
23.9.53

EXHIBIT P-16

Translation of an Urdu letter from Hassan Joo addressed to Ghulam Mohd Sahib.

I had received your letter which was replied by me. I was not here these days. I came back over here after a long interval. I like the proposal you have made. It would have been better if the work had been done before. My men are coming. You have a talk with them. If you deem proper, you should also try to have a meeting. The weather is passing and perhaps it may not be possible to do this work for some time. I have made my men understand everything verbally.

Yours
HASSAN JOO

EXHIBIT P-25

Translation of an Urdu letter dated 12.8.55 from Taj-ud-Din Khwaja (Pakistan Intelligence Officer).

Aslamalekam,

After reaching Srinagar you should meet Mohi-ud-Din Sahib and Mirza Afzal Beg and then come to me after procuring detailed information from them. It is essential, if it is possible, for you to bring a letter from them, if they need any help.

Sd/- TAJ-UD-DIN KHWAJA

EXHIBIT P-31

Translation of a letter from Zeenat-ul-Islam (Begum Abdullah).

Respected Brother Ibrahim Sahib,

Greetings. Your present for Rs. 500/- the receipt of which had been sent by Bihari Ji (Sana Ullah Shah) on the 14th November, 1955, has been

received by me. Accept my heart-felt thanks for the same. Our other affairs would be reported to you by Bihari Ji.

Your well-wisher,
ZEENAT-UL-ISLAM

EXHIBIT P-33

Translation of an Urdu letter dated 13.10.57 from G.B. addressed to Akram.

13 October 1957

Brother Akram, Aslamalekam,

Very grateful for your remembrance.

I did not write to you so far, as Bhai Sahib Aziz Joo has been more or less informing you about the affairs.

After the departure of Haji Sahib, great difficulties were experienced in regard to his successor. Neither "Afeem" nor "Feel" agreed. As such the choice fell on the man belonging to your native place. He is to a great extent under the influence of Afeem and Afeem has proved to be a great coward. He wants to cover his cowardice on the plea of acting according to Constitution. Famine (of workers) is becoming more manifest. The letter of Ahmed Sahib's conversation was restricted to a few friends as per instructions. But it is not known how its copy has gone in somebody else's hands, who made more copies and distributed them. Whosoever got that copy, he copied it further and distributed in a wider circle. This had a good effect and now even our old enemies are openly praising Ahmed Joo's (Sheikh Abdullah) position. It is my proposal that the copies of this should be distributed in large numbers. Its responsibility cannot now be thrown on you or us. These are in great demand.

Several copies of the two letters which were addressed to Ahrar have been made in Urdu and English and are available. The idea was to publish it after the statement of Afeem or side by side with it, but since that statement had been postponed to the 22nd October, it would be proper if these are distributed beforehand. We are taking a decision about it today. It was my personal opinion that the statement of Afeem should have been on the 10th of October. Therefore, its copies had been sent to Delhi beforehand so that these could also be circulated after his statement on the 10th or 11th October. But, in the meantime, Khalil Joo's message came that this statement should be given at the time of discussions on the Constitution as by that time the newspapers would have commented on it. I was against this as I felt that the time of its presentation should coincide with the presentation of the Constitution in the House. Later on Ahmed Joo's letter was received. That was also in the same strain as Khalil Joo's. So, by a majority vote it was postponed to the 22nd of October. All the copies of "conversation", letters to Ahrar (Sadiq) and copies of the statement have already been sent to Haider Khan (Pakistan), and it has been emphasised that the publication of these in different languages in the form of "Tracts" should be synchronised with

its publication here. It is hoped that all this would be done. The letter addressed to Security Council has also been sent to them. Those people wanted its original and certified copy which has also been sent. But they have been told not to make use of the original.

Rejoinders to the statements of the mps and Dr. Kitchlu had already been distributed. After this your draft was received and this is also being circulated.

I wrote two articles on "Budget" and "Five-Year Plan". One was got published in the newspaper through Girdhari Lal Anand and it has been circulated in the form of Tract in his name. The second has been published on behalf of the organisation. Copies of both of them are enclosed for your perusal. These have also been sent to Haider Khan (Pakistan).

The difficulty is that the Post Offices at Delhi, Pathankot and here do not deliver such papers. It is also difficult to send a special messenger from here, as in spite of our incurring expenditure nobody undertakes the responsibility. Moreover, he is searched in the way. We have not been able to solve this problem satisfactorily.

A reliable man of Haider Khan (Pakistan) came here last week. Long discussions were held with him and our position was explained to him in detail. They are preparing to come forward openly. I pointed out to him the harm which was occurring due to the indefinite postponement of the matter and it is possible if it is delayed any further, irreparable damage may be done. Secondly, I pointed out to him the necessity of pruning branches in the garden. They had sent the scissors and other material but a Gardener is not available. So, he was told to send a good Gardener from (his) village itself. The rot that has set in can only be remedied by immediate pruning of branches. He wanted to know your opinion as to their future programme. So, if you think proper, send detailed instructions.

The expenses are very high and the bank money is almost finishing. Therefore, we will have to make further struggle for this. It is hoped that there will not be any difficulty in this. The situation here is very bad. As such Haider Khan will have to be approached. Aziz Joo has gone to India to see his son 15 days back. God willing, he will return next week.

There is no cooperation. Our own men shirk work. Suhrawardy and Feel have become bad sores, and because of them the situation has deteriorated. Sometimes one loses hope altogether. But relying on God some way out would be surely found.

You might have read in papers that Major Attlee is coming. There should be some present (memorandum) for him, otherwise he would also take the paper flowers as genuine just like Russian leaders. It is necessary to place the real situation before him. Let us see who dares to do it. You may also send instructions in this regard.

105 mps had come. Hamdani Sahib was asked to meet them. Invitation cards were sent under pressure, but these did not reach them in time because he avoided. Personally I met two to four and apprised them of the situation, but no one knows the real situation. This is all being done on imperialistic policy.

The rift (in Bakshi's cabinet) continues and preparations are being made

not to include Ahrar (Sadiq), Dhar, Mir Qasim, Ghani Trali, Sufi, etc. in the new elections. Let us see what this results in.

Telegrams had been sent to Nehru, Ahrar and the President, Plebiscite Front, at the time of the presentation of the Constitution on behalf of every committee. Most of these were detained. I think that after collecting all the documents in the form of a "Tract" it should be sent along with a forwarding letter from the President to the President of the Security Council and President of Bharat. What do you think?

Convey my salaams to all friends and elders.

Yours
G.B.

NOTE : Portions in brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-34

Copy of a letter in English addressed to Afzal Beg.

Dearest Beg Sahib,

Aslamalekam.

I am in receipt yours of 2 inst. I admit that I do not reply letters in time but that is because I am overbusy with my profession or office. Besides when I see that letters containing something with regard to politics—and every letter must seek your guidance in the field—are not delivered to the addressees, I wait till the opportunity for "via Bhatinda" (courier) arrives.

2. I don't complain of the weather of my colleagues. I know my job and while facing the storm I do ask you to guide me. I have absolutely no hesitation in working under any person—whatever his past has been. But I shall work wholeheartedly only under a person in whom I have the fullest confidence. Whatever opinion Kh. Sahib may frame about me, I worked to the utmost of my capacity under him because I had never the occasion to doubt his sincerity and honesty. We have in our ranks certain gentlemen who are not in favour of severing relations with Bharat, and the Brahmanic Imperialism finds them the best tools to achieve the nefarious end. Prior to your arrest we could only guess what Bahanjee (Mridula Sarabhai) is going to do with regard to your person. And at the time the police was in your house to arrest you, Bahanjee asked Kochak Sahib about her driver, when Kochak Sahib told her of your arrest, she was prompt in saying that "those in Delhi are not responsible for Beg Sahib's arrest and that you should not hold any protest meeting or Hartal". The same Bahanjee, it is said, was in telephonic conversation with Begum Sahiba on the day Kh. Sahib was being arrested in Bhadarwah, and asked Begum Sahiba about Kh. Sahib's "welfare". That may be only guess, but it is a hard fact that Bahanjee had asked a colleague of ours that the friends at Delhi were not satisfied with Kh. Sahib's line of action and that the addressee along with his friends should try "either to meet him or end him". And the result is obvious.

3. Now having been successful in "ending" Kh. Sahib, those our colleagues forming a clique, wanted to effect certain fundamental changes in our programme. It is obvious that they want to use H as their spokesman, he being in an advantageous position. So, when the new President took over, I could read their minds. Being ignorant about the political outlook and the capabilities of the new President, I adopted the method of wait and watch. At last on the previous Sunday, when I met the President, I found him quite up to the mark in whatever I desired. The clique, it came to light, had tried to know certain secrets and had failed miserably in the attempt. Still they pursued their policy and it was suggested that only the release of Sheikh Sahib should be demanded in order to win the sympathies of "friends in India".

4. There is a body of Mullahs organising the Muslims under Anjuman Tabligul Islam with Mirak Sahib as its patron. I met the latter in order to see the real purpose of the move. He is sincere and our man. But the body is chiefly manned by gogas—with Budh Singh as the President, Bonilung as the Vice-President, Rashid Master as the Accountant. In order to test their bona-fides I send a copy of the Daily "Syasat" Kanpur in which the news of the book "Living Biographies of Religious Leaders" was published and Muslims were asked to raise their voice against it. Wonder is that the body kept quiet and that raised the doubt with regard to its real aim. You may be able to judge the situation. If it is a Govt. sponsored body, the aim is to divert the attention of the masses from the Front to some not-un-important issue; in which its death warrant can be effected within days. I don't express an opinion, although I plead that the body must be manned by true Muslims.

5. Masudi is coming here. They say it is not the same Masudi who was placing hurdles in the way of Beg Sahib. What for is he coming here and what shall be his future programme, is not known. Anyhow, he cannot remain an obscure figure here in Kashmir and shall be given his due.

6. Some people from Jammu had come over here. I give them the suggestion of forming a united front for the ensuing elections. I don't want to fight the elections but I want to establish and strengthen contacts with them so that we get some from them in publicity and other things. One Shiel Kumar was here the other day and he is desirous of getting our financial help in order to publish a paper or poster. Seeing the difficulties we encounter while getting anything printed or published I think Jamvies can stand in good stead.

7. I am successful in checking the growth of Political Conference in the District. In fact my attack was directed even at the centre. For the last two they could not even visit Kulgam their "stronghold" in the valley. As a last resort they wanted to make capital out of the Tawheen movement and held a meeting in Ismail Building, Lal Chowk. Strange as it may seem, they forgot the nature of their movement, the composition of their body and it clearly demonstrated their political bankruptcy. They were all arrested and are now in the art gallery of political leaders.

8. I sent herewith some copies of the resolutions passed yesterday. Mirza shall stay with you for some days. Kindly by the return post. Rest O.K.

My best compliment and respects to Sher-e-Kashmir, Kh. Sahib, Sofi Sahib and all.

Sd/- Yours obediently
MOHIUDDIN

EXHIBIT P-36

Translation of an Urdu letter from "Wahab Bhat" to Nizam-ud-Din Sahib.

Kind and Respected Nizam-ud-Din Sahib (Afzal Beg),

May God save you. Aslamalekum. Your well-wisher is well. Received your letter. One of the enclosed letters was handed over to Haji Sahib. The second will be handed over after eight or ten days to the addressee. Haji Sahib is a gentleman. He has started the work with full zeal. He was highly impressed by your letter. I hope that he will carry on his work wholeheartedly. Before Haji Sahib, Amin Sahib was implored that he should take over as the President, but he did not agree. Therefore, the burden was laid on the shoulders of Haji Sahib. God does everything for the best. I feel that this selection has been the best from all angles. Rest assured.

It is fully realised that disunity at this time would prove fatal. Keeping this in view I restrained Khwaja Sahib a number of times from speaking the truth which he used to say was diplomacy. But we have to do all this keeping in view the delicacy of the time. There is no doubt that Amin Sahib, Afzal Sahib and Hamdani Sahib are to some extent proving inactive. The fact is that after their return from Delhi these people have grown slack, and they shirk action. But in spite of this, there is no alternative but to associate with them. Rest assured that action is already being taken according to the policy dictated by you. Otherwise, God knows, disruption should since long have taken place. It is not being expressed anywhere except within the inner circle that so and so was negligent and so and so was doing this and that. Even these discussions are held only with a view to improve matters; otherwise, before the enemy, all are one. Be assured that there is cooperation in all respects. There is no criticism anywhere. This is all through the grace of God.

There is no doubt that occasionally and at places weakness appears among the workers. But all this is put to an end simultaneously. In your letter to Haji Sahib you have said that the enemy would use all weapons to create frustration. All this is being done, but in spite of this, people and the workers of the lower level are not affected. In our organisation there are only two or four important workers known to Khwaja Sahib who are inactive. But, they are also made to work side by side by all means. Regarding this, you may not entertain any worry. The letter of Asad Ullah Khan and the statement of Hamdani are still kept a secret. It is contemplated to give these only two or four days before. In the letter of Hamdani you had written that Khwaja Sahib had shown the letter of Asad Ullah Khan to Hamdani where-

in a parity had been drawn between India and Pakistan. Which is that letter? It is possible he may not have seen it. (An illegible word can be read as GB) is doing a lot of work and does it boldly. (A line is written, then scored off and is illegible). Be assured that no impediments will be allowed in the work. This is our determination and, God willing, we shall fulfil it.

Kochak Sahib has really become cold. He came to me and complained that nobody cared for him, etc. etc. Soon after I called for the Shikari (hunter). Those days Chaudhari Ganai was also out. I too have the complaint that he had paid no attention to it. Besides me, the Shikari (hunter) even now could do more which would be proper. You may impress it upon him. His cooperation is necessary. Zargar Sahib is working well. I feel that the Gen. Secy. is not working properly. He feels apprehensive. Otherwise, if a convention is held at each of the places Islamabad, Bhadarwah and Sopore, the Chabala would lose his wits. But, alas, some of our friends are afraid of the very name of practical work. They feel that the work should continue by holding a meeting or so and by issuing posters. Therefore the new President is of the opinion that he would mostly work in the field. Let us see what happens. In any case we are not without hope. Work which could be done and should have been done is not absolutely being done. But we are not idle either. Due to the non-availability of a suitable Imam, a congregational prayer cannot be held, but there is no negligence in offering prayers five times a day. Khwaja Sahib's directions have also been received. Assure him that work would be carried on in the same manner in which it was done in his presence. Enclosed with this letter is sent a form on behalf of Amar Nath. This may be signed and got attested by the Officer in Charge Jail so that the ownership of the car be transferred to him. Ibin-e-Gaus is still in Delhi. He will be called when required. If the seat of the President does fall vacant, it will be filled up somehow. You need not worry. Sometimes even a fake figure-head has to be put up.

It is requested that folded-hand salaams may be conveyed to Qibila, the blessed Sheikh Sahib. I need prayers. Salaams to Soofi Sahib and Khwaja Sahib.

Obediently,
WAHAB BHAT

N.B. : Khwaja Sahib may be told not to worry about his home. They are all well. I go there four times a week. Everything is being done according to the scheduled programme. Do not worry. With apologies for bad handwriting.

W.B.
(In English)

EXHIBIT P-38

Urdu list of code words (rendered in Roman).

Name	Code Name
1. Sadar-ud-Din Mujahid	Rehmat
2. Zargar Habib Ullah	Barkat
3. Loon Abdullah	Hashmat
4. Ghani Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din	Rafqat
5. Panju Ahmed Ullah	Rifat
6. Butt Ghulam Mohd	Samad
7. Pir Maqbool Saheb	Nur and Lala Mehr Chand
8. Abdul Ahad	Rafeeq
9. Mohd Amin	Javed
10. Madre Mehrban	Abid, Zeenat-ul-Islam
11. Sheikh Sahib	Azeem
12. Mubarik Shah	Kareem
13. Khwaja Ali Shah	Shafeeq
14. Beg Saheb	Atiq
15. Zaildar Beg	Aslam
16. Abdul Ghani Goni	Anwar
17. Bandu Ji	Sultan
18. Mohammed Shah	Asad
19. Ali Mohammed Butt	Fateh
20. Hindustan	Baramula
21. Pakistan	Sopore
22. Nehru	Jaffar
23. Srinagar	Rampur
24. Asar Sharif	Majlis
25. Makhdum Sahib	Dal
26. Khanqah Maula	Madrasa
27. Jama Masjid	Maktab
28. Poster	Chob
29. Stage	Chhat
30. Tract	Card
31. Banglola	Kangri
32. Jalsa (meeting)	Maulood
33. Mohd Saeed Masoodi	Waeed
34. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Hamdani	Haider
35. Soofi Mohd Akbar	Waheed, Naeem
36. Ghulam Qadir Master	Master
37. Hakim Habib Ullah	Shahsor
38. Sana Ullah Shah	Bihari
39. Dictator	Khuro
40. Yusaf Shah	Arsha
41. Azad Kashmir	Lucknow
42. Jaloos	Gari
43. Hartal	Mela

Name	Code Name
44. Naara	Sarwar
45. Tarikh Angrezi	Khatam
46. Gariftari	Sheerin
47. Mohd Ali Wazir-e-Azam	Ashraf
48. Bakshi	Muljam
49. Sadiq	Ippi
50. Qasim	Kameena
51. Rashid Bakshi	Hatta Matta
52. Saraf	Makrooh
53. D.P.	Masheer
54. Rajpuri	Kakroo
55. Gandar Bali	Yazeed
56. Makhdoomi	Shaitan
57. Kotru	Mukhbir
58. Assembly Member	Kashtkar
59. Mirza Ghulam Qadir	Shakoor
60. Katju (Dr.)	Pujari
61. Azad (Maulana)	Shamasrao
62. Mridula	Sharif
63. Praja Socialist	Hamdard
64. Kripalani	Karam
65. Democratic Party	Sadaqat
66. Muslim Conference	Khidmat
67. Political Conference	Chand
68. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din	Qadoos
69. Ashai	Sabur
70. Chikan	Damsoz
71. Parliament	Bazar
72. Sheikh Majid	Amar Shah
73. Admi	Mangal
74. Kashmiri Pandit	Saudagar
75. Atta Ullah Beg	Khuda Baksh
76. Chanda	Karobar
77. Pir Afzal	Dafoor
78. Prem Bazaz	Mansur
79. Ahmed Shah Sahib	Sabqa Shiekh Sahib
80. Beg Saheb	Israil, Atiq
81. Sher Khan	Pakistan
82. Maulvi	Kashmiri
83. Regiment	Sadiq
84. PSP	Lipa
85. Begum Sahib	Papa Ji
86. Opposition Assembly Party	Mado Ram
87. Hamara Karinda	Siri Kanth
88. Delhi Ka Karinda	Photowala
89. Congress	Kanta
90. Security Council	Munshi

Name	Code Name
91. Karachi	Sumandar
92. Kashmir	Talaab
93. Azad Kashmir	Chaudhari Lucknow
94. Maleechh	Army
95. Aslah, Bandoq Wagaira	Mewa
96. Ropaya	Akhrot, ya Puri
97. Transmitter	Sandooqcha
98. Literature	Khaddar
99. Prime Minister Pakistan	Parkash
100. Staff	Qasi
101. Mehraj Din	Azad
102. DSP Rawalpindi	Ibrahim Joo
103. Hillan Afsar	Ibrahim
104. Raja Hillan	Javed
105. Wasal	Shaheed

EXHIBIT P-39

Translation of an Urdu letter addressed to Azad Mehrajuddin (courier) from Ibrahim (Pak. IB Officer at Hillan).

Dear Azad,
 Aslamalekam. Apprehending that the routes might not be obstructed on account of snowfall and winter, it was thought that the work be accomplished soon to avoid hardships in future. God Almighty has stood us in good stead and weather is clear. You also remained helpless on account of circumstances beyond your control. It is hoped that this time you must have done work in toto. The worries that there would be impediments in our way on account of Lala Mehar Chand (Pir Maqbool Gilani) proceeding abroad have now vanished with the return of Israil Ji (Afzal Beg) who would be in a position to continue this work. I am confident that according to our written instructions you must have consulted Israil Ji also. In case it is not done so far, it is imperative upon you to do it now because Ibrahim Ji has specially instructed that in order to continue the work in future Israil Ji should be consulted so that action be taken according to his advice. Hence, I am sending you a letter addressed to Israil Ji separately. In case he has not been consulted, you should consult him now within three or four days by contacting him some how or other and intimation be sent to us. Since he is well acquainted with our work, he could have no objection in availing us of his good advice. Your reply is solicited early and urgently as there is a danger of the approaches being closed soon, and it would be difficult to send the goods.

Your dear one is with me, and is all right and sends his salaam. He says there is no need of sending any one to him. He is experiencing no difficulty. They have reached here along with Yakub Khan. Convey my salaams to Burhe

Mian. We are worried about his ailment. God may bless him with good health. Any service for me?

Wassalam.
Apka Karinda
IBRAHIM

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-40

Translation of an Urdu letter from Hassan Joo (Major Asghar Ali of Pakistan) addressed to Mehraj-ud-Din.

Dear Mehrajuddin Sahib,

Salaam. Received your letter of welfare which was accompanied by another letter. Both the letters were read carefully. We were discussing the same topic and it was a good coincidence. I will shortly send a brief of all the happenings to the rear or will carry myself as time has come when work should be done in a better way. Perhaps a full decision may be taken about it within two or three weeks, God willing great care will be taken of your brother. I have explained to the local officials. The way you are voluntarily working honestly and efficiently is very well-known. The second is his letter. When you get time, it may be sent to him.

Yours
HASSAN JOO

NOTE : Portion within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-41

Translation of an Urdu letter addressed to Azad Sahib (Mehrajuddin) written by Ibrahim (Pak. IB Officer at Hillan).

Dear Azad Sahib,

Salaam. I am sending a letter in the name of Mehar Chand (Pir Maqbool Gilani). The word MALECHON in it denotes Indian Army and Sher Khan implies Pakistan Govt. ITTEHAD GROUP (The United Front) should essentially incorporate in its programme that the alien armies should quit. The Pakistan Government will not be found lacking in getting your wishes complied with, keeping in mind the free and fair plebiscite. As you have stated that the carrying of machine is difficult rather impossible, in this case the machine may be kept at our advance headquarters. The documents which are required to be prepared and the quantity needed would be sent to you duly printed according to your requirements on receiving the

manuscripts at our headquarters. In that case, it would be more convenient to all the parties. On receipt of your reply, we will arrange for the stationery at our advance headquarters. With this proposal the snake would be killed and the stick would be saved. Keep me informed about your welfare and the current affairs. When you start writing letters do not address to Malik Sahib or Shah Sahib but should write without referring to any title, rank or name so that it should not disclose the identity of the addressee. At the most you may mention Ibrahim.

Apka Mukhlis
IBRAHIM

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-42

Translation of an Urdu letter addressed to Azad (Mehrajuddin) written by Karamat Hussain Shah (of Pakistan IB).

Dear Azad,

Live Long.

Aslamalekam. Your kind letter apprised me of the situation. I was glad to find you safe and sound. We are always mindful of the health of your people. We pray to God that He may protect you from the evil. We are pleased to have your noble advice. There is no question of any displeasure. It had already been enquired from you and Bihari Sahib (Sanaullah Shah of Tangmarg) about the route via which this thing could be sent conveniently. Today responsibility having been taken by Bihari Sahib this thing I am sending through him. Inform Lala Mehar Chand (Pir Maqbool Gilani) that by the grace of God his articles would reach Behari Sahib within two or three days. He should acknowledge receipt of the safe arrival of the goods, after having received from him, so that I may be satisfied. It is hoped that Bare Mian might have started to meet Lala Sahib. He has undergone a lot of suffering, which we realise. It is prayed that God may bless him with reward.

I am sending two envelopes per hand of the bearer which have been received just now. Both of these are to be delivered urgently to Lala Sahib. In the typed envelope, the word "Mohd Hussain" denotes Aftab Ahmad Khan (of Pak. Foreign Service), and "Jai Muqaddma" means New York. This should be explained to Lala Sahib by you verbally so that he may not experience any difficulty in understanding the subject-matter of the letter. The acknowledgement receipt of these two letters be got from Lala Sahib and sent to us. We duly realise your feelings of devotion and hard work. You should never feel that we can ever be displeased with a person like you.

You should always pray that God may grace us with success in the attainment of our virtuous goal.
Wassalam.

Apka,
KARAMAT HUSSAIN SHAH

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-44

Translation of an Urdu letter addressed to Azad written by Karamat Hussain Shah dated 16.9.54.

Dear Azad,

Live Long—Aslamalekam. Before this a letter has been written to you. It is hoped that you have received the same. I have also received the letters sent by you. I am waiting for your man. When he meets, these letters along with other detailed affairs will be duly communicated to the "Bari Sarkar" (at Rawalpindi) specially. By the grace of God, the work would be speeded up over here also. The rest I would narrate on meeting. Your work would be done soon, rest assured.
Wassalam.

KARAMAT HUSSAIN SHAH
16.9.54

N.B.: I would meet the man sent by you at the venue fixed by you. The duty of conveying the goods meant for whosoever, which are lying with me, would also be on your man.

EXHIBIT P-45

Translation of an Urdu letter written by Hassan (Major Asghar Ali of Pak.) addressed to M.A. Sahib (Mehrajuddin).

Dear M.A. Sahib,

Greetings. Received your letter of welfare. Thanks. Had a talk with the bearer of this letter. Really full cooperation is needed in this matter about which discussions can be held in a meeting only. Whenever you come, arrangements can be made.

Apka,
HASSAN

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-46

Translation of an Urdu letter written by Karinda Ibrahim (Karamat Hussain Shah of Pak. IB) addressed to Azad Sahib (Mehrajuddin).

Dear Azad Sahib,

Aslamalekam. How do you do? A letter addressed to you by Ibrahim Ji, along with a closed cover for Lala Mehar Chand (Pir Maqbool Gilani) is sent to you. Letter for Lala Ji be delivered to him. Regarding the machine (cyclostyle machine) about which Ibrahim Ji (Khan Md. Khan of Pak IB) has written to you, it has all reached Bihari Sahib (Sanaullah of Tangmarg). From there, it is hoped, these must have reached Lala Mehar Chand. Now, therefore, the question regarding acting upon his proposals does not arise. Nevertheless, we should be informed by return whether or not the machine has been received, so that we may be satisfied. Your brother has come to me today. He is all right. He has been given an encouragement. By the grace of God, your work will also be done. I will personally meet Ibrahim Ji within a few days and remind him that he should get his work immediately done. Other affairs the bearer will narrate verbally. Please keep us informed about your health. It is prayed that God may keep you protected.

Wassalam.

Apka Karinda,
IBRAHIM

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-80

Copy of an English typed letter addressed to "My Dear Brother" (Afzal Beg).

My dear Brother,

You may be desirous that I should give you an appreciation of the present political situation here. Khalil (Masoodi) may have already sent you a letter which may have reached you. If not, the bearer will produce a copy. The letter appears to me to be a pessimistic picture and its enclosure is too lengthy to be impressive. He gave out the letter as ours. It is not. We had our own. Copy is herewith per bearer. He may come over here after some time. He will be welcome but if he implements the idea of his pet child "Democratic Front" it may, despite our best intentions to the contrary, create inharmony between two Fronts. I talked to Shri Gandarbal all about it when he was here. He told me that Plebiscite Front was too narrow to admit others into it and a new organisation was needed to allow unfettered action in the larger interest of the country. I told him that PL. FR was broader enough to cover all activity. His main theme was that the country needed the release of its leader first to give it a bold lead and to pull it out of the swamp it had sunk into. I think that PL. FR is paying good dividend and I am personally for it.

One important factor has cropped up which requires close, careful and anxious consideration and thought. Need we change our approach in this new context? Constitution will be completed as early as the Ruling clique wish and elections in Kashmir may be held simultaneously with Indian elections. What should our attitude be? We cannot fight these elections in vicious circumstances. The Ruling clique have so far manipulated all elections to their favour. In such circumstances, we cannot be sure of result if we fight these elections. But if we do not fight the same, the result will be obvious and we shall be chained to the devil for five years to come.

The situation will altogether be different if leaders will be released sufficiently in advance of time but if they are released at the eleventh hour they cannot deliver goods and a pernicious effect will follow inasmuch as the world will be made to believe that we have no following, since we failed to register a victory despite the leader's release. Thus we are on the horns of a dilemma. Is there any escape? We may align ourselves with other parties. But we cannot be sure which parties and with what colour will crop up. Moreover, ours is the biggest following. It appears to me to be out of proportion for such a party to seek alignment. Some way is to be thought out. May we ask for your guidance in this regard?

Another factor is causing us grave concern. The Assembly may meet soon. What should be the attitude of the opposition? If I am correct, you had in mind a kind of loose federation with four units linked to a not strong centre. Will opposition follow the same policy or fight their case as per conditions that may arise? But their cry will be in wilderness. Should they boycott the Assembly? What is your guidance in this behalf.

As regards Delhi and its attitude, there exist various points of view on the subject. These can easily be imagined and need not be discussed here. Although Khalil's letter is a partial representation of prevailing facts but his views on your release need be taken into consideration. Let us pose this question afresh what Delhi's attitude will be with regard to your release. It will naturally want that you toe its line which if you do not do they may keep you where you are to avoid further complications. In some quarters it is believed that Nehru's latest pronouncement is neither an election stunt nor a result of frustration. He made the statement just on return from Delhi of foreign diplomats who may have struck a bargain with him on Kashmir and emboldened him to make the statement which clearly means that he wants to sit tight in his saddle. Most of us do not agree with this point of view. I feel for myself that he is a shrewd strategist. He wants to strike a favourable bargain for himself while making the final settlement. Election campaign cannot also be ruled out. Another factor is also to be taken into consideration. He has aligned himself with Leftist bloc which commands more than half the population of the world. Just as West wants Kashmir as a spring board, East may want it for similar purpose and East's support to Nehru may give him a point of vantage. Against this, the other side (West) is strong and but for their own reasons and trading concern would have thrust a solution on the problem long ago. Add to it, communism is a red rag to them and they will favour a solution against India. What effect these diverse pulls will have on Sheikh Sahib's release? I think favourable; more so, because he cannot

indefinitely be detained. Thus I am of the opinion that our present stand pays a good dividend and we must stick to it. Moreover, fundamentals are to be fought and sought for first. There are others among our sincere friends who do not look eye to eye with us in respect of PL. FR. Do please give a very careful thought to this subject and favour us with your views as to what we should do in such a complicated situation.

MMn (Begum Abdullah) and myself have received letters from Mr. Pakhar (Pakistan) wanting our assurances on the stand to the problem. These letters are herewith. Please tell him what you want to convey.

Chay (Maulana Masoodi) is doing its best to wean us off our present stand. It believes that Hen's (Mridula Sarabhai) stand is final and thus we strike our head against rock in opposing him. It may come over soon to add to my worries. But my attitude towards it will be as it has been so far considered.

Harassment of our workers continues unabated and a crusade is conducted against our enrolment of membership. At Kulangam, all the agencies of Government trapped a handful of our workers including Shahree and Hafiz, roughly beat them, kept them in lock-up and starved them for four days. They have now been released and a case registered against them. I am just consulting legal advice if we can register a case against police and judiciary. If advice may be favourable we shall do so.

Prices are shooting on from day to day. Life has become almost impossible for us to live. Imported grains are not palatable. Concentration of wealth in some hands and payments of hush money to a favoured few are making their effect felt by the average body of citizens.

I am definitely of opinion that time has come when we shall have openly to come out into the field. It should be planned and not of the nature of momentary effervescence. Some well-meaning persons strongly advise against it for obvious reason. They think that we should maintain the flicker as we do at present. However, we are meeting after some time to think over the matter. Personally I am for some bold action but I have to depend on the support of my colleagues whom I shall try to convert into my point of view.

Almost all my friends are back home now. They deem discretion better part of valour. Some do not see eye to eye with regard to our policy of the Plebiscite. They may be believing, honestly, first, in the leader's release and then in action.

My darling kid (Damsoz) got 15 illustrated child's tale books (money) but in boy's curiosity the child wants a library. MMn (Begum Abdullah) has 50 to 60 books to please the child. He is keeping good health.

Our idea is to raise a volunteer corps and have a Plebiscite youths as well. But the basic character of people stands in our way. Even then we shall try.

Bandhuji will leave for Delhi as soon as he may get a permit. We are meeting frequently.

My time is over-occupied. I feel very lonely but *He* is my consolation and succour. Let me humbly see *His* guidance—Indina Ya Rabba—Amen. General

(1) The pull in diverse directions at Delhi has affected our workers to some extent. They feel somewhat shy to come into open. Looked upon

objectively they may have reasons to do so. I talked to them individually and concluded that although their loyalty cannot be questioned but they are a little confused in thought. It may be due to honest differences. Some feel, leader's release should have come first; others prefer Fundamentals first; some are on Parole and thus cautious; some suffering from different ailments and so on. Even if they work unnoticed which they appear prepared to do, they will render a good service and relief both to the organisation and myself. One factor caused me concern. Team spirit was absent in them both at Delhi and Jammu. The worker at the base is sound, attached, devoted, honest and ready to do his duty. Of him I am very proud and really happy.

(2) Should Maulana (Masoodi) return, I shall do my best, within my light and limitations, to keep the clock going on steadily. If workers wish that he should lead us, I shall with humility bow to their decision and work where I may be asked to work. It is immaterial for me whether I am at top or bottom. But main effort, *Inshalla*, will be to see harmony is maintained.

(3) A sympathiser told me that I was not polite or tactful towards my workers, that there was some lack of clarity among them. What he told is exactly the propaganda that Political Conference carry on against us. On close and detached thinking I came to the conclusion that mostly his appreciation of the situation resulted more from arm-chair politics than from objectivity.

(4) Questions are often posed why a Deputation waited on Nehru; why top level, returning from outside, pull in different directions and did so also in Delhi and Jammu (Assembly); why have I been left alone; why so and so did not sign a document in Jammu when others did it? To me it appears that there may be existing adjustable differences but such questions are sure to arise in a big organisation like Ple.Front and those who call it complexity ignore psychology or talk from a safe distance. It appears that there is some undue fright existing in the mind of some and to cover this fright different pleas are put forward to avoid coming forward. Against this the base workers are bold and invariably visit me boldly and openly. How much proud I am of them and their sincerity—goodness alone knows. Darood on Prophet who said *Alfaqr Fakhre Wal Faqr Minee*.

I am convening meeting very shortly to talk frankly to the concerned upper few and to clear atmosphere. *Inshallah* I will succeed. We depend here more on your prayers than our efforts. Let Heavens grant these and lead us on, on the right path to steer our course clear of pitfalls—Amen.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- KHAWAJA ALI SHAH

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-83

Translation of an Urdu Letter dated 14.5.56 addressed to "Dear Brothers" by Nizam-ud-Din (Beg) dictated to Pir Abdul Ghani.

Dear Brothers, (Khawaja Ali Shah and others)

Aslamalekam. May God bless you. May the sacred Quran keep you safe.

Received letters from both of you. But it is not possible to write you separately, nor are there any special matters to discuss separately. I am therefore, writing a common reply. It is not a diversion. I am obliged to do it as a necessity. By accepting it I am given an opportunity of being grateful.

I went through both the letters carefully and after due consideration have reached the conclusion that most of the difficulties are transitory, which are to some extent the result of our own carelessness. The letter of "Janab Assa-dullah Sahib" (Sheikh Abdullah) to "Haider Sahib" (Hamdani) is a detailed one and is an appreciation and full commentary on all the problems confronting us. I also share the view that has been expressed therein. Besides, I would like to discuss some matters. This letter also will come to your notice, and I hope that it would serve as a beacon light for the concerned friends.

Moreover, I would like to discuss some matters, which need your personal and appropriate attention. So far as the question of Abdul Aziz Sahib's rejoining service is concerned, after careful consideration I prefer that the idea of rejoining service should for the present be given up. The Chabala Company (Bakshi Ghulam Md. and colleagues) wants to take such a man in service whom they could use as a tool towards the fulfilment of their own ends. As regards Aziz Sahib, not only will such a weapon be used with severity but in view of his attitude both before and after the 9th August, extreme efforts will be made that at the first instance he should be made ineffective from within and then misunderstanding would be created against him outside, so that whatever influence and popularity he may have gained by dint of his sacrifices is diminished and a general misunderstanding is created against him and, if possible, God forbid, no effort would be spared to degrade him. You should consider that Chabala Company has all the means at its disposal for the purpose and in their ill intentions they are not lacking. On the contrary the masses, being illiterate, fall an easy prey to such a criticism. To create such an atmosphere is an easy job for the Company. It is highly difficult for me to advise Aziz Sahib to join in such an atmosphere. Keep this also in view that others would use this particular case as an example of going in and doors would be opened for such examples. This would create discouraging and harmful conditions. It is better to give up the idea of rejoining. Of course resignation should not be submitted. Chabala may do whatever they themselves want to do and Aziz should continue to be on leave on medical grounds. In the circumstances, such an advice would tantamount to doing an enmity with him which is impossible for me. It can be argued that after joining he may be able to do something for the cause, but

my considered opinion is that "thieves are early risers" and the opponent would take timely preventive action against any such weak steps as Aziz Sahib may like to take for the attainment of his objective. So, after considering the pros and cons I have come to the conclusion that by his rejoining there are more chances of harm than of any good.

Now remains the question as to what Aziz Sahib would do by remaining out. If he is on parole then at the proper time he should cancel his further leave provided his health has improved. In case he is not on leave, (as I have come to know that the extension of his parole has been terminated this time) he should continue giving advice etc. as far as possible and leave the future to circumstances. My basic point of view should be before you that Aziz Sahib's previous sacrifices should not go waste.

I want to tell you explicitly that under all circumstances attention should be paid to the upbringing of the children of Aziz Sahib. I have often noticed that you are formal in this respect and are indebted to a great extent. Previously too, I had sent a message to Bhai Sahib (Ghulam Qadir Beg), and respected Assadullah Sahib also had invited the attention of Haider Sahib in this respect. Means are there and there is no question of formality. Everybody has confidence in you that you would take a proper and befitting decision in this regard. You should not unnecessarily be a victim of formality.

You have mentioned about the public gossips and criticism. I consider that it is due to our own carelessness. We discuss everything with all and sundry, and our secrecy is no better than the proverbial secrecy of "Khalil Khan". Only the next day all our matters are public. It has been written to Haider Sahib. This matter came up for discussion a number of times last year also and it was finally decided that important matters should be restricted to a selected few. It should not be overlooked that we are passing through abnormal and critical times and a little carelessness sometimes proves fatal. It is necessary that every friend keeps this in view and if at the centre this principle is adhered to strictly, most of the complications would not arise. Besides, the opponents set afloat one rumour or the other. The best remedy for this is that at the present time one should be to a great extent thick-skinned and should turn a deaf ear to such nonsense.

I regret that I could not agree with your views about Khalil Sahib (Masoodi). If nothing more is said, this is an acknowledged fact that he was in the opposite camp before the 9th of August. You would get a lot of evidence about this locally. He has betrayed his real self inadvertently in a letter which he wrote to Assadullah Sahib at the formation of the Plebiscite Front last year. He has hinted in that the founder of the Front was still adhering to the policy against India formulated previous to the 9th of August. You should imagine what it could mean. It is said that he might have reconsidered his point of view in regard to the Front. In this connection I want to tell you this much that such a presumption is fraught with danger and there are many good circumstances against this presumption. Since December, 1953, the PSP and their line of action was the same and the PSP has now come out openly into the arena. Besides, you should think over the proof given by you that all the friends who met them at Delhi have become less energetic in their views and hold the goal of the Front as incorrect. I can very well imagine the extent

to which such an expression of thoughts by such exalted friends can break the spirits. There is no need to have further discussions on the circumstances, nor is there any time.

Now remains the question of strategy and expediency. I want to make it clear to you that personally I am not against the principle of strategy. But before adopting this attitude, it is essential to consider its pros and cons *vis-a-vis* the parties. I fear that under the present circumstances in either case he would prevail. Locally he has greater influence over the workers and can plead the case more elaborately. Most of the people feel tired and would like to have respite. But even during this respite, his surreptitious logic would leave poisonous effects on their mental outlook of which consequences would, God forbid, be fatal. Some of the instances which came from Delhi are before you. Although there could be a valid reason for slowing down the pace (in connection with the expenses), but for that also here exists a remedy now. But the basic cause appears to be that an attempt has been made to influence their viewpoint. By bringing the person concerned to the spot and providing him means to facilitate his contacts with others, would increase the possibilities to expand its influence. After some time you would find yourself in quagmire and you can well visualise its consequences.

It is true that he wants to give a place to the right of self-determination in that huge organisation, but that place would be in an obscure corner, and it would meet the same fate which our goal has met with the PSP programme. After all at one stage they were also harping on plebiscite. I want to draw your attention to another fact. The Plebiscite Front would also be kept alive with the creation of a new organisation, which would work side by side. This is apparent from his advice as well. The higher circle of influence of both would be the same. But the people would essentially be divided, and it is quite probable that there may be a division at the top also. As the Front slogan is at a high pitch and as at places Meeruthism is spreading, people would naturally feel inclined more and more towards the new organisation. In such a race our friends would be losers, and by and by from an obscure corner the objective of self-determination would also be forgotten easily.

Now let us take one organisation instead of two. In that case you want to give the demand of self-determination a new status by bringing it on to the international plane. Keeping this as your objective (on paper only) you want to renew the present Government putting forth a new social programme. Its first effect would be that you will give a set-back to your sympathetic healthy element by giving a secondary place to the objective of the front, and your comparison with the party in power would then only be based on better administration in practice. I have very many doubts that you will be successful in this test among the people of ordinary intelligence, especially when the Chabala Company would exploit the situation saying that they were gradually going back from plebiscite. To achieve this end, they have got numerous resources at their disposal. Even in Pakhri Pura (Pakistan), where some ground has been gained with great difficulty, this new step would adversely affect it. There is grave apprehension that in this race also you would be creating a misunderstanding in the public, and a valuable achievement (public support and voluntary cooperation which is available to you at the moment) will be badly hit. As has been written by Assadullah Sahib, the Front programme also includes

civil liberties, the present Government's maladministration etc. Therefore, its reorientation is out of place and replete with danger. Moreover, it is my firm conviction that even if you explain it a thousand times as a call for strengthening the programme the people who have reposed confidence in you would not have it in you.

There is another question regarding the forthcoming elections. It has already been discussed in detail by Assadullah Sahib in his letter. You must have noticed that for some months the Indian newspapers have been pointing out that only those political parties should participate in the elections which owe allegiance to the Central Constitution. This constitutional allegiance, in other words, means endorsing the irrevocability of the relationship of the State with India. In obedience to the Constitution the contesting parties could undertake any economic programme. Any colour may be given to it outwardly but the intelligentsia would definitely say that loyalty should be admitted. For the Front, such a declaration would, on the one hand, be tantamount to washing its hands of its goal and on the other it would result in a complete alienation of public sympathies and cooperation. If for the election purposes the PF relaxes its objective, its harmful effects would be the same as have been discussed above. Before adopting any "strategy" you should rest assured "that thieves are early risers" and that the opponents would never allow the people having dubious loyalty to progress at all even if they may have to adopt any measures to this end. You must be remembering that at the time of partition of India, the judges of the High Court and the members of the Boundary Commission sacrificed their fairness and impartiality on the altar of communalism. Today, the problem is in no way less important. On the one hand the Congress organisation and the existence of its leadership would be in danger and on the other the claim of justice. The latter claim would easily be sacrificed. For sake of argument, I am prepared to admit that they would purposely give you four or five seats so that they could propagate by beat of drums and tell the world that the masses have rejected your stand by a vast majority. Be sure that they would not leave any stone unturned to achieve this end. It would be suicidal to undertake such a dangerous step. Supposing that they allow you to cross the stage in the election field (which is impossible as I see it) what type of Government do you visualise and would Bharat allow it to march even a step ahead both in political and economic field unless they have got endorsed all steps taken till then? If you endorse it, it would be your end and in case you do not even then it would mean annihilation.

Some of the above-mentioned reasons also apply to our Assembly members on the question of their participating in the coming session of the Assembly. You should see the proposal which has been sent to Haider Sahib. That statement and the letter of Assadullah Sahib clarify our position on the subject. To write more is unnecessary.

Most of the above-mentioned problems are discussed in the letter of Janab Assadullah Sahib. I have tried to understand them from another angle, but the result is the same. I know that the problems on which I am expressing my views today must be in your mind, but all the same I want to put this before you friends again so that my point of view also should be before you,

while you are facing with any problem.

At places an opinion has been expressed that Beg Sahib has committed a mistake by raising the plebiscite slogan. I beg your pardon if I put his point of view before you as I understand it. I would in no case be pleading his case. But, God forbid, even if I claim so, I feel that like the client of *Shirji Bachera*, they would certainly tell the court that the accused wants to argue himself. I had the chance of meeting him five or six times and I am simply repeating his point of view before you.

When Beg Sahib was released from jail, he had two objectives before him. Firstly, that the nation should be given a clear lead in the face of the present political problems, and secondly, to give a reply to the virulent propaganda and the innumerable nonsenses levelled against the front-line workers after the 9th of August throughout the State. Beg Sahib did not jump into the field immediately after his release. He knew that the public resisted the extreme opposition and the bloody drama enacted after the 9th of August in such a manner as had no parallel in the history. But it could have been a momentary phase. Beg Sahib, therefore, contacted the intelligentsia from all corners of the State and found those feelings quite deep in their minds. Side by side, he tried to ascertain from all the elements from Delhi to Srinagar to see whether there could be any honourable solution of the problem which could be acceptable to the masses. But in this connection at every stage he felt that India was not easily agreeable to arrive at any just or honourable solution and that it would certainly make an offer of running administration, but on the line of the Chabala Company (Bakshi Government). But there is no possibility on our side to accept such a position. Beg Sahib accordingly collected the splinters of the boat torn as under in the storm of the 9th August, and after having reassembled the same and giving it a new shape, moved it in a direction. The nation was thirsty about it. The need of the time and the demand of the principles was that after interpreting the sentiments of the masses correctly, they should be put on the path in an organised manner. Thank God they got on to it. The boat is in the right direction and it does not matter if its speed is slow. You yourself are seeing the results of this step. Both the main parties to the dispute admit the existence and importance of this organisation, although one of them is expressing this in utter consternation. I am sure it would bring forth results even on the international level. I am feeling the lead of God in this timely slogan. Friends who feel that oppression has increased on the nation as a result of this organisation, I beg to differ from them with due respect.

I see a great difference in the present and the oppression prevalent before the release of Beg Sahib. If a nation has to undergo hardships, why it should not undergo the same for the sake of a lofty ideal, so that it may get the reward of its sacrifices for the nation. I feel that this organisation is making its headway in the face of all hardships, and would surely succeed. Secondly, I would request the friends having different views this much that the only way out of the hurdles of the time was to forsake the party principles. May God save us from this. There is no *via media*.

So far as the virulent and baseless propaganda levelled by the persons who staged the drama of the 9th August is concerned, it was uprooted to such an extent during the release of Beg Sahib that not only the world admits but the

supporters of the Chabala Company from top to bottom also admit it, and feel that their propaganda was all false. They also admit it in a subdued tone that their action of the 9th August was wrong, and that the Chabala Company and their followers could not establish themselves in Kashmir nor there seemed any possibility of consolidating their position in the future in spite of spending huge amounts. In spite of treatment the disease spread. It was so ordained that the hunters of the 9th August got themselves stuck up in the quagmire and required help to pull themselves out.

I think the basic problems are the same as you have prominently brought out in your letters. Regarding the small matters, I write as under:

Bandhuji went to Delhi. He has got his own contacts there. If he gets an opportunity to express his views, it would go in our favour. It is true, as I have already mentioned that his test was not inside but outside. But he has his own difficulties as well, and we should take them into consideration.

Aziz Sahib had already taken them into consideration. It is not necessary to insist upon him to join the party, rather we should utilise him in our own way for publicity purposes. If he agrees to work wholeheartedly in secrecy for us as he has already promised, he can really be very useful. It is not essential that everyone (specially friends like him) should come to the forefront. Everyone can help in his own way.

You are correct in saying that it is rather difficult to work with sister (Hamsheera) (Mridula Sarabhai). I am sure that even Saqrat Sahib (K. Mubarak Shah) had succumbed to this superior influence and I sympathise with him. I feel that whatever he has done at Delhi was done by him under some influence there, though it was against his own wishes. The best course for him is to go in back immediately. Outside he could fall a prey to wrong advice every time. I am happy that you now agree with the advice given by Attiq Sahib Beg at Kud. It would be gratifying to see the maxim "Be old and learn" is kept in view.

They themselves should decide about the election problems of the small portion of Pakhar Pura (Pakistan). We are interested this much that administration should be just, healthy and impartial. Proposal about the Colonel is absolutely right. Arrangement of Lathe with Dr. Bullah, his associate or the horse thief, if undertaken, would be very beneficial. Attention should be paid to it.

Distribution of work is very essential. If two or three suitable persons are available, then the publicity work may be entrusted to them. There are such people in your ranks.

Regarding the two letters of Niazi Sahib (Khan Mohd Khan, Dy. S. P. Pak. IB) about which you may have mentioned, only one addressed to Assad Sahib (Sheikh Abdullah) was received which has since been replied. The letter addressed to Attiq Sahib was not received and the question of its reply does not arise. If possible Niazi Sahib be informed that it would be very useful if Assad Sahib was called from there in a regular way. I have already explained my arguments through my dear one. To go beyond the demand of right of self-determination is not only unnecessary but is harmful from all aspects. This has already been discussed many a time before and decision taken on it.

We have learnt that you have become very weak. May God grant you full health. The venerable elderly person is hale and hearty and remembers you all with blessings. I believe in his faith in God and He will repay his prayers. The rest of the friends also stick to their faith and have reserved their blessings for you at all the five prayers. So far as my prayers are concerned, I am reminded of a verse of Ghalib of which the second couplet says "I do not know what prayers are, I am conscious of my sins and inaction". But I see a ray of hope in the verse of Hazrat Saadi: "I have heard that on the day of resurrection the bad are forgiven along with the good ones by God". While looking on my own action, I am reminded of a verse from Hafiz: "Oh all benevolence! all my faults may be forgiven". We hope that God would wash away all our sins and weaknesses in his river of benevolence, and am sure of the success of the country and the nation, God willing!

How are the children? Convey our salaams in the house, Janab-e-Qibla (the Sheikh) and others convey their loving salaams.

Yours
NIZAM-UD-DIN
(Afzal Beg)
24.5.56.

NOTE: Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-96

Translation of an Urdu letter written by Sajawal (Pak. IB Officer) to Aqa-Dar Islam (Afzal Beg).

No sooner did your letter reach it was sent to Ibrahim Sahib (Khan Md. Khan, Pak. IB Officer at Rawalpindi), the reply for which has been received. For the present, I am not sending you the letter from Ibrahim Sahib. There were some important points in that letter, for which Ibrahim Sahib has asked you for the reply. Kindly send a detailed reply with explanations to queries which should be typed. It is very urgent.

1. What is the reaction to the declaration of the Prime Minister of Pakistan that the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan would be done with the consent of the Kashmiri people?

2. What is the reaction to the rumours regarding the proposed march of Razakars towards Occupied Kashmir, that is whether trenches were being dug and the strength of the Police and Military is being increased? What effect it has upon non-Muslim population? Is it a fact that they are evacuating towards India and there has been a fall in the prices of property, houses, etc?

Please confirm whether you have received through Khuda Bux the box of apples (cyclostyle machine). Instructions about its use have already been sent to you. Regarding penicillin, our special representatives must

have reached you for consultations. He would first meet you for advice. Penicillin is ready with us in abundance.

Sd/- SAJAWAL

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-169

Copy of a draft of a typed English Resolution corrected at places (by Sheikh Mohd Abdullah).

Resolution

The Central Committee of the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front met on the 7th of April, 1958 and considered the latest report of Dr. Graham and the reasons that have prompted the Government of India to reject all the recommendations contained therein. The Committee while appreciating the efforts of Dr. Graham to resolve this ten-year-old dispute strongly deprecate the intransigent attitude of the Government of India. Apart from her general objection that Dr. Graham's recommendations by-pass the preliminary question of implementing certain Resolutions of the Security Council, India has based her attitude on the belief that accepting the recommendations of the Report would have the effect of placing the aggressor and the aggressed on the same footing; would tend to condone Pakistan's actions and would give the impression that the part of Kashmir across the Cease-fire Line was not an integral part of Indian Union.

The Prime Minister of India in a recent press conference stated that the world must accept two basic points which he called "realities" before considering the Kashmir problem. According to him the first reality is that Pakistan has committed aggression and must vacate it. Secondly, that the Jammu and Kashmir State has acceded to India and, therefore, has become an integral and inseparable part of the Union of India.

The Central Committee has given its careful consideration to these arguments and feels constrained to state that they are devoid of any substance. India's attitude reminds the committee of that famous parable about the lion and the lamb. Since the beginning of the dispute the Indian Prime Minister has many times held discussions across the table with various Prime Ministers of Pakistan under the auspices of all representatives and others and it never struck him that such meetings would place the aggressor and the aggressed on equal footing. Therefore, to refuse a joint meeting of the two Prime Ministers on this ground now, is nothing but clear intransigence. Then again, the very question of aggression is under question. Everyone and more so the Prime Minister of India, fully know that the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession with India under duress. According to no less an authority than Mr. V.P. Menon, the then Secretary for States, Government of India, "The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir was accepted, subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State when the

law and order situation allowed." This clearly shows that unless a plebiscite on the question of accession of the State is held the State cannot be considered to have finally acceded to India nor can it become, till then, an integral and inseparable part of the Union of India. If Government of India bases her stand on the mere signatures of the Maharaja of Kashmir on the Instrument of Accession, one fails to understand as to what justification does she have in annexing Junagadh and Manawader despite the fact that the rulers of these States had duly signed the Instrument of Accession with the Government of Pakistan without any duress. Is it not a fact that under the partition scheme the two dominions had entered into an agreement not to consider the signatures of the ruler on the Instrument of Accession sufficient for the Accession of the State with either of the two dominions where the ruler happened to be of a different religion than the religion of the majority of his subjects unless his action was supported by the majority of the people of that State? If the accession of J and K with India is to be considered a reality than what is the dispute about?

In the opinion of the Committee the Jammu and Kashmir State has not yet acceded with either of the two dominions and therefore, the question of aggression by Pakistan on Indian territory is not a "reality" but only an excuse for India to maintain her forced occupation on a part of the State.

As for the plea that Pakistan has not implemented the earlier Resolutions of the Security Council the Committee feels that the only way to adjudicate on this charge was the one suggested by Mr. Jarring and now by Dr. Graham, the two representatives sent by the Security Council to this sub-continent for resolving the dispute. By persistently rejecting every effort by the Security Council or its representatives for a peaceful solution India has proved beyond any doubt that she does not want a pacific settlement of the dispute in accordance with her previous international commitments and the promises held to the people of Kashmir. Her entire attitude is based on the superiority of her armed strength against Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. The Committee strongly condemns this attitude of India and warns her of the grave consequences that this may lead to.

The Committee appeals to the Security Council to take effective measures and make India yield to reason, justice and fairplay towards the poor and helpless people of Kashmir. This can be achieved only if occupation forces of both India and Pakistan are replaced by United Nations' force and the verdict of the people of Kashmir regarding the final affiliation of the State recorded under the UN auspices.

The Committee also appeals to the conscience of the world to render all possible moral assistance to the people of Kashmir who are valiantly fighting to liberate themselves from the iron yoke of Indian Government and her quislings within the State.

EXHIBIT P-178

Translation of an Urdu letter dated 26.9.55 from "Khawaja" (SI Khawaja Tajdin of Pak. Intelligence) addressed to "Mohtrim Bhai Sahib" (Malik Ghulam Mustafa).

786

26.9.55.

Mohtrim Bhai Sahib,

Salaam Masnun. Everyday, the promise of tomorrow is not good. Your promise every moment of tomorrow is equal to years.

When this meeting is dangerous to some extent both for you and me, then the meeting is not at all necessary. When our purpose can be served by writing, there is no use putting us in danger. And further, it is requested that the effect which your writing can produce, your verbal message from my side cannot do so.

Diverting of that great personality this side by you and giving information about everything beforehand, was an important and extraordinary work, which is not un-known to anybody.

Now the War Council, Socialist Party etc., all the organisations under the advice of the SHER-E-KASHMIR have joined the Free Plebiscite Front under the leadership of BEG SAHIB and BEGUM SHER-E-KASHMIR, and committees have been established in every tehsil and district of the Kashmir valley. And this agitation is continuing with full vigour. And so far as I know, you are also an important leader of this party. Then what is the reason, why you do not take up your pen and write down all the details and inform me. It is going to be two months since I came here, but no information has been received from your side. Officers above are awaiting reports from you, and they make me hang my head in shame time and again. It is hoped that you might have met BEGUM SAHIBA and BEG SAHIB many a time and that you have played an important role in the present agitation. You should therefore give detailed report about everything, so that I may be able to send it above, because your useful reports are being awaited even by the CENTRE.

A newspaper on this side has given out a report that about eleven people of the Plebiscite Front have been arrested. How far is this correct? Kindly give details about all the affairs that who have been arrested so far and what action the BAKSHI-BHARAT Government is likely to take against you people.

When my letter can reach you easily and safely and yours to me, I hope that you will not disappoint me and that you will oblige me with a detailed report per bearer, so that the CENTRE may be informed early.

Awaiting your reply,

Apka Khadim,
KHAWAJA

P.S. If you refuse to give your writing, it is better that you bring detailed written report with you, which I will obtain from you at Sidhpura and return after meeting you there.

KHAWAJA

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-185

Translation of Urdu letter dated 5.11.55 from Hamid Khan to Malik Sahib (Ghulam Mustafa).

Respected Malik Sahib,

Aslamalekam. Eager to meet.

I had come to see you. As you were not present I left disappointed. This will serve as a proof of my visit and your absence. I am glad to hear this that the blood in your veins has started circulation and I wish the same with your heart. Khawaja Sahib has informed me about your demand of sending some highly responsible persons for this purpose. The question of big or small does not arise. It is a common cause and the whole nation is on its back. Khawaja Sahib, being nearer, is doing this job of sending messages. Whatever is done by him, has got full support from authorities above. You should fully cooperate with him. Honest and sincere efforts are always rewarded by God. You have still to climb more heights in order to accelerate the progress of the work. By the grace of God I can reach wherever you would require me.

Rest later if God willing.

Yours sincerely,
ABDUL HAMID
5.11.55.

EXHIBIT P-197

Translation of an Urdu letter from Niazi (Pak. IB Officer) to Mohtrama (Begam Abdullah).

Mohtrama live long.

Aslamalekam. I am sending to you Malik Sahib who is a man of my own reliance. After consultations with Sher-e-Kashmir and other friends, you should decide whether this man should carry mail to and fro and should bring to you money and other necessities for the organisation. If you are not prepared to undertake this responsibility, the above-mentioned person should be requested on our behalf to depute some other person for this purpose. His specimen signatures, photograph and the manner in which money is to be remitted to you, please furnish details. This should be in the writing

of Mirza Sahib or Khwaja Ali Shah. It would be better if it is in the hand of Sher-e-Kashmir himself.

Yours sincerely,
NIAZI

EXHIBIT P-201

Translation of a receipt in Urdu for Rs. 10,000/-.

Through this document,
received Rs. 10,000/- from Malik.

Only

Yours HAMSHIRA (Begum Abdullah)

EXHIBIT P-202

Translation of an Urdu letter from Niazi (Pak. IB Officer to Mohtrama Hamshira Sahiba (Begum Abdullah).

Respected Sister,

Salutations. I have received a receipt for Rs. 10,000/- from you but no letter. Kindly inform me about the things in detail. I had sent a letter to respected brother through another source, and its reply is also anxiously awaited. I am enclosing herewith a copy of this letter and hope for an early reply. A sum of Rs. 25,000/- has been sent through Maulavi Sahib (Ghulam Mustafa) and hope it will reach you along with this letter. I should be informed about other necessities. Compliments to all.

Yours brotherly,
NIAZI

EXHIBIT P-203

Translation of a receipt in Urdu for Rs. 20,000/-.

Through this document,
received Rs. 20,000/- through Maulavi Sahib.

Your sister (Begum Abdullah)
10.10.57

EXHIBIT P-206

Translation of an Urdu letter from Niazi (Pak IB Officer) to Maulavi Sahib (Ghulam Mustafa).

My dear Maulvi Sahib,

Aslamalekam. Received your letter and was satisfied to know the contents. May God keep up your health and courage. You may be knowing that the money is badly needed there in the present circumstances. Therefore, I am sending a sum of Rs. 15,000/-. Please arrange its delivery immediately and also verify about the previous five thousand rupees. According to the information received from Hamsheera Sahiba and already conveyed to you by me, this amount has not reached her. So, this may be verified from Hamsheera Sahiba (Begum Abdullah) or Bhai Sahib (Sheikh Abdullah). A receipt for this sum of Rs. 15,000/- rather a total of Rs. 20,000/- is to be got and sent. Furnish details of whatever Khizer Sahib told you so that it should be easy to reach at any conclusion on this basis.

It is essential to give a practical proof by making further efforts. I have already informed Padosi Sahib about it in detail. Do help him in this matter as far as possible and oblige. I am sending you two pieces of Karakuli but regret that these are not as good as I wanted to send. Besides, these are costly although of an average quality. I have been able to get good envelopes which are also being sent. The money with me has finished and besides this it is close of the financial year. Our friends, as already mentioned by me, may be needing money now-a-days and they must be provided with it early. So, this time you may make use of the advance to meet the expenses and you will get the money when received. The exigency of the time demands that the money should reach the destination soon. Therefore, there should be no further delay. Send their reply soon after the compliance. Also consult them if they can arrange to collect money from you and from any place in your vicinity, they may be paid their second instalment there through you, so that the work should not suffer on account of the shortage of money.

I have not received a letter of welfare from Bahanji for a long time. As already reported, she sent me only a short note which has caused anxiety to me. She may be requested to write about herself in detail and also let me know her requirements.

Yours sincerely,
NIAZI
April, 1958

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names and dates.

EXHIBIT P-207

Translation of a Chit in Urdu from Hamsheera.

Respected Maulavi Sahib,

Aslamalekam, Rehmat-Ullah.

I shall be grateful if the bearer is handed over the Amanat (money).

Yours
HAMSHEERA

EXHIBIT P-208

Translation of a receipt in Urdu for twenty dozen eggs dated 1.5.58.

Received twenty dozen eggs (twenty thousand rupees) three less. These three eggs were broken in transit.

Thanks

1.5.58.

Yours Sincerely,
ALIF DAL

EXHIBIT P-210

Translation of an Urdu receipt for five dozen eggs.

Received five dozen eggs (Five thousand rupees).
Thanks.

ALIF DAL

NOTE : Portion within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-212

Translation of Urdu letter from Niazi (Pak. IB Officer).

My dear

Aslamalekam.

Begum Sahiba should engage a leading lawyer after it has been decided that Sher-e-Kashmir is to be tried in the open court. The expenses might have gone up in this way. Therefore, it has been decided that irrespective of other things the sum of Rs. 20,000, which is lying with you may be handed over to Begum Sahiba. Hope you will act accordingly and oblige us with a reply about the receipt of money by Begum Sahiba and other details.

Yours sincerely,
NIAZI

EXHIBIT P-214

Translation of Urdu letter from K.M. Khan Mohammad, Pak. IB Officer to Area Officer R.I. Hillan.

Area Officer Sahib Hillan,

Your expenses have outweighed your work for the last two or three months. It is necessary to control them. Action should be taken on the decisions arrived at verbally, provided he sticks to his activities. The proposal you had forwarded cannot bring any effective results. The better and right course is to destroy the records. Hope you have made detailed enquiries from Jahan-gir Sahib. Send us a detailed report about this within a month. Also he may be asked to report on the following :

(1) Details about the routes and the roads where Revolutionary Party of Workers (Iftah Ki Takhribi Party) can easily approach and the targets which can be allotted to them ;

(2) List of suitable targets ;

(3) Separate lists of Military stores, markets, residential quarters of Army Regiments with the details about their access and the arrangements made for their security ;

(4) Details about the mills, factories and their size and kind and the arrangements made for their security ;

(5) List of those persons who can provide shelter to our men at the time of need and are willing to do work, their complete address and how they can be approached.

(6) A set of Guides will have to be provided to guide the parties engaged in the destructive work ;

(7) They should be further instructed with regard to destructive activities. You yourself also do alarming activities on the Jammu and Kashmir road where the tourists stay *en route* or assemble during day or night so that they are disgusted and on their return they propagate against the lawlessness and disorder prevailing in the State.

Sd/- in English
23.5.57

EXHIBIT P-257

Translation of an Urdu receipt without date written by A.D.

Received ten thousand two hundred books (money). Thanks. Some of our persons, will come in the near future to meet you. Kindly act fully on what he says. It is stressed. About the remaining affairs, that person will tell you.

A. D. (Begum Abdullah)

(This money was proved to have been received from the Pak. High Commission through Syed Md. Shah).

NOTE : Portions within brackets added to indicate code names.

EXHIBIT P-SH/3
11.1.60

Translation of an Urdu FIR.

First Information Report

First Information regarding a cognizable offence u/s 154 Cr. P.C. Police Station, Sadar Srinagar, District Srinagar.

FIR 25 of year 1958

Date and place of occurrence of the offence.	21.2.58
Date and time of receipt of complaint.	21.2.58 at 1930 hours
Name of complainant or Informant with parentage, caste and residence.	State through Pir Saifud-Din Makhd
Offence with the section of law violated.	307, 399, 335, 148/149, 336, 332, 452, 120B.
Details of stolen property.	R.P.C.
Place of occurrence and distance and direction from Police Station.	Raj Bagh at Hazratbal 6 miles towards North-east.
Name of the accused with residence.	As given in body
Action taken regarding investigation and reason for not registering the case.	

Sir,

The subject of complaint is this :

That at this time, constable Pushkar Nath rc 855 of Hazratbal has personally presented at the Police Station, the following written report about the case mentioned above and being the orders of the SHO the subject of the report is as follow:

To

The Supdt. Police,
Srinagar.

Sir,

Today on the occasion of "Mehraj-ul-Nabi" Friday, after saying the Friday prayers and the pilgrimage, I went to Raj Bagh, Hazratbal where the meeting of the workers of the National Conference, as usual, was to be held. At Hazratbal before the Friday prayers, Sheikh Mohd Abdullah recited ayats

and delivered a lecture. In that connection Sheikh Mohd Abdullah had already got collected his own organisation at Hazratbal in the form of volunteers. As a matter of fact, the important leaders of the Plebiscite Front and the Political Conference had already been called on the Friday evening. The workers of the Political Conference wearing the badges of "Awami Khidmatgar" on their arms, were present there. The volunteers of these two parties moved about and worked together. After the Friday prayers, the workers of the National Conference as usual, got collected at Raj Bagh, Hazratbal. Loud speaker was fitted and the meeting of our workers was in progress. In the meanwhile, a big tumultuous mob appeared from the side of the shrine raising the slogans "Nara-e-Taqbir—Allah-hoo-Akbar, Sher-e-Kashmir Zindabad, Plebiscite Front Zindabad, We shall decide the fate of this country, Death to Bakshi Cabinet, Death to the traitors of the Nation, Kill the workers of the National Conference", and entered Raj Bagh. This, big mob was led by the workers of the Plebiscite Front and the Political Conference. This mob was armed with lathies, sticks and knives and stones. Sooner the mob arrived, they started pelting stones and attacked the workers of the National Conference. They injured men seriously by using lathies, sticks, knives and beating and robbed them of their blankets, caps, coats, shoes, watches, etc. by force. Accordingly, in addition to the other injured persons, Mehraj Din Bandey r/o Gidhar Para was stabbed with a knife and his intestines came out. The names of other injured persons are as follows:

1. Ghulam Qadar Khan r/o Maharaj Bazar (2) Mohd Shaban Matoo, r/o Nawa Kadal (3) Sham Lal Kaul r/o Zajoon (4) Gulzar Khan r/o Maharaj Bazar, (5) Mohd Yousif Qadri r/o Rana Bazar, Srinagar. In addition to these many more people were also injured. The loud speaker which I had installed was taken away by them. The jeep belonging to the National Conference was burnt. Besides this many vehicles belonging to the National Conference were damaged. The mob was led by Soofi Mohd Akbar r/o Soepur, Ghulam Mohd. Chicken, Ex-Director, Food Control, Ghulam Mohd Butt Reda r/o Basant Bagh, Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Hamdani, Ghulam Qadar Butt r/o Baboosi Pura, Gandarbal, Ghulam Rasool Para r/o Bata Malina, Hissan Din Bandey s/o Nur Din r/o Hazratbal and other ring leaders of the Plebiscite Front and Political Conference. The names of other rioters are as follows :

(1) Ali Mohd Butt Reda s/o Haji Passa Joo r/o Basant Bagh (2) Maqbool Mir, Ex-Police Constable r/o Barabal (3) Sheikh Ghulam Mohd Tandu Sheikh r/o Batamalina (4) Abdullah Paul r/o Bichru Badga (5) Azim Khoji r/o Hazratbal (6) Guila Shakhsar r/o Hazratbal (7) Ahad Lone employee of the Plebiscite Front r/o Khanyar (8) Hassan Billo, Peon, Plebiscite Front, (9) Saeed worker Plebiscite Front r/o Barapul (10) Nura Dar Mainganoe r/o Rainawari (11) Abdul Salam Tarnab r/o Chalpon Kucher (12) Gulam Rasool Tarnab r/o Shamashwari (13) Gulam Ahmed Shah r/o Raiwana (14) Ghulam Hassan Kanth, relative of Khwaja Ali-Shah r/o Sona Majis (15) Ghafoor Gujri r/o Karala Khud, (16) Ghulam Nabi Khial, employee Radio Kashmir Srinagar r/o Maul, (17) Abdul Hamid Maulvi Pleader of Shopian (18) Aziz Punjabi r/o Pather Masjid (19) Ghafar Gujri r/o Dardal PS Maharaji Ganj (20) Ghulam Ahmed Shehri r/o Gand Jahangir, Soepur, a worker of Plebiscite Front (21) Ali Mohd Naik, a worker of Plebiscite Front

r/o Taral (22) Khaliq Najar r/o Basant Bagh (23) Ali Bazaz r/o Karala Khud (24) Aziz Guru r/o Qara Nali Mohalla (25) Ghulam Qadar Refugee r/o Matan (26) Hasur Frango, Kushu Bagh (27) Khaliq Bakto, Kushibagh (28) Saraj r/o Anantnag (29) Pir Maqbool r/o Balgam (30) Ghulam Rasool Taghi-ami r/o Giah Bal (31) Hala Wani r/o Malik Sahib, Srinagar (32) Ghulam Qadar r/o Rari Masjid (33) Ali Bulbul r/o Jama Latah (34) Ghulam Hassan Zarga r/o Yandan (35) Mir Mohd Yousif Makhoodmi worker Plebiscite Front Lohia (36) Jala Zilu r/o Pather Masjid (37) Ghulam Nabi Surma r/o Wara Pura (38) Khaliq Nath r/o Raidwani (39) Abdul Gani Butt Chacha relative of Gila Butt r/o Barkar Shah (40) Saeed Shah s/o Nur Shah r/o Bata Malina (41) Ghulam Mohi-u-Din Soofi s/o Khaliq Soofi r/o Dasahma Gandarb (42) Mohd Khalil, Shopkeeper r/o Bandi Pura (43) Qadar Dand Soofi Haman, Sopore (44) Abdul Rashid Butt r/o Wakora (45) Mohi-ud-Din Rangrez r/o Kolgam (46) Aslam Dar r/o Malik Zangir (47) Ghulam Mohd Thagu r/o Ranail (48) Ghul Qadar Badroo r/o Baramulla (49) Mir Hafiz Ullah, worker Political Conference, a relative of Mir Ahmed Shah, retired Inspector of Police, etc.

In addition to these, the whereabouts of Haji Abdul Hamid r/o Safa Kadal, Guli Mohd Butt, r/o Haftmadu Bal Srinagar, Abdul Salam Butt r/o Malik Pura, Ghulam Ahmed Noon r/o Miran Kadal, the workers of National Conference, are still unknown. After the Raja Bagh, Hazratbal happenings, a group from this mob under the leadership of Ghulam Rasool Qara r/o Bata Malina and Hajam Din Nandsa r/o Hazratbal entered the Auqaf building where members of the Auqaf etc. were collected. The windows and doors were broken and a few persons were injured. In addition to the persons noted in the report many other volunteers of the Plebiscite Front and Political Conference who indulged in plundering and killing can be recognised. During the beating, the plunderers snatched away watches, blankets, shoes, coats, etc. of our workers and caused a damage to the tune of thousands of rupees to the property of Government and National Conference. Hence the application is presented for necessary action.

Dated :
Friday 21st Feb. 1958.

Sd/- MIR SAIFUDIN MAKHDOOMI
President Tehsil National
Conference, Srinagar

Officer I/C, P/S Sadar. He will register the case immediately and take up the investigation.

Sd/- S. P. SRINAGAR
Camp Hazratbal

From
Camp Hazratbal.
Moharir P/S Sadar.

The original report is sent by hand of Pushkar Nath FC 855. After preparing the F.I.R. u/s. 307, 398, 435, 148, 149, 336, 332, 452, 120B the number

of FIR should be intimated. I have taken up the investigation. The details will be noted in the case diary.

Dated 21.2.58.

Sd/- PT. SHRI KANTH S.H.O.
P/S Sadar Srinagar

According to the above order, the above FIR was prepared and one copy of the FIR and its number was intimated to the Special Staff and the SHO. As the case is of special nature, special report will be submitted separately.

Sd/- in English

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